

SOI: 1.1/TAS

DOI: 10.15863/TAS

Scopus ASJC: 1000

ISSN 2308-4944 (print)

ISSN 2409-0085 (online)

№ 01 (129) 2024

Teoretičeskaâ i prikladnaâ nauka

Theoretical & Applied Science



Philadelphia, USA

**Teoretičkaâ i prikladnaâ
nauka**

**Theoretical & Applied
Science**

01 (129)

2024

International Scientific Journal Theoretical & Applied Science

Founder: **International Academy of Theoretical & Applied Sciences**

Published since 2013 year. Issued Monthly.

International scientific journal «Theoretical & Applied Science», registered in France, and indexed more than 45 international scientific bases.

Editorial office: <http://T-Science.org> Phone: +777727-606-81

E-mail: T-Science@mail.ru

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h Index RISC = 1 (78)

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**International Scientific Journal
Theoretical & Applied Science**



ISJ Theoretical & Applied Science, 01 (129), 312.
Philadelphia, USA



The percentile in the SCIENCE INDEX ranking = 73
Процентиль в рейтинге SCIENCE INDEX = 73


Impact Factor ICV = 6.630

Impact Factor ISI = 0.829
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The percentage of rejected articles:



ISSN 2308-4944



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Impact Factor:

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PIF (India) = 1.940
IBI (India) = 4.260
OAJI (USA) = 0.350

SOI: [1.1/TAS](#) DOI: [10.15863/TAS](#)

International Scientific Journal Theoretical & Applied Science

p-ISSN: 2308-4944 (print) e-ISSN: 2409-0085 (online)

Year: 2024 Issue: 01 Volume: 129

Published: 01.01.2024 <http://T-Science.org>

Issue

Article



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WHAT PREVENTS YOU FROM TRUSTING THE NORTH CAUCASUS REGIONAL ELITES TO PERCEIVE PEOPLE FROM THE REPUBLICS OF THE TURBULENT REGION AS FELLOW CITIZENS AND NOT STRANGERS?

Abstract: *in the article, the authors analyze the causes of intolerance, religious extremism, terrorism, radicalism among youth, problems in interethnic relations. Factors of interethnic tension that have regional specificity, in contrast to continental Russia, are considered. Particular tension in interethnic relations is caused by territorial disputes, the solution of which, even in the legal field, carries the danger of interethnic split, especially in such multi-ethnic entities as the Republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Adygea, Chechnya and the southern regions of the Stavropol Territory. The authors believe that the reason for this situation in the southern regions of the Russian Federation is the unovercome consequences of the political and economic crisis in the North Caucasus.*

Key words: *extremism, radicalism, interethnic schism, North Caucasian republics, polyethnicity, outflow of the Russian population, identity, restoration of ethnic business, modernization, development of the regions of the North Caucasus Federal District, people's rights, migration problems, Russian Federation.*

Language: English

Citation: Kravtsova, F. G., Rumyanskaya, N. S., Blagorodov, A. A., Prokhorov, V. T., & Volkova, G. Yu. (2024). What prevents you from trusting the North Caucasus regional elites to perceive people from the republics of the turbulent region as fellow citizens and not strangers?. *ISJ Theoretical & Applied Science*, 01 (129), 101-116.

Soi: <http://s-o-i.org/1.1/TAS-01-129-7> **Doi:**  <https://dx.doi.org/10.15863/TAS.2024.01.129.7>

Scopus ASCC: 2000.

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Introduction

UDC 316.22:323.78.

Over the past few decades, the ethnic composition of the Caucasian republics that are part of the Russian Federation has undergone significant changes. Despite the fact that historically these lands were the territories of non-Slavic mountain peoples, during the USSR a course was set for the active development of the Caucasus, as a result of which a huge number of Russian specialists, along with their families, moved to the mountain republics.

After the collapse of the USSR, a period of mass migration of the Russian population from the Caucasus began, as a result of which there are

currently almost no Russians left in many Caucasian republics...

In order not to beat around the bush, I propose to immediately consider the statistics, which will clearly show us what a huge outflow of the Russian population from the Caucasus has occurred in recent decades.

Chechnya is obviously a record holder; the number of Russians in this republic has decreased by 16 times (!) over the past few decades. Military actions, ethnic cleansing, as well as the complete decline of the economy in the 90s led to mass emigration of the Russian population from Chechnya (Table 1).

Table 1. Change in the share of Russian population in the republics of the North Caucasus (1989-2020)

Republic	1989	2002	2010	2020
Adygea	71	68	65	64
Karachay-Cherkessia	45	42	34	32
Kabardino-Balkaria	35	32	25	23
North Ossetia	34	30	23	21
Dagestan	12	9.2	4.7	3.6
Chechnya	32	25	3.7	1.9
Ingushetia	13	13	1.2	0.8

But the fact is that we also see many other North Caucasian republics, where there was no war, but still there was a massive outflow of the Russian population. At the moment, these republics, for the most part, have become deeply mono-ethnic, as a result of which we can now observe a large number of problems that have worsened in these territories.

The main reason why Russians were in the Caucasus during the Soviet period can be called a certain "mission" for the development of this region, which the party set for itself. The Soviet political elite realized the importance of urbanization, development of production and improvement of the economic climate in the mountain republics. The indigenous population of the North Caucasian republics led an extremely traditional way of life, as a result of which there was a huge shortage of highly qualified personnel, as well as simply educated workers capable of working for the benefit of the region.

Therefore, Russian specialists were sent en masse to the Caucasus to help the local population with economic and social development. Tens of thousands of Russian engineers, architects, teachers and simply skilled laborers came to these republics and worked to develop local cities.

Now, when there is no government request to maintain economic and political stability in this region, the North Caucasus republics, as we can see, are experiencing many serious problems. The growing influence of local ethnocracies, incredible levels of

corruption and nepotism, the lack of functioning democratic institutions, as well as enormous economic backwardness combined with high levels of poverty - all this is happening in these territories.

And the main thing worth mentioning is, of course, the lack of implementation of Russian laws. Despite the fact that the North Caucasus republics are part of Russia and in fact are obliged to obey the federal laws in force in our country, sometimes one gets the feeling that these republics have some kind of their own legal norms. The creation of a de facto special legal field in the Caucasus, based on local traditions and religious values, is an extremely dangerous phenomenon, the consequences of which can be very disastrous for the whole of Russia.

Russian refugees from the Caucasian republics are a common thing. But now citizens are fleeing ethnic strife from the only Russian region of the North Caucasus Federal District - from Stavropol. Other Stavropol residents, on the contrary, write in open letters to the president that they will not go anywhere and demand "to stop the policy of squeezing out Russians." The topic began to leak onto federal TV - silence is no longer considered an indisputable panacea for interethnic tension.

On February 16, unregistered (free) Cossacks will hold a Great Cossack Circle in Vladikavkaz. The agenda of the congress can be summed up in one word - survival.

Cossacks without whips

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It is not surprising that the main spokesman for Russian discontent in the Stavropol region, as is generally the case in the south of Russia, is the Cossacks. It was the Cossacks who were appointed in the Russian Empire as the regulator of interethnic relations in the Caucasus.

“General Ermolov understood: the annexed people cannot be influenced by the army, they can only be influenced by another people, more organized. In 1864, the fate of the Caucasian War, which lasted a hundred years, was entrusted to the hands of the Cossacks, and already in 1867 it stopped, says Yuri Churekov, ataman of the Caucasian Cossack Line (KKL). – To be honest, some Cossacks may stoop to accepting a bribe from a Russian. But a hereditary Cossack will never accept a bribe from a Caucasian, under any circumstances.”

In the “dashing 90s”, due to the general chaos, the Cossacks of Stavropol regained some of their special pre-revolutionary powers and treated visitors as they wanted. It reached the point of blatant lawlessness: frisky boys used swords to chop up the goods of visiting traders on market stalls, tore their passports to shreds, and publicly flogged the guests themselves. By the 2000s, such amateur activities had faded away. State order has strengthened, but... with an overlap in the other direction.

“85% of the population of Stavropol are Russians. At the same time, the share of Russians in local security forces is 50% (20 years ago it was almost 100%). We can talk about purposeful discrimination against Russians based on ethnicity,” continues Ataman Churekov. – Most interethnic conflicts in the region are resolved by the state in favor of the guests, and it does not matter who the instigator was. They are punished especially severely for fighting with them, and they also add a sentence for inciting ethnic hatred. And the guests themselves are either released to go home, or (if the Russians begin to actively rally) imprisoned, so that after a while they can be sent to serve their sentence in their native republic, where they will soon be released.”

When asked to remember some high-profile incident, the ataman reacts emotionally: “What kind of incident do you want? A stabbing? Murder? Rape? Trade [weapons](#)? Kidnapping? Here it’s all like “hello.” One continuous case - every day in all points of the region. Tomorrow at half past eight in the morning we will hold a rally: the Cossacks are once again being tried for repelling the visiting thugs. When someone says that the Cossacks are patrolling together with the police, keep in mind: this is chatter. We are talking about registered - mummies - Cossacks who simply perform the function of witnesses. Three cops are coming - one Russian and two non-Russians, and with them two mummies, so that at least the appearance of national equality is respected. In personal conversations, police chiefs tell us: guests have problems with integration into our legal field,

and if they are punished, then eight out of ten guests will have to be punished, but we cannot do that. Traffic cops are generally afraid to slow down violating guests - they immediately wave their weapons: “Which particular barrel do you want a fine from?”

Another claim of Stavropol residents to their neighbors is economic. Using the power resource, visitors buy land and all kinds of businesses in the region. They pay taxes in bad faith and do not leave the proceeds in the region. “I’m not offended by my neighbors. They behave as their owners allow them,” comments Stavropol resident Sergei Popov, coordinator of the public movement “Russian Unity of the Caucasus.” – Stavropol has been assigned the role of a donor for the ailing economy of the North Caucasus republics. Our region supplies them with electricity cheaper than the Stavropol residents themselves. The conditions for doing business also turn out to be more favorable for guests (and if a Russian opens a company in Chechnya, it will last for a week and a half). Plenipotentiary Representative A. Khloponin is interested in the outflow of the Russian population from the region. The logic is simple: let the North Caucasians come here, not to Moscow.”

It was social activists, and not officials or deputies, who for two years sought the inclusion of Stavropol in the target program “South of Russia”, in which all the North Caucasus republics, as well as Kalmykia and Adygea, participate. This is an urgent need for the Stavropol region, since there are no serious investors willing to invest in the region’s economy (and no wonder: they shoot here). Khloponin finally promised to include the region in the program, but social activists are in no hurry to celebrate the victory: the conditions for participation are not clear. The desire of the plenipotentiary to transfer the state Stavropol resort-agglomeration Caucasian Mineralnye Vody into the ownership of the state company “Resorts of the North Caucasus” is known. If this becomes a condition, then it is better to do without the program, Stavropol residents believe.

“Khloponin wrote in his strategy that it is necessary to support the Russian population. But how? Russians are not mentioned in government regulations. If you ask the Ministry of Economic Development for money to support Russians, they say: who are these Russians? They know the Chechen Republic, Dagestan, Ingush, but the word “Russian” is not on the map of the country, notes S. Popov. – Within the North Caucasian Federal District, only the Russian region – Stavropol Territory – does not have republican status. The republics are considered the territories of constituent peoples, and the Stavropol region is considered a common land, a no-man’s land. We do not demand to be taken out of the North Caucasus Federal District, we do not want to run away anywhere. The solution to the problem lies in equalizing rights - in declaring the region the

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Stavropol Russian Republic. Then the regional authorities will not hesitate to talk about Russian interests, just as Chechen leaders talk about Chechen interests, and Dagestan leaders talk about Dagestan ones. Our neighbors will respect us, because in the Caucasus they understand very well what their own land, their home means.”

S. Popov is confident that such a formulation of the problem will not aggravate the national issue, and as an argument he cites his own many years of experience working in the Stavropol Committee on Nationalities Affairs and in the embassy (after a month of working with Khloponin, he retired). “When the war began in Chechnya, it was thanks to our relations with our neighbors that there was no fire around us,” says Popov. – There was not a single clash with Chechnya along the entire border, because we supported the zealous guys on both sides. After the militants’ attack on Budennovsk, about five thousand Cossacks were ready to begin expelling all Chechens from the region. We didn’t let them do this. With a competent national policy, the Stavropol region will be able to single-handedly improve relations between the entire country and the Caucasus. Can we negotiate with each other? After some time, it will be too late to declare the region the Stavropol Russian Republic: it will gradually cease to be Russian. Increasingly, “for sale” signs are appearing on houses. In the east of the region, enclavization is taking place, especially in the Kursk and Neftekumsk regions. The once Russian villages are now entirely populated by visitors. Conflicts no longer arise between the indigenous population and the newcomers - representatives of different nationalities of Dagestan conflict with each other, transferring the civil war from their republic to the region. In addition, the region has become a new springboard for terrorism: at the end of last year, the FSB discovered a suicide training center in the city of Stavropol, which was attended by 30 to 40 girls.

Political scientist Konstantin Krylov calls what is happening in the Stavropol region politically correct - “unfriendly colonization.” “The need for colonization is clear: the republics, thanks to federal subsidies, demonstrate record birth rates and, accordingly, an abundance of active youth. After the Stavropol region was officially declared part of the North Caucasus, this colonization received quasi-legal grounds, says Krylov. – Even the most beautiful person begins to commit lawlessness, feeling permissiveness. We must understand: this is not about the fact that Cossacks and other Russians cannot repel visiting hooligans. They can. But their native state is actively preventing them from defending themselves - for the sake of pacifying the North Caucasus in exchange for loyalty. The Kremlin is not interested in Russian loyalty, since Russians are basically harmless. When any noticeable Russian indignation with a force component arises, the authorities begin to behave somewhat differently - remember Biryulyovo.

Such a policy will cost Russia very dearly. If everything continues as it is, the exodus of the Russian population from Stavropol is inevitable (look at the North Caucasus republics, where the Russians have already left).”

The political scientist's frightening forecast is not the most pessimistic. It can be assumed that the matter will not end with Stavropol, and it will be followed by the Krasnodar Territory, Rostov, Volgograd regions... But there is also an optimistic forecast: after the Olympic Games, the policy of pacification of the Caucasus will be adjusted. In this case, the 2014 Olympics really turned out to be a Russian milestone [stories](#).

What is Stavropol region for Russia?

- about 1 million tons of oil per year;
- about 100 million cubic meters of associated gas per year;
- about 300 million cubic meters of natural gas per year;
- about 6 million tons of grain per year (the best granary, the calling card of Russia in the world agricultural arena);
- seven power plants with a total energy production of about 18 billion kWh per year;
- two airports;
- the largest resort region of the country – Caucasian Mineral Waters, which has no analogues in all of Eurasia in terms of quantity, variety and value of mineral waters;
- 10 universities, three scientific institutes, one philharmonic society;
- objects of mechanical engineering, chemical, food, light, glass, microbiological industries.

The process, which in the 90s was declared the revival of the Cossacks, is today perceived by many Cossacks as a farce. Registered - that is, entered into the state register - Cossack troops have the status of non-profit organizations, while for some reason their leadership is approved by the Ministry of Regional Development. The ranks and shoulder straps in these troops are supposedly recognized by the state: the legislation specifically stipulates that the ranks of unregistered Cossacks cannot be equated to similar ranks of registered Cossacks. Participants register as special Cossacks at the military registration and enlistment office, but in reality the registered troops do not perform any “state service.” They would be happy, but the state does not give them such an opportunity.

The registered Terek Cossack Army officially numbers about 30 thousand Cossacks of the North Caucasus Federal District. Of these, only a few dozen are engaged in patrolling on a professional basis and receive salaries from the state for this. Last summer, the newly elected ataman of the army, Sergei Klimenko, wrote an open letter to the president and posed the question bluntly: if the duties of law enforcement assigned by the state to the Cossacks are

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not an empty formality, then to fulfill them the Cossacks need powers, as well as a means of subsistence.

The ataman did not directly ask for money - only resources for military self-sufficiency. Namely: to transfer to the operational control of the troops the state block of shares of JSC Kavminkurortresursy and the state Kizlyar Brandy Factory, since these objects in the Russian Empire were created by more than one generation of Cossacks; allocate a building for the army headquarters with the subsequent construction of a military temple on this territory; give the army 100 thousand hectares of agricultural land; provide the army with quotas for seafood fishing in the Caspian Sea, production and sale of alcoholic beverages; open Cossack youth centers with technical equipment in all subjects of the North Caucasus Federal District. In order for the Cossacks to have any real powers to create in the republics state-owned institutions "Republican Cossack Center" with a staff of at least 10 people, which would be subordinate not to local authorities, but to state ones; in places of compact residence of Cossacks, introduce the position of deputy head of administration for the elected chieftain of the local Cossack community.

In response to Klimenko's requests, the authorities voiced their request to him - to leave his post, which the ataman did. The former ataman returned to his place - Vasily Bondarev, a big man, formerly the first secretary of the local city committee of the CPSU. His authority in the army was not recognized by everyone, since Bondarev held the Cossack circle for his election behind closed doors, and even set the police on those Cossacks who obstructed him (an unprecedented case).

Dissatisfaction with Bondarev in the army and outside the army has been evident for a long time, and now it is growing with particular force. During the 12 years of his atamanship, a tradition developed in the Stavropol region: under his patronage, atamans of local communities received hundreds of hectares of land from the state for the Cossacks, and used them at their own discretion.

"Whoever has stuck to the Cossacks for mercantile reasons: thieves, security forces, and party workers. We, free Cossacks, are between mummies and thieves," says Yu. Churekov, ataman of the Caucasian Cossack line. - The authorities pretend that they have rehabilitated the Cossack people subjected to genocide, and the "professional Cossacks" pretend that they are performing "state service." It's like rocking a motionless train and saying it's moving. If this continues, then only the atamans fed by the authorities will remain on the register. We want to truly serve Russia and protect our people, and not stage a masquerade like the American Indians."

Now the KKL is actively working to unite the free Cossacks of the entire country. The organization's

membership has currently reached 17 thousand people.

The Russian Church about Russian problems

The Russian Orthodox Church also began to talk about the oppression of Russians in the south of Russia. Metropolitan Kirill (Pokrovsky) of Stavropol and Nevinnomyssk said: "We are accustomed to thinking that only small nations need protection. This is wrong. In many republics, the Russian population is a minority, often oppressed on ethnic and religious grounds."

Separately, the Metropolitan touched upon the topic of Stavropol: "Uncontrolled migration processes, interethnic conflicts, which are often artificially given the status of domestic quarrels, lack of jobs, low quality of education and healthcare force the Russian-speaking population to leave their homes and move to other regions."

According to the bishop, interethnic conflicts will stop "if residents of neighboring republics who come here are firmly convinced that in the event of a crime being committed, they will not only not receive the protection and patronage of the diaspora, but will also have problems in their small homeland."

Bloody everyday life

One of the most notable incidents of the past year in the city of Stavropol was a fight involving the 24-year-old Deputy Minister of Communications of Ingushetia and two other residents of the republic. The Cossack was made disabled by stabbing him in the stomach with a knife. A wave of popular indignation followed. The one who directly struck the blow was given 10 years in prison. The other two, including the deputy minister, are 6 years old. "It's good that at least ministers from the republics don't come to fight," says the coordinator of the public movement "Russian Unity of the Caucasus." S. Popov. "President Yevkurov behaved like a real man: he visited our region three times, visited fellow countrymen and students, and talked with families." But the most high-profile conflict in the region in recent years is considered to be the murder of pilot Nikolai Naumenko in Nevinnomyssk. "Chechnya handed over the brother of the killer who was standing next to him; he is given a suspended sentence. And look for the killer himself. Chechnya does not extradite murderers. Even if our authorities wanted to demand it, they could not. I worked in a group for the release of hostages and I know very well what it's like to search for people in Chechnya," says S. Popov.

It is significant that during the rally regarding the murder of Naumenko, the police detained 141 people. About 400 people were detained in Biryulyovo. It is enough to compare the population of Moscow with a population of millions and Nevinnomyssk with a population of one hundred thousand to understand the scale of the problem in the region.

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Main part

The situation in the North Caucasus remains one of the most hotly debated in the Russian expert community and among foreign authors. At the same time, in recent years there have been serious shifts in determining priorities for discussion. If earlier what was happening was considered primarily in the context of inter-ethnic relations and regional politics, today this topic has turned into a plot of an all-Russian scale. It is not Chechnya, Ingushetia or Dagestan themselves that come to the fore, but their perception by the “core of Russia.”

What is the price of the North Caucasus for the Russian Federation? Not only and not so much material, but also political. Does this problematic region strengthen or weaken the country? Does the North Caucasus expand Russia's opportunities in international politics? To what extent can the North Caucasian regional elites be trusted and are residents of Moscow and other central territories ready to perceive people from the republics of the turbulent region as fellow citizens and not “outsiders”? Is it necessary to “feed the Caucasus” by supporting subsidized subjects of the South of Russia? And not only feed, but also recruit soldiers from there into the Armed Forces, attract managerial and scientific personnel, students and graduate students, and interact with local businesses? This is the range of issues that are the focus of the North Caucasus agenda.

All these problems did not arise today. They were formed from the moment when the new Russia, having barely repelled attempts to take revenge by supporters of the Soviet project, was faced with a separatist challenge in Chechnya, and then with numerous ethnopolitical and religious problems in the southern part of the country. And in the two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, references to North Caucasian subjects over and over again occurred not only in the current political context, but also in the historical context. Consider the “Circassian problem” alone, which became especially relevant during the preparation for the XXII Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. And all this, not to mention the numerous “wars” of historical memory and monuments, in which Generals Ermolov, Zass, Admiral Lazarev and Imam Shamil turn from idols and anti-heroes of the past into participants in modern socio-political discussion. Only in the fall of 2013, two characteristic events came to the attention of the media and experts. The first is the opening of the reconstructed Dadi-Yurt memorial in Chechnya in memory of the victims of one of the episodes of the Caucasian War (1819). In response to this action, which was fully supported by Ramzan Kadyrov, activists of the “Officers of Russia” organization proposed that President Vladimir Putin erect a monument to the famous general of Imperial Russia Alexei Ermolov. The second is a critical statement by the head of Dagestan Ramazan Abdulatipov regarding

the anthem of the Krasnodar region, which, in his opinion, contains signs of interethnic hatred (the text contains the words: “we are going to fight to the death against the enemy, against the infidel”).

Today, the urgency of the situation is added by the almost universal growth of ideas of separatism, in which not only the outskirts, but also the center are calculating the possible costs and benefits of living together. Meanwhile, finding adequate answers to the questions outlined above goes far beyond the scope of North Caucasian geography. In many ways, this is the definition of Russian civil and political identity, the active phase of its formation has not yet ended. Resolving the Caucasian puzzles is not least a contribution to the future Russian state project. Both in domestic and foreign policy.

It has already become a truism to talk about the great strategic value of the North Caucasus for Russia and Eurasia. According to the fair remark of academician Yuri Polyakov, “The Caucasus is not a gate that can be opened and closed.” This is primarily a territory of ethnopolitical and religious interaction. Under certain circumstances, it can play a role in strengthening Russia and its position in the world. But the North Caucasus has a chance to turn into a dangerous frontier. Over the past 20 years, a lot has already been done towards the implementation of the “frontline” scenario. However, the situation has not yet become irreversible. And in order to stop the growth of negative trends, a meaningful conversation is required about the North Caucasus dimension of modern Russian statehood.

Sociological research in recent years leads to disappointing conclusions. In Russian society, a negative perception (up to complete rejection) of the North Caucasus is growing. Its presence as part of Russia is not perceived or is not considered as a value. The introduction of de facto apartheid is proposed as the price for preserving Russian unity. As a rule, sharp outbursts of negativity occur after high-profile terrorist attacks, such as the terrorist attack at Moscow Domodedovo Airport on January 24, 2011 (the largest attack at airports in the world in terms of the number of victims - 37 killed). According to a Levada Center study conducted in hot pursuit of the tragic event (February 2011), 24% of respondents said they supported the idea of closing the administrative borders between the republics of the North Caucasus and the rest of Russia. Answering the question about what tools should be used to implement policies in the North Caucasus, 36% of respondents said that it is necessary to tighten control over internal migration, and 18% supported the secession of the North Caucasus. But even outside of connection with one or another terrorist attack, the reaction of respondents to “North Caucasus issues” is usually harsh. According to a Levada Center study specifically devoted to “imaginary enemies” (December 2012), “Chechen separatists” and “Islamic fundamentalists” took

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second and fifth place, respectively, with 39 and 20% (while the United States, NATO and "Western forces" received the first, third and fifth). According to the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2012), about 10–15% of respondents supported the slogan "Russia for Russians," and about 30% were in favor of granting political and legal privileges to the largest ethnic group. In a Levada Center survey (October 2013), conducted in 130 settlements in 45 regions, 71% of respondents supported the idea of "Stop feeding the Caucasus"; 63% were in favor of tightening registration rules for visitors, as well as movement around the country as a whole. When asked about when respondents experience rejection and fear (according to statements - 61.5%), this happens when meeting with people from the North Caucasus regions and migrants from the Central Asian republics. Between these two categories (one of which represents Russian citizens and the other foreigners), respondents do not see a significant difference.

One of the main theorists of post-Soviet transit, Dmitry Furman, described this phenomenon as follows: "We have achieved pure formality in the Caucasus. In the lower Russian mass consciousness there is an understanding that the North Caucasus is not Russia. Surveys show that the people of the North Caucasus are more alien to ordinary Russians than, say, Ukrainians or Belarusians. Any ideas to limit migration apply to Asians, representatives of Asian and Caucasian republics, and to our North Caucasus too."

A request for the political and legal isolation of the North Caucasus or the introduction of apartheid norms in relation to this part of Russia exists among certain social movements and in government structures. In recent years, a socio-political trend has formed in Russia, which can be defined as "new Russian nationalism" or "Russian separatism" ("Russian Civil Union", "Russian Social Movement", "Russian Platform", "New Force" party). It has not yet become fully institutionalized, although some steps have been taken. Unlike previous politicians who spoke under the slogans of protecting the Russian people and providing them with preferences, the "new nationalists" do not deny either democracy or federalism. There is also room for human rights rhetoric in the speeches of their representatives and ideologists. Recently, the New Force party has been most active. She is responsible for the "Stop Migration" campaign and the "Stavropol Region is not the Caucasus" campaign. In 2010, an online survey was conducted regarding the transition of Stavropol to the Southern Federal District (SFD). Then the number of supporters of this idea reached 10.5 thousand people. It was voiced by various public organizations of the region. It was also presented during the traditional November "Russian March" in the same 2010. It was even proposed to rename the region into

the Stavropol Russian Republic. The 2013 campaign organized by New Force ended after several attempts to turn it into a national event. The thematic mass action in Nevinnomyssk on January 26, 2013, when law enforcement agencies detained 139 participants in an unauthorized meeting, became especially resonant.

A number of ideas actively defended by the "new nationalists" are being introduced into public circulation by both representatives of the executive branch and "systemic" politicians representing the Russian parliamentary corps. The separation of Stavropol from the North Caucasus was supported by Ilya Drozdov, a member of the State Duma of the Russian Federation from the LDPR, a member of the commission on CIS affairs. On August 2, 2012, the governor of the Krasnodar Territory, Alexander Tkachev, took the initiative to create a "Cossack police" on the territory of Kuban. At an extended meeting of the board of the regional administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Tkachev explained that the police Cossacks must prevent the mass relocation of representatives of the North Caucasus republics to the region under his jurisdiction. With his most important task, the Kuban governor outlined the transformation of the region into a kind of "migration filter", since, from his point of view, the neighboring Stavropol region cannot cope with this role. "Here are Kuban people, here they have their own laws, here they are quite tough guys," summed up the head of the region.

The Krasnodar region will host the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014. And this event, in its significance, has already gone far beyond the scope of just another international sports forum. The Sochi Games have an important symbolic meaning. They are intended to confirm Russia's return to the "major league" of international politics. The strategic importance of Kuban as a whole is also extremely important - it is the third largest population after Moscow and the Moscow region (about 5.5 million people). The region includes the territory of the Black Sea coast that remained in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Novorossiysk and Tuapse ports rank first and third in the country in terms of cargo turnover.

Everyone has already gotten used to the extravagant statements of the Vice-Speaker of the State Duma and long-time leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. However, his calls for limiting the birth rate in the republics of the North Caucasus (by introducing a fine for the third child) and fencing the region with "barbed wire", expressed during Vladimir Solov'yov's television show "Duel" (October 26, 2013), caused a wide socio-political resonance and discontent among both North Caucasian elites and human rights activists. Thus, the idea of secession or at least isolation of the North Caucasus is beginning to be considered by "systemic"

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politicians as potentially attractive in working with the electorate.

Quite often, representatives of the Russian bureaucracy and the parliamentary corps use the term “diaspora” in relation to the residents of the North Caucasian republics, although this is the name given to the community of citizens of one state on the territory of another.

Against this background, the highest Russian authorities consistently defend the political unity of citizens and the territorial integrity of the country. This was reflected in the creation of the Council under the President of the Russian Federation on Interethnic Relations (its first meeting was held on August 24, 2012), and in the approval of the State Ethnic Policy Strategy until 2025 (December 19, 2012). This document identifies as the main priority the need to strengthen “all-Russian civic consciousness and the spiritual community of the multinational people of Russia (Russian nation).” The same speech by Zhirinovskiy did not go unnoticed by the president. On November 6, 2013, Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with the leader of the LDPR, unequivocally told his interlocutor: “You have a stable electorate, and there is no need to turn to part of your electorate in order to strengthen your positions to the detriment of the fundamental interests of the country.” However, while consistently defending the principles of a single civil nation and rejecting xenophobia, top officials in some speeches introduced certain elements of contrasting the North Caucasus with the rest of Russia. Thus, on December 21, 2010, after a resonant action on Manezhnaya Square, Vladimir Putin (at that time the head of government) said: “Everyone has a small homeland, we are proud of it. But I won’t give 10 kopecks for the health of a person who, having come from central Russia to the republics of the North Caucasus, treats the Koran impolitely there.” He called for stricter registration rules for visitors in large cities if they violate “local customs and laws.” Speaking at the Mashuk-2013 forum (August 2013), Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev spoke of the need for a “transition period” before introducing direct elections of regional heads in cases “when the political culture is still somewhat different.”

Not only xenophobia

In speeches by human rights activists and representatives of the American-European expert community, the growing opposition between the North Caucasus and the rest of Russia is explained by the strengthening of xenophobic sentiments in the central part of the country. This is often seen as a legacy of the “imperial tradition” or a manifestation of “great power chauvinism.” There is no doubt that xenophobia and Russian ethnic nationalism play a role in this process. However, it would be extremely simplistic to limit the analysis only to such subjects, namely:

firstly, the North Caucasus is perceived as a region fraught with danger and political instability. And there are serious reasons for such conclusions. Suffice it to say that in the “Unified Federal List of Organizations Recognized as Terrorist by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation,” among 19 structures, three are associated with the North Caucasus (the remaining 16 are of foreign origin, mainly from the countries of the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). At the same time, the “Caucasian Emirate” (“Caucasus Emirate”) became the only structure operating on Russian territory that was included in the “terrorist lists” of the American State Department, and the actions of the leader of the “Emirate” Doku Umarov were declared a threat to the interests of not only Russia, but also USA. In 2012, 1,225 people became victims of armed violence in the North Caucasus (700 killed and 525 injured). Today’s North Caucasus exports instability far beyond the region itself. Terrorist attacks by North Caucasian jihadists took place on the railway (Nevsky Express train between Moscow and St. Petersburg in 2009), in Moscow (Moscow metro in 2010, Domodedovo airport in 2011), in Volgograd (bus bombing in 2013). Jihadists in the North Caucasus also announced the spread of activity to the territory of the Volga Federal District. In the last few years, Islamist groups, including radicals, have become a much more significant factor in the socio-political life of the Volga-Ural region;

secondly, during the period between the last All-Union (1989) and the second All-Russian population census (2010), there was a sharp change in the ethno-demographic balance in the republics of the North Caucasus. Some authors talk about its “derussification” and even define it as “Russia’s internal abroad.” Be that as it may, many connecting threads between the Russian ethnic majority and the North Caucasian world (in a broad cultural sense) were cut off. Of the seven republics of the North Caucasus, only small Adygea (surrounded by the Krasnodar Territory) did not experience a sharp decline in the share of Russians in the total population. This trend began to emerge during the Soviet period (as evidenced by census data from 1959–1989). However, in the last two and a half decades it has acquired a qualitatively different scale. Thus, in Dagestan, the share of the Russian population decreased from 9 to 3.5%, in Kabardino-Balkaria - from 31.95 to 22.55%, in Karachay-Cherkessia - from 45 to 31.4% (while from the first largest Russian groups in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic became the second).

A separate line is the situation in Chechnya and Ingushetia. In 1989, Russians made up more than 24% of the population of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. According to the 2010 All-Russian Census, 1.92% of Russians remained in Chechnya, and 0.78% in Ingushetia. At the same time,

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the expulsion of the Russian population from Chechnya was accompanied by massive excesses that did not come to the attention of either domestic or Western human rights activists. In one of her interviews, the chairman of the Forum of Resettlement Organizations, Lidiya Grafova, made a very difficult admission: “We are to blame for the Russian refugees from Chechnya. We are, in general, a human rights movement. It was at our instigation that public compassion focused only on the Chechens. This is probably an overshoot of democracy – supporting the minority even at the cost of discriminating against the majority.”

Concerns have grown about internal migration of people from the region to various parts of greater Russia. This is far from the only, but one of the reasons that resettlement programs to attract people from labor-abundant Dagestan and Ingushetia to regions that have a shortage of labor resources (in one of the districts of the Tver region - Narovchatovsky - between 2002 and 2010 the population decreased by 13, 4%) never earned even a partial amount. In 2010 and 2011 managed to organize the resettlement of 150 people from Dagestan and Ingushetia to the Penza region. However, the project of the presidential envoy to the North Caucasus Federal District Alexander Khloponin (2010) to resettle labor migrants from Ingushetia to the Sverdlovsk region was not successful;

thirdly, the North Caucasian republics are unfavorable from an economic and social point of view. The economic development indicators of these entities are the lowest in Russia (with the exception of some types of agricultural products). Former large heavy industry enterprises are either closed (Tyrnauz Mining and Processing Plant in Kabardino-Balkaria) or are barely surviving, having sharply reduced production volumes (Electrozinc in North Ossetia, the Caspian Plant in Dagestan, which produces military-industrial complex products). It is symbolic that in October 2010, in one of the abandoned mines of the Tyrnauz plant, special forces of the FSB and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs carried out a special operation to eliminate the militants who had settled there. The North Caucasus republics also retain their top positions in the unemployment rate rankings. The North Caucasian Federal District as a whole took first place in 2012 in terms of the number of unemployed (14.6%). The unemployment rate among young people is especially high. All this requires the attention of the federal government, which, against the backdrop of difficulties in neighboring regions (Stavropol Territory) or in the center of the country, is perceived as giving priority to the Caucasus to the detriment of the rest of Russia;

fourthly, in the last two decades the level of participation of the North Caucasus republics in all-Russian processes has critically decreased. The most striking indicator is military service. During the entire

period after the collapse of the USSR, the problem of conscription from this region into the ranks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was never resolved. Yavrus Dzhambalayev, who heads the conscription department of the Dagestan recruiting station (the largest federal subject in the North Caucasus), believes that by December 31, 2013, 1,335 people should be drafted into the Russian army. This is twice as much as called for in the spring. However, plans are plans, and in November two groups were sent to their duty stations (170 and 149 conscripts, respectively). And this despite the fact that Dagestan is considered one of the “youngest” subjects of the Russian Federation. Thus, the “successes” in the quantitative increase in conscription can be considered more than modest. In July 2012, for the first time in many years, 150 Chechens were called up for military service in the 249th Special Motorized Battalion of the Russian Internal Troops. This unit is stationed in Chechnya on a permanent basis. Then the news from the Chechen Republic was viewed almost as a sensation, despite the fact that, according to the republican military registration and enlistment office, the number of citizens of military age in the territory under its jurisdiction was about 80 thousand people;

fifthly, the Russian government itself encourages managerial particularism in the North Caucasus, which, on the one hand, helps solve a number of tactical problems, but does not help the comprehensive integration of the region into the all-Russian political, legal and cultural space. Today, the issue of Chechnya's secession from Russia has ceased to be politically relevant. Chechnya is the only one of the unrecognized republics that broke away from the newly independent post-Soviet states that was returned to the control of the central authorities. And not just returned, but turned into a showcase of exemplary loyalty to the center. Political stability is credited to Kadyrov both by the federal government and the expert community. In 2009, the CTO (counter-terrorist operation) regime of republican significance was abolished in Chechnya. The number of terrorist attacks, although still ongoing, is decreasing. In 2012, 174 people suffered from them (82 killed), which is slightly less than in 2011 (186 victims, 92 killed). For comparison, in neighboring Dagestan in 2012, 695 people became victims of terrorist attacks (405 killed). In the fall of 2011, it was announced that Kadyrov had finally eradicated blood feud - a centuries-old institution that neither the tsarist nor the Soviet authorities had been able to overcome. Within a year, Kadyrov had reconciled 450 families and had already dissolved the special reconciliation commission he created as unnecessary. Thanks to large-scale federal transfers, the republic has become a regional investment leader.

However, there is a downside to this shiny sign. First of all, we should talk about the cost of incorporating Chechnya into Russia. A special

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political regime has been established de facto in the republic. On its territory, the laws of the Russian Federation are far from being in full effect (the constitutional principle of the separation of religion from the state and education, gender equality is actually ignored). Moreover, the federal authorities (courts, prosecutor's office and military units on the territory of Chechnya) can perform their direct functions only to a certain extent. Today, the law enforcement agencies of Chechnya are de facto subordinate to the head of the republic. Campaigns to combat the radical underground are carried out by the republican government itself. At the same time, thanks to the "Kadyrov effect," militant groups are simply redeployed to other republics of the North Caucasus (Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria) and outside Russia. Certain categories of crimes in Chechnya cannot be investigated by Russian investigative agencies located in Chechnya (murders, kidnappings), and sentences for natives of the republic are served only in correctional institutions on the territory of Chechnya (if they are detained outside the republic, they must be transported to their historical homeland). Chechen conscripts do not undergo active military service outside of it in other constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and the conscription itself covers only a small circle of conscript youth. The special informal status of Chechnya also contributes to strengthening the perception of the North Caucasus as a state within a state.

Without a doubt, one of the main events of 2013 was the arrest of the former mayor of Makhachkala, Said Amirov, who for many years was one of the central characters in the Dagestan elite. He had direct access to the top political leadership and big business in Moscow, bypassing the republican authorities. He also had his say in making the most important management decisions not only in the area of his direct competence. And their "power resources" (in addition to administrative influence). Thus, in 1999, during the raid of Shamil Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan, Amirov sent his own detachment in support of the federal center. And this support, as well as similar assistance from other regional "barons," was a significant factor that ensured Russia's success in the fight against the spread of separatist metastases throughout the North Caucasus. Amirov not only held his post for many years, but also received high government awards, as well as public support from above. His arrest, judging by the first months after this action, did not mark the beginning of systemic changes in the approaches of the federal center to the organization of power and governance in the North Caucasus.

Figures like Amirov did not arise in a vacuum. They turned out to be in demand when the largest North Caucasian republic was left to its own devices and developed, having separatist Ichkeria in its

neighbourhood, and was also forced to resolve the difficult "Lezgin issue" with the newly independent Azerbaijan and resolve the situation with the resettlement of Kvareli Avars from Georgia. Not to mention the problems of privatization and the transition from the planned Soviet system to new forms of economic management;

sixth, the growing isolation of the North Caucasus (accompanied by the growth of ethnic nationalism in the 1990s and Islamization in the early 2000s) is associated not so much with the efforts of local or foreign preachers, but with the collapse of the secular system of regulation of various spheres of life. In this context, land scarcity and ongoing urbanization are particularly noteworthy. Rural communities are emptying out due to lack of work. Traditional ethnic areas are being eroded, and the principles of private property come into conflict with ideas about ethnic property, when representatives of "their people" may have preferences in access to property and power resources in a particular territory. And all this against the backdrop of an ineffective judicial and administrative system. Hence the appeal to mosques, sheikhs or Salafi groups as possible arbiters. As a result, such "competition of jurisdictions" leads to both conflicts and violence, because there are problems with recognizing one or another religious authority as the only legitimate one.

The problem of preserving the North Caucasus as a full-fledged part of Russia is obvious. But in solving it it is extremely important to avoid simplifications. The idea of "separating the Caucasus" by a strong-willed decision of the center or creating certain "special conditions" for it (de facto apartheid), which has become popular in the blogosphere, does not stand up to criticism upon closer acquaintance with the specifics, namely:

firstly, secession will not stop ethnic migration (the main phobia of Muscovites and residents of large central cities in Russia). The region is not homogeneous, and contrary to some persistent media cliches, it is not united by some common idea of opposition to Moscow. Consequently, in the event of a hypothetical separation, the question of borders, the number of possible states and de facto entities will inevitably arise. In a "separated Caucasus", a strong statehood will not appear, but a "war of all against all" is likely (Sufis against Salafis, Islamists against secular nationalists, not to mention confrontation between different national projects). The Russian Caucasus in "free floating" is not Algeria in the early sixties. Here the Russian state simply will have no one to negotiate with. Or you will have to negotiate with every more or less significant field commander;

secondly, the question arises about Russians still living in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adygea and in small numbers in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, as well as about representatives of the

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peoples of the Caucasus located in the rest of the Russian Federation from Stavropol to Vladivostok ;

thirdly, the military infrastructure is important (parts of the Caspian flotilla, border outposts, units of the Ministry of Defense). This question refutes the opinion of supporters of “financial savings” for Russia by stopping funding for the North Caucasus. The problem of “enough to feed” will only be transformed into other priority expenditure items (construction of barracks, allocation of apartments for military personnel and their families, arrangement of a potential state border and ensuring its functioning). At the same time, supporters of the idea of separating the Caucasus forget that in the region itself there are a significant number of people interested in maintaining Russian jurisdiction. Among them are those who fought in the 1990s. on the side of Russia in Chechnya, and in 1999 in Dagestan, not to mention representatives of government agencies, police, business, and ordinary people;

fourthly, the loss of the Caucasus will inevitably exacerbate issues that previously remained in the shadows. In a “reduced” Russia, the problems of other national-state formations will come to the fore - Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tuva, Yakutia... Even among the leaders of the neo-Cossack movement there are those who do not consider themselves Russians, and consider the Cossacks as a unique people. Consequently, the “separation” of the Caucasus will be perceived as a precedent. And not at all abstractly, as in the case of Kosovo, Abkhazia or South Ossetia;

fifthly, the loss of the North Caucasus is fraught with serious costs for Russian foreign policy. The presence of the North Caucasus republics with a Muslim population within Russia gave and continues to give Moscow the opportunity to play on many geopolitical boards and have influence not only in the West, but also in the Islamic world. Considering the growing role of the Middle East and Southeast Asia in world politics, it would be strange to refuse such an instrument. And even more so, build your positioning in opposition to Islam and its adherents.

And the last one is sixth (in order, but not in importance). It should be noted that the implementation of apartheid practices in modern conditions is unrealistic. And not only for moral or ethical reasons. The racial segregation of the past in the USA, Australia or South Africa could work under one condition - a gigantic educational gap between the white and “colored” population. Note that as soon as the level of education among the latter increased, the movement for equal civil rights and the abolition of apartheid began.

The ideas of a “special” or “closed” status of the Caucasus are based on inadequate ideas about the supposedly immanent “traditionalism” of this region and the predominance of consanguineous relations there. In reality, the traditional social structures of the Caucasian peoples are experiencing a serious crisis

and transformation. The same Chechen teip no longer lives compactly and does not own common land. The institution of elders is degenerating, having been undermined by armed conflicts, when the possession of weapons became more important than age. The process of Islamic revival is accompanied by a conflict of generations. And for Salafi youth, the older generation of “wrong”, “superficial” Muslims is not an authority. Apparently, Russian Islamic scholar Vladimir Bobrovnikov is right when he asserts: “The pre-revolutionary Muslim identity of the Caucasian highlanders changed sharply and irreversibly during first the pre-revolutionary Russian reforms of the second half of the 19th century, and then collectivization and Soviet national-linguistic transformations of the 1920s–1950s. The “mountain people” themselves, for the most part, are no longer mountain people, but distant descendants of people who once lived in the mountains.”

Moreover, at the beginning of the 21st century we have a fairly educated society in various regions of Russia, regardless of ethnic origin. Let's add to this their inclusion in the national and global information space. In this regard, any attempt to de facto abolish equal citizenship in Russia and introduce apartheid will cause a response and provoke a ninth wave of separatism and multidirectional, but equally destructive to the unity of the country, ethnic nationalism. Who, in fact, will voluntarily agree with the introduction of “migration filters” for residents of the North Caucasus, if they are officially installed in the Stavropol region, Kuban or Moscow? A rhetorical question.

It will not be possible to isolate yourself from the migration of “outsiders” for other reasons. The objective laws of economics, geography and demography work against this. If the population of the North Caucasus republics is increasing, land resources in Chechnya, Dagestan or Ingushetia are physically insufficient, and the unemployment rate (especially among young people) is high, then the departure of the surplus population cannot be stopped by any cordons. Moreover, it is desirable as social prevention: without internal migration, the Caucasian “cauldron” has a much greater chance of exploding.

Squeezing Russians out of the national republics of the Russian Federation Lately there has been a lot of talk about improving the demographic situation in Russia. The country's population is supposedly constantly growing, and the authorities are often credited for this. But they are silent about who it is growing at the expense of. In 2002, there were 115 million Russians in Russia, but in 2010 there were only 111 million. The largest population growth is in Chechnya, Ingushetia and the Republic of Tyva. Meanwhile, the number of Russian people in the national republics (and not only in them) of the Russian Federation is falling at an impressive pace, and the ethnic composition of individual territories is

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rapidly changing. In some places this is caused by economic and demographic problems, and in others by direct squeezing out by local ethnic elites. Settlement of Russians in Russia A decrease in the number of state-forming people in the regions in the event of any future political crisis or instability may lead to an increase in separatism in those regions where there will be few Russians. The central authorities, often verbally declaring that the Russian people are “the foundation of Russian statehood,” for some reason do not actually support this foundation and do not particularly strive to increase and strengthen it. At least this is not visible from the statistics. Let's turn to the impartial official figures from the population censuses of Russia (and the USSR) to see where the situation requires immediate intervention, and also try to understand how we can find ways out of the current difficult situation. South of Russia The Russian population was rapidly leaving the regions of the North Caucasus due to hostilities, fearing that the conflict could spread to other republics. Here the situation is most deplorable. Due to the abolition of the Terek Cossack formations by the communists, inter-ethnic clashes in 1958, and after that - ethnic cleansing and genocide in the 1990s during the wars in Chechnya, there were practically no previously numerous Russians left there. According to the 1989 census, the number of Russian people was 269,130 people in the entire Checheno-Ingushetia (or 24.8% of the total population), and in 2010 there were 24,382 Russians or 1.9% in Chechnya. The situation is similar in Ingushetia (2002 - 1.2%, 2010 - 0.8%) and Dagestan (1959 - 213 thousand, 2010 - 100 thousand). In Ingushetia, crimes against Russians continued after the Chechen wars. In 2006, in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya, the deputy head of the Sunzhensky district administration, who oversaw the program for the return of the Russian-speaking population to Ingushetia, was shot dead, and in 2007, the family of a Russian teacher was killed in the republic. In Dagestan, Russian flight began even in the Kizlyar region and the city of Kizlyar, where Russians historically were the majority (the number of Russians in the city decreased from 83.0% (1959) to 40.49% (2010). Changes in the national composition of the North Caucasus since the time of the Russian Empire and to the modern Russian Federation. In other subjects of the North Caucasus District, the process of decreasing the number of Russians is also underway, but not at such a fast pace. In Kabardino-Balkaria, the percentage of the Russian population decreased from 240,750 (31.9%) in 1989 to 193,155 (22.5%) in 2010. In areas with a traditional Russian majority - Maïsky and Prokhladnensky - there is an increase in non-Slavic ethnic groups. The number of Russians in Karachay-Cherkessia even increased slightly - 150,025 people in 2010 versus 147,878 people in 2002. But in percentage terms it is still decreasing due to the higher birth rate among the Caucasian peoples.

In North Ossetia, the percentage of Russians decreased from 40% in 1959 to 23% in 2010. The percentage of non-Slavic peoples in the Mozdok region, the original Russian Cossack land, is increasing. It should be said that the Russian population of the republics tried to fight for their national rights to the best of their ability. Since the late 1980s, the idea of annexing (returning) the Cossack regions of northern Chechnya (which were given to the communists) to the Stavropol Territory has been popular. Attempts were made to create a Russian Cossack autonomy on the left bank of the Terek, as well as other autonomies for Russian-speaking citizens with different names and in different republics. However, projects of such autonomous entities did not receive approval from regional and federal authorities. Visually The Stavropol Territory should be mentioned separately. The inclusion of the region in the North Caucasus Federal District began to change the ethnic map of the region even faster, heating up already tense interethnic relations. If we compare the population censuses of 2002 and 2010, we can state that the number of Armenians increased by 12 thousand, Dargins by 10 thousand; The number of Dagestan peoples (especially in areas bordering Dagestan), Turkmen and others increased significantly. It is also worth noting that the Russian population is declining, including due to numerous interethnic marriages of Russian women with representatives of the Caucasian peoples; Children from such unions for the most part do not feel the ethnic identification of their mother and bear non-Russian names and surnames. However, in addition to the assimilation of Russians by Caucasians, there is also the usual flight of the Russian population from Stavropol. In the Southern Federal District, Kalmykia deserves special attention, where the number of Russians has decreased from 120 to 85 thousand people. In the Gorodovikovskiy and Yashaltinskyy districts - traditional places of residence of Russians - the process of settling Meskhetian Turks is underway, where they already make up up to 15% of the total population. In the Rostov region, the number of Meskhetian Turks increased from 28 thousand in 2002 to 36 thousand in 2010. Due to the migration of Dagestani peoples, higher birth rates among Kazakhs, Tatars, and Nogais, the number of Russians in the Astrakhan region is decreasing (67% as of 2010) and the ethnographic map of the region is changing. And if in the Rostov and Astrakhan regions the matter is mainly in demographic problems, then in Kalmykia, in addition to them, there is a process of soft squeezing out Russian-speaking residents and replacing them in all spheres with Kalmyks. Siberian subjects The main Russophobic region of the Russian Federation in Siberia is rightfully considered the Republic of Tyva, from where the Russian population has fled since the early 1990s - almost the same as from the North Caucasus regions. In 1992–1993 alone, more than 20

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thousand Russians left there, and the organization Khostug Tyva (Free Tuva) called for independence from Russia. In 1959, Russians numbered 40% there, and in 2010 - only 16%, which is explained not only by the squeezing out of Russian speakers, but also by the high birth rate among Tuvans. Since the late 80s of the 20th century, separatist sentiments have been popular in Tyva; there have even been attacks on the Slavic population; there have been serious ethnic unrest, which miraculously did not escalate into armed clashes. Thus, in the village of Elegest, an attempt was made at a large-scale Russian pogrom. 15 Russian houses were attacked, three of them were set on fire. After this, a stream of Russian refugees began to flow from Tyva. Russophobia is still evident at the everyday level in the republic. For example, on social networks in groups of Tuvans you can see anti-Russian slogans. Tuvan lands were part of the Chinese Empire until 1912. Yakutia did not lag behind. High-ranking officials of the republic at one time even made clearly xenophobic statements, according to which, for example, the Yakuts should have "priority in medical care." The Yakut radicals did not particularly hide the fact that they were just waiting for Russia to weaken in order to try to gain real independence. In turn, the Russians did not like the Yakut language lessons in schools, the inability of the Slavs to get good, well-paid jobs, to enter universities on a budget, as well as the predominant broadcasting on Yakut local television. Added to all this was the economic crisis in the 1990s, when many large industrial productions, the main places of work for Russians, uniting cities around them, were closed. As a result, the Russian population in Yakutia decreased from 50% to 37% by 2010. And this is in an area that is of strategic importance for the country due to its huge reserves of resources. True, it is worth saying that in connection with the revival of many enterprises in recent years, a stream of people from all over the country and the CIS has again poured into Yakutia, but not so en masse. Similar processes, but to a lesser extent, occurred in the Altai Republic and Buryatia. A striking example of the imbalance in the interethnic politics of Yakutia is the republic's television channels. Federal division of the state The very fact of the existence in Russia of regions in which Russophobia is felt to this day and from where Russians are forced to leave speaks of serious problems in national politics. When officials in Russia speak out against the infringement of the rights of Russian speakers somewhere in Europe - for example, in Latvia (which is also very important), I would like to draw their attention to non-Russian regions within the country, where discrimination against the Russian people still exists. After all, there can be no doubt that the uniform distribution and increase of the Russian population throughout the country is the key to the stability of the state, protection from possible separatism, etc. "Kosovo scenario". In addition, many

researchers agree that the modern administrative-territorial division of Russia has long outlived its usefulness. The communists at one time not only gave the lands conquered by the Russian Empire to national minorities, but also in the RSFSR itself they crumbled artificial national formations, which today no longer reflect the real correlation of ethnic groups in them. For example, Jews in the Jewish Autonomous Region, allocated by the Bolsheviks, are less than 1% (!), Karelians in Karelia - 7.4%, Khakass in Khakassia - 12%, and so on. Isn't it time to carry out a thoughtful and thorough reform of the national republics? The territory of the RSFSR in 1926 and 1956. As a result, due to the international policy of the USSR, there are regions in modern Russia from which the Russian population is leaving. This is most noticeable in the example of the republics of the North Caucasus. And although the official authorities of these republics themselves want the Slavs to return, Russian speakers have no great desire to go back. Mainly because people are afraid of new attacks on ethnic grounds, the growth of Islamism, and destabilization. It can be stated that for demographic reasons, as well as due to the lack of political will of the state leadership, the Russian territories of the eastern republics of the North Caucasus (Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan) were lost to the Slavic population, the ethnic cleansing of the region was almost completely completed. Expansion is now aimed at the Stavropol Territory and other areas of historical residence of Russians, as can be seen from the official census figures, which are difficult to argue with. The situation in Yakutia and Tuva, where xenophobia towards Russians and their mass exodus were also observed, requires deep understanding by the state leadership. The development of industry, the attraction and distribution of the Russian majority among these regions is the key to the strength of the regions. Today, if the population of Russia increases, it is at the expense of other peoples; the number of Russians themselves continues to decline. We need a completely new state policy, which will be aimed at popularizing Russian national identity, as well as assimilation into the Russian cultural and political environment. It is these measures, together with an urgent program to attract the remaining compatriots from the CIS, that can become the very bonds that will prevent non-Russian separatism from growing in any crisis and upheaval. but even in the RSFSR itself, artificial national formations were crumbled, which today no longer reflect the real correlation of ethnic groups in them. For example, Jews in the Jewish Autonomous Region, allocated by the Bolsheviks, are less than 1% (!), Karelians in Karelia - 7.4%, Khakass in Khakassia - 12%, and so on. Isn't it time to carry out a thoughtful and thorough reform of the national republics? The territory of the RSFSR in 1926 and 1956. As a result, due to the international policy of the USSR, there are regions in modern Russia from which

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among these regions is the key to the strength of the regions. Today, if the population of Russia increases, it is at the expense of other peoples; the number of Russians themselves continues to decline. We need a completely new state policy, which will be aimed at popularizing Russian national identity, as well as assimilation into the Russian cultural and political environment. It is these measures, together with an urgent program to attract the remaining compatriots from the CIS, that can become the very bonds that will prevent non-Russian separatism from growing in any crisis and upheaval.

Conclusion

Thus, the ideas of “Russian separatism” or the introduction of apartheid will not solve any of the pressing problems of the complex region and Russia as a whole. On the contrary, their practical implementation can provoke new conflicts, spur the isolation of various parts and ethnic groups of Russia, as well as the fragmentation of the country as a whole. However, the statement of this thesis does not mean at all that the authorities defending the current status quo can limit themselves to just routine criticism of extremists. The idea of “escape from the Caucasus” is fueled not only by catchy populist slogans, but also by the inaction of those who, by their status and position, should be involved in the prevention of ethnic and religious excesses, and the legal resolution of property, household and other disputes.

Consequently, the main task of today remains the real, and not the formal, arrival of the Russian state in the North Caucasus. In the form of an integrating

force, a fair arbiter and a guarantor of security. Take, for example, such a story as the conscription of young men from the North Caucasus republics into the Russian army. In a multi-ethnic state, the conscript army becomes not just a power structure, but the most important tool for the integration of different segments of society. For the overpopulated and labor-abundant Caucasus, with its high unemployment rate and average age of 26–28 years, the army can become a good social elevator and a real alternative to the underground and criminal business. Speaking about the socio-economic development of the region, we should focus primarily not on the interests of large metropolitan businessmen, but on projects that will provide opportunities to the local population (jobs, involvement of small businesses), which in turn will create additional “anchors” for loyalty. And, of course, with the help of effective internal migration programs, the state will solve several problems at once (development of neglected and sparsely populated regions, reducing the demographic burden on the Caucasus, involving its residents in all-Russian processes). State support for civil society institutions in the Caucasian republics could create mass support for countering clanism and corruption. However, when discussing these measures, one should keep in mind: outside the all-Russian context, changes in the North Caucasus will not happen. Without qualitative changes in the entire state mechanism and a radical reform of national policy, transforming it from a complex of folklore and ethnographic holidays into a strategy for the formation of a Russian citizen, an oasis of prosperity cannot be created.

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SOI: [1.1/TAS](#) DOI: [10.15863/TAS](#)

International Scientific Journal Theoretical & Applied Science

p-ISSN: 2308-4944 (print) e-ISSN: 2409-0085 (online)

Year: 2024 Issue: 01 Volume: 129

Published: 01.01.2024 <http://T-Science.org>

Issue

Article



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WHY ARE WE HIDING THE OUTFLOW OF RUSSIANS FROM THE NORTH CAUCASUS FEDERAL DISTRICT?

Abstract: In the article, the authors analyze the reasons for the outflow of the Russian population from the North Caucasus Federal District, which provoked an acute shortage of highly qualified personnel, which are so necessary not only today, but what is especially important, tomorrow for the modernized leap of the Caucasus. It is for this reason that the enterprises of the defense-industrial complex, which at one time provided up to 90% of the economy of the North Caucasus Federal District, are almost completely inactive, which has led the situation to the economically depressed state that is typical today for most regions of the North Caucasus Federal District. But at the same time, it is disappointing that the republican authorities are afraid of publicizing the facts of oppression of the Russian population and highlighting the trend of outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus. This is explained by the fact that they do not want to spoil the overall image picture in their republics, which ultimately affects the amount of funding from the federal center to these totally subsidized regions.

Key words: extremism, radicalism, inter-ethnic split, North Caucasian republics, multi-ethnicity, outflow of the Russian population, identity, restoration of ethnic business, modernization, development of the regions of the North Caucasus Federal District, people's rights, migration problems, Russian Federation.

Language: English

Citation: Prokhorova, Yu. I., Rumyanskaya, N. S., Blagorodov, A. A., Tomilina, L. B., & Volkova, G. Yu. (2024). Why are we hiding the outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus Federal District?. *ISJ Theoretical & Applied Science*, 01 (129), 117-131.

Soi: <http://s-o-i.org/1.1/TAS-01-129-8>

Doi:  <https://dx.doi.org/10.15863/TAS.2024.01.129.8>

Scopus ASCC: 2000.

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Introduction

UDC 316.78:323.19.

Intolerance, religious extremism, terrorism, radicalism among young people, problems in interethnic relations worry the state and citizens. This is reflected in the media by the growth of publications on interethnic and interethnic issues and is an indicator of public attention to the problem. The number of publications in the press and media interest in ethnic problems has a steady upward trend, especially in the southern regions of the Russian Federation. In the North Caucasus, there are factors of interethnic tension that have regional specificity, unlike continental Russia. Particular tension in interethnic relations is caused by territorial disputes, the solution of which, even in the legal field, carries the danger of interethnic split, especially in such multi-ethnic entities as the Republics of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia. The situation is aggravated by the unresolved consequences of the political and economic crisis in the North Caucasus, and in these republics in particular. The most unprotected in this regard were the representatives of the Russian people: the migration of Russians within the republics of the North Caucasus Federal District and their massive outflow from Dagestan to other regions of Russia can only be compared in scale to general mobilization, so widespread has this process become. Now in Dagestan, in order to find a Russian citizen of the republic, especially outside the capital and one of the "Russian" regions, you need to show considerable diligence. The Russian people, who gave everything to the Caucasus, from education to industry, are today forced to flee, giving away their property for next to nothing, abandoning fertile inhabited lands. At the same time, there is a division of citizens into Russians and non-Russians. There is no special executive body for national policy in the republic, and there is no direct work with the population. The Government Commission of Dagestan on Issues of the Russian Population was unable to organize its work properly, and in many respects even worsened the already difficult situation of the Russians; did not stop the outflow of population from the republic and did not create conditions for the return of Russians who had left. As a result, these processes acquired ethno-confessional urgency and became a socially dangerous phenomenon. The role of local governments in the prevention of interethnic tension and interethnic relations in general is weak, although everyone is aware that the overwhelming majority of interethnic conflicts occur at the local level. Perhaps local governments do not have the necessary powers. Growing migration activity also provokes interethnic tension. Migration from the national republics of the North Caucasian Federal District to other regions leads to the formation of large ethnic communities of mountain peoples in the receiving regions, increasing

labor competition. Such migration changes the ethnic composition of the population in the receiving region and is the main reason for the growth of interethnic tension. Essentially, these are enclaves that will develop without assimilation processes. At the same time, there is a growing influence of Muslim religious communities - "jamaats", which creates fertile ground for the development of extremist ideas in the form of the most radical trends - Wahhabism and Salaffism. Increasingly recently, representatives of the Russian population of the North Caucasus have been observed to adhere to Islamic ideals. Many Russians actually find protection in Islam, observe its rituals and lead an Islamic lifestyle. Involving ethnic Russians in the ranks of their followers is considered by Wahhabis, who recognize terrorism as the most effective way to achieve their goals, a priority direction for disseminating their views. This is how the number of Slavs who converted to Islam and took Muslim names is growing; it is through them that missionary activity is carried out throughout continental Russia, expanding the number of adherents of the movement for the "purity of Islam."

In the multi-ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, the factor of the "Russian language" as a means of interethnic communication and international education is gradually being replaced by Arabic. Arabic is becoming a rallying point for young people. Thousands of young people today are forced to seek knowledge outside the Caucasian republics, because the "intelligentsia" and the official clergy are not able to give what the youth are looking for. For example, for Dagestani youth "Daavat" - a call to faith, is the basis of today's realities. Young people are being recruited into the ranks of the Wahhabis, and ethnic separatism is developing against the Russian people and the Slavs as a whole. Some experts consider these processes to be a response to the actions of skinheads in large cities of the country. Adding fuel to the fire is the constant talk about the creation of the Islamic Republic and the separation of Dagestan from Russia, which also increases migration. As a result, the uncontrolled mass exodus of Russians turns into the rise of titular ethnic groups in the republics. The physical squeezing of Russians out of the Caucasus republics also aggravates relations with the Cossacks. The true reasons for the outflow of the Russian population from Dagestan have not yet been officially determined. The assertion that the main reason is their difficult socio-economic situation is clearly untenable, if only because their situation is exactly the same as that of the rest of the population of Dagestan. The mass outflow of the Russian population, the most educated group among the residents of the North Caucasus regions, also continues from the other national republics. In fact, this means Russia's withdrawal from the Caucasus. The modernization of the North Caucasus Federal District, formulated by the President as the main task facing Alexander

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Khloponin, was complicated primarily by the fact that to this day the outflow of the Russian population, that is, the most qualified personnel who are so necessary today for the modernization leap, continues in this region regions of the Caucasus. The vast majority of Russians who left the North Caucasus republics between 1989 and 2020 were teachers, doctors, highly qualified workers, engineers, high-tech specialists and scientists. It is for this reason, for example, that enterprises of the military-industrial complex in the Caucasus republics, which at one time provided up to 80% of the economy of these republics, are almost completely inactive. And this is just one of a number of examples. The combination of such factors largely led the situation to that economically depressed state. Despite the fact that the outflow of the Russian population continues, human rights organizations operating in the North Caucasus, including the Memorial Foundation, SOVA etc., record only those cases of violations that relate exclusively to the oppression of representatives of North Caucasian ethnic groups by local authorities and the federal center, especially by security forces. At the same time, facts of violation of the rights of the Russian population, in particular, facts of oppression of Russians by both local authorities and the “titular” population of the republics of the North Caucasus Federal District, are not given any publicity or consideration. The same tone is supported by Kavkazcenter.com and the Caucasian Knot. Because of this, an extremely one-sided picture of what is happening in the North Caucasus is created, and this, in turn, causes a number of serious problems for the Russian leadership in relations with such Western structures as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the European Parliament, the Commission on Human Rights and other organizations. Strange as it may seem, the local media of the republics of the North Caucasus Federal District, controlled by the republican authorities, work in the same vein, namely, they hush up the facts of oppression of the Russian population. And if human rights activists and extremists are trying to pit the federal leadership of the Russian Federation against each other and Western structures involved in monitoring the human rights situation, thereby creating political problems for the Russian authorities, then in the situation with local media the motives are completely different. Republican authorities are afraid of publicity of facts of oppression of the Russian population and highlighting the trend of outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus due to the fact that they do not want to spoil the overall image picture in their republics, which ultimately affects the volume of funding from the federal center to these totally subsidized regions. Thus, with regard to the topic of the outflow of Russians from the republics of the North Caucasus, including Adygea, a kind of “conspiracy of silence” is emerging. It is not profitable for local authorities to

advertise these facts for economic reasons. External ones predominantly Western human rights foundations and the media they supervise create a one-sided picture of what is happening, trying to legitimize the increased political pressure of the West on the Russian leadership. In this context, the main task of the Russian authorities is to conduct a scientific sociological study designed to restore a full picture of what is happening in the North Caucasus in order to identify the reasons for the outflow of Russians, describe them, and immediately begin to develop constructive solutions to these problems. These decisions, in turn, should eliminate the catalysts for the outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus, over time reverse the situation and lead to the beginning of an influx of Russians to the North Caucasus Federal District. Only the return of highly specialized Russian personnel and the saturation of the Caucasian infrastructure with Russian specialists in the industrial and agricultural complexes will solve the modernization tasks that were set for Khloponin. Ultimately, the general recovery of this region, initiated by the influx of Russians, should provoke its transition from the category of unprofitable regions to the category of donor regions. An empirical study conducted by the authors of the report “North Caucasus: The Russian Factor” (published in the spring of this year) brings its own to this picture adjustments and additional aspects, namely:

firstly, the North Caucasus News Agency, which appeared recently and actively supplied factual material to the authors of the report, aims to create an information resource that, through its activities, would balance the one-sided anti-Russian picture formed by the already mentioned portals, the SOVA analytical center and similar resources;

secondly, the report itself puts on the agenda the problem of geopolitical destabilization of the North Caucasus, in particular, it describes the consequences of the influence of the Western vector on the North Caucasus, the purpose of which is to “sever it” from Russia, transfer this region and place it under the geopolitical control of the West.

The means to achieve this goal are precisely to stimulate the outflow of the Russian population, the loss of administrative and military control over the region by the federal center. In this regard, the “Russian Vector” in the North Caucasus should be aimed at stabilizing the situation, at preserving the territorial integrity of Russia - that is, at preserving the North Caucasus under the geopolitical control of Moscow. In addition, the report describes the history of the outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus, starting in the late 60s, shortly after the “Grozny uprising” of 1957, when Russians began to leave as a result of ethnic pressure from the Chechens rehabilitated by Khrushchev, and ending in the 2000s. It provides statistics on the outflow of Russians by year and region. So Dagestan in the period from 1979

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to 1988. More than 31 thousand Russians left Kabardino-Balkaria, a little over three thousand, North Ossetia about 20 thousand, and Checheno-Ingushetia more than 56 thousand people. But over the next decade, the number of Russians who left rapidly increased. The reasons for this: the beginning of the genocide of Russians in Chechnya, the rapid ethnicization and growth of separatist sentiments, the spread of Islamism and, ultimately, the first and second Chechen campaigns. From 1989 (the last Soviet census) to 1998 (the last year of the “Khasavyurt peace”) about 35 thousand Russians left Dagestan, more than 7 thousand Kabardino-Balkaria, and about 9 thousand people left North Ossetia. Naturally, the record holders were Chechnya and Ingushetia - more than 256 thousand people left voluntarily. To these should be added the violent “loss” of another 9 thousand people, and this is only according to official statistics. How many Russians “died” during the period of Dudayev’s genocide against Russians is now quite difficult to establish. If according to the 1989 census, the total share of Russians in the North Caucasian republics reached 26% (in absolute figures - 1359 thousand people, with the total population of the republics - 5305 thousand people) and varied from 9% in Dagestan to 68% in Adygea, then by the last census 2002 this figure fell to 15%, or 994 thousand people. That is, since 1989, to 2002 the negative balance of the Russian population amounted to more than 360 thousand people. At the same time, the index of representation (RI) of Russians among heads of government bodies in the North Caucasus republics continues to decline. If in 1989 the ratio of the number of representatives of titular ethnic groups among heads of government bodies and their structural divisions to heads from among Russians in Kabardino-Balkaria was 0.57, then in 1999 it was 0.57. the same index in Kabardino-Balkaria was 0.47. The same in other republics: North Ossetia - 0.58 in 1989, versus 0.36 in 1999, etc. The oppression of the Russian population in the North Caucasus republics did not end in the 2000s. So in 2015-2022. According to the State Statistics Committee, at least 20 thousand people left the Karachay-Cherkess Republic (10.7% of the total number of Russians in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic). More than 22 thousand people (about 9% of the total Russian population) left the relatively calm Kabardino-Balkaria. Modern sociological surveys show that the Russian population is still inclined to leave the republics of the North Caucasus: about one third of those surveyed. Thus, 31% of Russian residents of Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria) want to leave for another Russian region, and among Kabardians and Balkars this figure is only 9%. In Vladikavkaz, 17% of Russians and 9% of Ossetians expressed a desire to leave North Ossetia, in Maykop - 28% of Russians and 1% of Adygeis. A significant part of Russians consider the interethnic relations

developing in the region to be bad. In Ingushetia, half of the Russians and only 9% of the Ingush think so. In Karachay-Cherkessia there are a quarter of Russians, 8% Karachais and 11% Circassians. The Russian population of the North Caucasus openly talks about restrictions on their rights. In Ingushetia, 57% of Russians and 25% of Ingush say this; in Chechnya – 40% Russians and 21% Chechens; in Kabardino-Balkaria - 29% Russians, 9% Kabardians and 21% Balkars; in Dagestan - 17% Russians and 13% Dagestanis. In Vladikavkaz, 54% of Russians and 25% of Ossetians surveyed spoke about inequality of opportunities for different ethnic groups to receive higher education; in Grozny – 40% Russians and 17% Chechens; in Nazran – 43% Russians and 16% Ingush; in Nalchik - 54% Russians, 56% Balkars and 25% Kabardians. 56% of Russians in Karachay-Cherkessia report ethnic inequality in employment; in Chechnya – 79%; in Kabardino-Balkaria – 73%; in Adygea – 68%. 18% of Russians in Karachay-Cherkessia and 20% of Russians in Dagestan declare a connection between their ethnic origin and their difficult financial and economic situation. Two-thirds of Russians in the North Caucasus reported ethnic inequality in their ability to be elected or appointed to leadership positions, and more than 13% described themselves as victims of humiliation or insult based on their Russian or Orthodox identity. In 2023, the outflow of Russians continued. Today, the main reason for the migration of the Russian population from the North Caucasus to other regions of Russia is economic preconditions - low living standards, unemployment, clanism, which is increasingly affecting the authorities and economic institutions of the republics of the North Caucasus.

Main part

Among the numerous mines laid under the foundation of Russia by the Bolsheviks and their heirs, the North Caucasus occupies a very significant place. During the civil war, the Red internationalists did not find anything better than to give the Chechens and Ingush the primordially Russian lands of the Terek Cossacks. Thus, the Cossacks, hated by the gang that captured Russia, were suppressed and support from the mountaineers was ensured. On November 17, 1920, the Bolshevik “Congress of the Peoples of the Terek Region” officially proclaimed the destruction of the Terek region and the creation in its place of the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the formation of which was approved by the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of January 20, 1921 of the year. National districts were created within the newly-minted “republic,” which were later to serve as the basis for the formation of separate autonomous regions. The cities of Grozny and Vladikavkaz became independent administrative units. At the same time, under the pretext of “liquidating the consequences of the agrarian policy

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of tsarism,” “On the agrarian issue, recognize the need to return to the mountaineers of the North Caucasus the lands taken from them by the Great Russians, at the expense of the kulak part of the Cossack population, and instruct the Council of People’s Commissars to immediately prepare an appropriate resolution,” wrote V.I. Lenin. On October 14, 1920, the Politburo adopted a resolution according to which the allocation of land to the highlanders was to take place at the expense of the “kulak part of the Cossack population.” District party conferences held locally in the spring and summer of 1921 decided to resolve the agrarian issue in the North Caucasus by “alienating surplus Cossack lands for the permanent allocation of landless mountaineers.” To ensure these decisions were made by the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which was then headed by G.K. Ordzhonikidze, [tens of thousands of Cossacks were evicted from their homes within 24 hours](#). Half of them, including women and children, were simply destroyed. “Five villages were evicted militarily. The recent uprising of the Cossacks provided a suitable pretext and facilitated the eviction; the land came into the possession of the Chechens. The situation in the North Caucasus can be considered undoubtedly stable,” I.V. reported to Lenin. Stalin. In the order of the Acting Commander of the Caucasian Labor Army Medvedev we read: “Art. Burn Kalinovskaya; the villages of Ermolovskaya, Zakan-Yurtovskaya, Samashkinskaya, Mikhailovskaya - to be given to the poorest landless population and, first of all, to the mountainous Chechens who were always loyal to the Soviet regime: why should the entire male population of the above-mentioned villages from 18 to 50 years old be loaded into trains and sent under escort to the North, for heavy forced labor; old people, women and children should be evicted from the villages, allowing them to move to farmsteads or villages in the North; horses, cows, sheep and other livestock, as well as property suitable for military purposes, should be transferred to the Cavalry Army - its relevant bodies, and the horses will be distributed according to the instructions of the Front Headquarters.”

Having done away with the Terek Cossacks and giving them the lands of “loyal” Chechens, the Bolsheviks began to increase the autonomy. Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Okrug... In January 1934, the unification of the Chechen and Ingush regions took place. On December 5, 1936, the Checheno-Ingush and North Ossetian autonomous regions were transformed into autonomous republics. To manage the autonomous regions, cadres of the national bureaucracy were cultivated in the Bolshevik party schools. The Stavropol region was not spared from the redrawing of borders. And in 1937, the Kizlyar National District was created in the southeastern part of the region. The policy of

“Chechenization” was interrupted by Hitler’s attack on the USSR. Instantly turning 180 degrees and forgetting all “internationalism,” the Bolsheviks, with the usual bitterness, began to repress the already “loyal” Chechens and Ingush. After the mass deportation of peoples, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was liquidated. Most of its territory, together with part of the Stavropol Territory and the abolished Kizlyar National District, was united into the Grozny region formed on March 22, 1944. However, the time has come for a “thaw”. This strange “thaw” mourned the “commissars in dusty helmets” and did not shed a single tear for the Russian peasants... In the same way, it rehabilitated the Ingush and Chechens, without even for a moment remembering the exterminated Terek Cossacks. Nikita Khrushchev returned the highlanders to their native lands, restored the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic at the expense of the territories of the disbanded Grozny region and a significant part of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, from which the eastern regions with cities such as Nazran (formerly Costakhetagurovo), Malgobek, Karabulak, etc. were cut off. In addition, the Cossack left bank of the Terek was slaughtered for the offended peoples. This significant event took place in 1957. A year later, a little-known Russian riot took place in Grozny. “In 1957 alone, over 200 thousand people arrived in the autonomous republic, which significantly exceeded the figures provided for by the four-year resettlement plan. This created serious problems with employment and housing. In addition - the massive acquisition of weapons, mutual responsibility, murders based on blood feud, rape, attacks on residents of the republic representing other nationalities. The arriving sheikhs, mullahs and teip authorities, influencing young people in a nationalistic and religious spirit, sought to revive the ideas of muridism and obedience to Sharia law. Quarrels over houses and garden plots, scandals and group fights with the use of bladed weapons and firearms have become commonplace throughout the republic. For example, at the end of 1957, anti-Russian leaflets were distributed in Grozny, and attacks by Chechen youth on students of vocational schools and officers of the Soviet Army were also recorded. “Things are very bad,” one of the Russian residents of Chechnya wrote to her relative in Russia, “Chechens come, do whatever they want, beat Russians, slaughter, kill, set houses on fire at night. The people are in panic. Many have left, and the rest are gathering.” And indeed, as a result of intimidation, with the full connivance of the republican authorities, during 1957, 113 thousand Russians, Ossetians, Avars, Ukrainians and citizens of other nationalities left the Chi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The justified indignation of the population at the atrocities of hooligan elements from among the Chechens, as well as the inability of the authorities to

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really protect non-indigenous residents, provoked the Russian population of Grozny into mass riots that occurred in the city on August 26 and 27, 1958. On the evening of August 23, 1958, in the suburb of Grozny, the village of Chernorechye, where most of the people lived workers and employees of the Grozny chemical plant, Chechen Lulu Malsagov, while drunk, started a fight with a Russian guy, Vladimir Korotchev, and stabbed him in the stomach. A little later, Malsagov, along with other Chechens, met Yevgeny Stepashin, a factory worker who had just been demobilized from the army, and stabbed him several times. Stepashin's wounds turned out to be fatal, but Korotchev was saved." On August 26, the first rally against the atrocities of the Chechens takes place in Grozny. A group of youth broke into the regional committee and tried to force the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Chi ASSR Gayerbekov, the second secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU Chakhkiev and other workers to the square. However, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs managed to expel the demonstrators from the regional committee and detained the most active of them. The meeting was dispersed by garrison soldiers and police. However, the very next day, as Matveev writes, "about 10 thousand people gathered on Lenin Square. The speakers persistently repeated their demands - to release the comrades arrested the day before. Calls were heard from the speakers above people's heads: "Free the arrested youth!", "Exile the Chechens from Grozny!" By 2 p.m., part of the crowd of more than a thousand people approached the buildings of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic. Several people entered the balcony of the Ministry of Internal Affairs building and demanded the release of all those detained the day before. Under pressure from the masses, the authorities made concessions and released everyone. The resolution of the meeting addressed to the authorities was also hastily written. "Taking into account the manifestation of a brutal attitude on the part of the Chechen-Ingush population towards the peoples of other nationalities, expressed in massacres, murders, violence and bullying," it said, "the workers of the city of Grozny, on behalf of the majority of the population of the republic, propose, namely: On the evening of August 23, 1958, in the suburb of Grozny, the village of Chernorechye, where workers and employees of the Grozny chemical plant mainly lived, Chechen Lulu Malsagov, while drunk, started a fight with a Russian guy, Vladimir Korotchev, and stabbed him in the stomach. A little later, Malsagov, along with other Chechens, met Yevgeny Stepashin, a factory worker who had just been demobilized from the army, and stabbed him several times. Stepashin's wounds turned out to be fatal, but Korotchev was saved." On August 26, the first rally against the atrocities of the Chechens takes place in Grozny. A group of youth broke into the regional committee and

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*from August 27, 1958, rename the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into the Grozny region or into the Interethnic Soviet Socialist Republic;

*the Checheno-Ingush population is allowed to live in the Grozny region no more than 10% of the total population;

* resettle advanced progressive Komsomol youth of various nationalities from other republics to develop the wealth of the Grozny region and for the development of agriculture.

Unable to get through to Moscow, the crowd headed to the long-distance telephone exchange. While trying to get inside, chemical plant worker Andrianov was killed by security and two other people were injured. Under the threat of violence, telephone operators nevertheless organized a connection for the rally activists with the reception of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Khrushchev. At 11 p.m., a group of demonstrators with a red banner headed to the Grozny station and delayed the departure of the Rostov-Baku train. People walked around the carriages and asked passengers to tell residents of other cities that "in Grozny, Chechens are killing Russians, and the local authorities are not taking any measures." The following inscriptions appeared on the outside of the carriages: "Brothers! Chechens and Ingush kill Russians. Local authorities support them. Soldiers are shooting at Russians!" Around midnight, troops appeared at the station, but the rally participants threw stones at them. Butts were used. Soon the crowd was dispersed and the train was sent to its destination. At the same time, military units managed to restore order in the square near the regional committee building. The next day, police and state security agencies began an intensive search for active participants in the riots. Every day there were more and more new arrests, the number of which exceeded a hundred. Over the next two months, the local court barely had time to announce sentences: from a year of probation to 10 years in prison. Among the articles of indictment against the convicted person was Article 59-2 (mass riots). This is how the authorities dealt with those who dared to doubt the correctness of its course." The authorities did not draw any conclusions from this prologue of future bloody

events in the region. They were not made in the "new" Russia, where hardly anyone remembered the events of 1958. Exactly according to Khrushchev's patterns, the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Russia of March 15, 1992 recognized illegal repressive acts against peoples subjected to forced relocation - Chechens and Ingush, but not a word was said about the tens of thousands of exterminated Cossacks. Signed by Boris Yeltsin on April 26, 1991, the RSFSR Law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples" in Art. 6 even proclaimed the "territorial rehabilitation" of peoples officially declared "repressed", with the organization of "measures for the restoration of national-territorial borders that existed before their unconstitutional violent change," as well as the return of "repressed peoples" to their "places of former residence on the territory of the RSFSR". Of course, there was no talk of returning the lands to the Cossacks and restoring the Terek region liquidated by the Bolsheviks. What happened next must be memorable for everyone... "Pogroms, robbery and murders of the non-Chechen population began in Chechnya already in the spring of 1991 (and did not meet with opposition from Moscow)," wrote A.I. Solzhenitsyn. - Moreover, Chechen leaders and active militants did not fail to take advantage of the collapse of the state in the fall of 1991. Dudayev seized power and declared the independence of Chechnya, which the Chechens have always warily craved. Unprepared for anything, devoid of historical thinking, the Russian leadership immediately impulsively declared martial law in Chechnya, but, two or three days later, lifting it due to its impotence, only made itself look ridiculous. And here is the first mystery of the further three years of inaction: the Russian military command ceded abundant weapons of all kinds, including aviation, to the self-proclaimed Chechnya. Some powerful secret interests of some high spheres in Moscow dictated behavior "as if nothing had happened." The same abundant flow of Tyumen oil was sent to the Grozny oil refinery, without bringing Russia even the comparative value of this oil; the difference went to someone, was divided somewhere. State subsidies to Chechnya and all other economic and transport connections with it also continued. And in Chechnya itself, unbridled terror was being unleashed against the non-Chechen population, and mainly the Russians. The Chechens arbitrarily insulted and humiliated Russians, robbed, took away property, apartments, land plots, killed, threw them out of windows from floors, raped, kidnapped women, men, and children from kindergartens - many disappeared without a trace. "Russians! Get out of Chechnya! Russian cries were heard from Chechnya, Russians came with complaints and knocked on the door of Russian authorities - but for all three years they remained indifferent. There was no administrative or judicial protection for anyone. And about the fate of this half a million non-Chechens - the

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entire Russian press, now so free, was silent for all three years! And Russian television did not show us any tearing scenes or corpses for three years. And for three years the most distinguished Russian “human rights activists” were complacent, revealing the composure of our educated society. (For all three years, I know of only one report from Chechnya in a Moscow newspaper: that in the first six months of the Dudayev regime in Chechnya, every third resident was subjected to violence - of course, a non-Chechen.) This was, as they now say, ethnic cleansing, but from It became visible to the whole world in Bosnia, but to no one from Chechnya. Neither the UN, nor the OSCE, nor the Council of Europe.”

It would seem that this bloody story could really teach decision-makers nothing? It turns out she could. On January 19, 2010, by presidential decree, the North Caucasus Federal District was formed, into which, strictly according to Bolshevik patterns, in addition to the Caucasian republics, the Russian Stavropol region was included. In subsequent years, the media occasionally reported on the situation in the region becoming increasingly tense. “The power structures know that the situation in the Stavropol region has long been developing according to a scenario unfavorable for Russian statehood,” the correspondents stated. At the level of regional leadership and law enforcement agencies of the Southern and North Caucasus federal districts, meetings are regularly held where alarming information is made public. Most operational and analytical generalizations boil down to the fact that in the Stavropol Territory, the squeezing out of the Russian and Russian-speaking population continues at a rapid, let us emphasize, rapid pace. The eastern regions of the region take the lead in this regard. The Cossack and Russian population of villages, former farmsteads and villages is declining due to the outflow of people to other regions of Russia. In addition, the natural decline of old-timers continues. According to law enforcement agencies, the Stavropol region is inhabited mainly by immigrants from Chechnya and Dagestan. In addition to the fact that the purchase and seizure of agricultural land is underway, the eyes of the new population of the region are turned to the well-maintained and promising region from the point of view of tourism development in the Caucasian Mineral Waters region. The situation is so alarming that in a conversation with a correspondent, “one of the representatives of the government structures stated directly: “We have lost the Stavropol region...”. I think this statement doesn’t really need any commentary.” “You will soon be leaving home here and running away” - interethnic peace in the Stavropol Territory, it seems, remains only on paper. Dozens of detainees, knives, guns, fights, murders - the region has become a new zone of instability in Russia,” - so in 2021. [wrote "Moskovsky Komsomolets"](#). In a large article in the newspaper, the Stavropol Territory is

referred to as Russian Kosovo. Having given a long list of ethnic conflicts and crimes against Russians in the region, the correspondent notes: “It came to the point that at one of the meetings of the regional government, the chairman of the regional Duma, Yuri Bely, said: “We are sitting on a powder keg. Problems arise all over the region. On the Internet, people respond en masse to us like this: “We will show Alexey and Ivan who are the bosses here!” The governor of the region, Valery Zerenkov, proposed forming Cossack troops of up to a thousand people, armed with traumatic weapons, under law enforcement agencies. I was born in Grozny and remember very well what processes took place there in the late 80s and early 90s,” says Yevgeny Boyarsky, an activist of the New Force social movement. “Then we saw the explosive growth of nationalism. Up to 300 thousand people fled from the republic at that time, thousands of Russian-speaking people were killed before the start of the first Chechen war. According to my observations, now the situation in the region is at the level of the Chechen situation. Head of the Levokumsky district Nikolai Naphanyuk: “We have a population of 40 thousand people in our region. Every year 300–400 Russian-speaking families leave, that’s a fact. Now in our region the ratio is as follows: 75% Russians, 25% visitors. At the same time, about 70% of business and land are concentrated in the hands of visiting Dargins. The corruption of the previous leaders led to this situation. Whoever paid ordered the music.” Demographer, professor of the Stavropol State Agrarian University, Doctor of Political Sciences Yuri Efimov: “The Russian population is not so actively reproducing itself, but the Caucasian population is more active. Migration processes play into the hands of Caucasian ethnic groups. If earlier there was a huge influx of Russians from the national republics into the region, now it has been exhausted - everyone who could have already left. The situation is especially difficult in the east of the region. In 2020, I received carte blanche from the regional authorities to study the current situation. My assistants and I toured these areas, studied the situation in detail, and put forward a number of proposals to the governor. But no one wanted to do anything. We studied in detail the migration, demographic, socio-economic spheres of the eastern regions. The most difficult situation is in 5 of them: Neftekumsky, Budennovsky, Levokumsky, Kursk, Arzgirsky. Apart from our research, no one has even studied in detail the problem of migration flows and the interaction of newcomers with indigenous residents. Municipalities ring the bells, they see everything locally, but at the regional level it is easier for officials to pretend that nothing is happening.” The war in Novorossiia largely diverted public attention from the events in the Stavropol region. Experts who predicted an explosion in this region after the 2014 Olympics were wrong. An explosion occurred in

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Kyiv. However, this, of course, did not solve the problem of Stavropol. In 2015, Russian activists of the Stavropol Territory appealed to the authorities with a demand to recognize the state - the constitutive status of the Russian people. In their address to the president, they, in particular, indicated: "The strategy for the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus until 2025, developed under the leadership of Alexander Khloponin, does not assume the presence of a Russian ethnic and cultural component in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, and therefore in the future and in other subjects of the North Caucasian Federal District, including the Stavropol region." This appeal went unheard. "The Stavropol region is no longer a buffer territory on the path of radicals. This is a source of tension. In Stavropol there are places of compact residence of people who have recently become neophytes. This is a fertile environment for those who can form a radical jamaat. The situation itself contributes to this. There is a colossal outflow of the Russian population from the eastern regions of Stavropol and even from Stavropol itself. The indigenous population is being replaced. It is proceeding very systematically and systematically. A new cultural environment is being created. It is obvious that this process is being managed. Wahhabi preachers stimulated the influx of new population, radical ones, into the republics of the North Caucasus. Now it is going to the Stavropol region. A jamaat is formed. Then there is a conflict over land, then there are conflicts over pastures, and local residents no longer have the opportunity to graze their livestock... These people are financed from closed Islamist funds, from not very legitimately operating commercial organizations, this is very actively supported by Western grant-giving organizations. The preconditions are being created for the indigenous population to leave. The goal is for the Caucasus to cease to be Russian." "If this process continues to intensify, then in addition to the fact that the radical component will intensify, the economy will also decline at a colossal pace. Unfortunately, in our opinion, these processes are already irreversible in the Stavropol region." Having come to power in 1917, the Bolsheviks began to carry out the so-called. international policy. But it is much more accurate to call this policy anti-national. Anti-Russian. Its result was the collapse of the Russian state, colossal demographic losses of the Russian people and many mines that continue to detonate. Communist power has not officially existed for more than 26 years. But over all these years, its policy on national issues remains essentially unchanged. The processes, the irreversibility of which the RISS expert speaks of, are

truly irreversible in the current conditions. In order for these processes, as well as other similar ones (separatist, centrifugal) to become reversible, Russia needs a Russian national policy, which would be based on the interests of the state-forming people, the well-being and growth of which is the only guarantee of the existence of Russia as such. The adoption and implementation of such a policy is a matter of survival of our people and our country. And it is precisely the implementation of such a policy that would become a real, and not a formal, end to the most catastrophic period of our history - the Bolshevik period, and would mean a genuine overcoming of it. However, alas, There are no prerequisites for such an overcoming yet. The state system of the Russian Federation continues to follow false international-multinational dogmas. We have seen what this leads to more than once over the last century and, especially, the last decades. And God forbid we see this again - now in the Russian Stavropol region. It should be clarified that after the initial encouragement of national minorities in the fight against the Russians as the main enemy of communism, the Bolsheviks began to suppress the religions of all peoples, including the Chechens - which is why their uprisings followed, so did hopes for the German "liberators" during the war... The punitive expulsion of Chechens by Stalin "for cooperation with the occupiers" in 1944 only added fuel to the fire. They returned from exile embittered "against Moscow." The memory of this, according to [Chechen historian Avtorkhanov](#), played a big role in the emergence of the current anti-Russian separatism. Of course, after the first connivance, Moscow finally correctly suppressed the independent terrorist-slave-owning "Ichkeria" of Dudayev-Maskhadov-Basayev. But instead of restoring justice to the expelled 300 thousand Russians, Putin decided to buy the loyalty of the Chechens with money, which is obvious to everyone. From 2007 to 2015, Chechnya received 539 billion rubles from the federal budget in the form of subsidies, subventions and subsidies. Their annual volume averaged 60 billion rubles, and according to this indicator, the republic is one of the three most subsidized regions (only Dagestan and Yakutia received more in 2013 and 2014). According to the Ministry of Finance, in 2014, 81.6% of Chechnya's budget came from the federal budget. Only Ingushetia had more - 85.6%. In terms of subsidies per capita, Chechnya, however, is in 8th place (41.5 thousand rubles) after the Chukotka and Nenets Autonomous Okrugs, Magadan Region, Altai, Yakutia, Tyva and Ingushetia ([picture 1](#)).

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Figure 1 – Free assistance to Chechnya

“This is not the main problem of the North Caucasus Federal District, however, almost every researcher has noted, to one degree or another, a noticeable decrease in the outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus regions. Noticeably fewer people began to leave Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. For North Ossetia, this problem has always been less pressing, but for Ingushetia and Chechnya the problem has remained at the same level,” she told Russian Planet. The professor considers even the empirical conclusions of the authors of the reports sufficient, since they all live locally. “Immersed in the situation, they can observe on the spot, and even if this is not a completely sufficient, but quite objective method,” she said. Carnegie Moscow Center expert Alexei Malashenko also believes that the outflow has decreased, but explains this phenomenon simply - there is no one left to leave. “Yes, in these republics they treat Russians with great respect, but only the older generation,” he told Russian Planet. — In Ingushetia and Chechnya, it seems, there are no Russians at all anymore. So what is the outflow?” The problem can be solved, Malashenko is sure, but financial support should become noticeably higher. “If, like the military in the Caucasus, coefficients were also added to the salaries of teachers, doctors, specialists, then there would be interest, honor, and an incentive to return and stay,” he said. Officials take credit for stopping the flight of Russians. In recent years, both federal and local authorities have constantly announced multimillion-dollar programs “for the return of Russians.” However, many experts are confident that such programs are either a banal “washing” or simple PR. Thus, in Chechnya, back in 2017, they launched a targeted program “The return and settlement of the Russian and Russian-speaking population who previously lived in the Chechen Republic.” There were reports that the Russian-

speaking population had begun to return, and figures were also given: up to 300 returning families by October 2018. By the time the two-year program was completed in March 2020, a representative of the Ministry of Nationalities of the Chechen Republic admitted that the program remained at the draft stage, since the republican budget was not enough, and the federal budget was not generous for these purposes. Lawyer Kaloy Akhilgov, a former press secretary of the President of Ingushetia, believes that the outflow of Russians has indeed slowed down, but has not stopped. He sees the reason that “the crime situation has stabilized.” But the Russians, he said, are in no hurry to return. “In reality, Russians are reluctant to return. There are examples, but they are rare. I believe there is no such flow for which a program would be necessary,” said Akhilgov RP. As you know, the flight of Russians began in the 90s, primarily from Chechnya. In the “zero” years it decreased, tension around the Russian minority gradually subsided. The exception was Ingushetia, where the Wahhabis began a direct campaign to push out the Russians in 2006-2007. They distributed threatening leaflets, and even backed up these threats with direct attacks. One of the victims was the deputy head of the Sunzhensky district administration, Galina Gubina, which oversaw the then-current program for the return of the Russian-speaking population. Thus, in July 2007, in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya (Sleptsovskaya), an elderly teacher Lyudmila Terekhina and her two adult children were killed, and then militants planted a bomb in the local cemetery and detonated it during Terekhina’s funeral, when her colleagues came to say goodbye to her, she was injured 10 people. But since then, the republic has become much calmer; there have been no open threats against the Russian population.

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In Kabardino-Balkaria, at the end of 2013 and the beginning of last year, rumors spread about mass attempts to rape Russian girls on the streets, but the authorities did not note attacks based specifically on ethnicity. In the Stavropol and Krasnodar territories, fights with stabbings are still recorded, which acquire an interethnic character. As Abdulla Istambulov, adviser to the head of the administration of the head of Chechnya, notes, in other parts of Russia the stereotype remains that the Caucasus is dangerous. "People are not ready to go yet; stereotypes and fears are too deep in their minds," he told RP. In August last year, a program for the return of Russians was launched in the most multinational republic of the North Caucasian Federal District - Dagestan. The program is aimed at the northern part of the republic, where Russians live compactly: Tarumovsky and Kizlyarsky districts, the city of Izberbash. According to the program, the authorities are even ready to give Russian families money for the purchase or construction of cottages and to facilitate their employment.

The head of the Tarumovsky district, Marina Abramkina, echoes Malashenko - the outflow has indeed decreased, but only because there is no one left to leave. "Who's left here? Established families, those who live in joint marriages, and old people who have nowhere to go," Abramkina told Russian Planet. Meanwhile, the program to attract Russians, according to her, is still working - several families who once left Dagestan have returned to the area. "We already have requests from 52 families who want to return. There are also those who have never lived in Dagestan before, but have expressed a desire to move," said the first deputy minister for national policy of the republic, Zikrula Ilyasov. "A third of them are already settling in, according to the program they should be allocated funds for the purchase of housing, the decision has already been made "only the bureaucratic part remains," Ilyasov complains. — What's interesting is that they say that they haven't taken root in other regions because of the difference in mentality. In Dagestan, their social well-being is better, they say." The program also covers the usual development of the northern regions. For example, 10 million rubles were spent on road repairs. In the next one, 100 million rubles are planned, the official said. As part of the program, money is also allocated to Cossack communities. However, the official admits: "The program is currently sequestered due to the financial situation." According to the program, not only those who lived in Dagestan before can come, but also any Slavs in general - citizens of Russia. Thus, it was under this program that the republic accepted refugees from Ukraine for permanent residence. True, the program does not explain by what criteria Slavic origin is determined; Ilyasov could not answer this question either. Ilyasov believes that the reverse flow of Russians will begin anyway - after the first families

of immigrants have been settled. According to statistics, since 1989 (the last Soviet census) to 1998 (the last year of the "Khasavyurt peace") about 35 thousand Russians left Dagestan, more than 7 thousand - Kabardino-Balkaria, and about 9 thousand people left North Ossetia. The record holder, naturally, was the former Checheno-Ingushetia - the exodus from there reached 256 thousand. If, according to the 1989 census, the share of Russians and Russian speakers in general in the North Caucasian republics reached 26% (in absolute figures - 1.359 million people, with the total population of the republics - 5.305 million). The Russian "share" varied from 9% in Dagestan to 68% in Adygea, but by the 2020 census this figure had dropped to 15%, which amounted to 994 thousand people. That is, the outflow amounted to more than 360 thousand people.

The 2020 census also records the outflow of Russians, although at a slower pace. So, for example, in Dagestan over 8 years there were fewer Russians by 1.1%, in Kabardino-Balkaria - by 2.6%, in Karachay-Cherkessia - by 2.1%, in Ossetia - by 2.5%, in Chechnya - by 1.8%. There are one percent fewer Russians even in the Russian region itself—Stavropol.

The life of Russians and genocide in Karachay-Cherkessia. A Russian resident of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic N.V. Potemkin wrote a letter to me.

Hello Oksana! What you write about about the Stavropol region happened to my Motherland in the mid-90s, my Homeland is Cherkessk, although I don't like this name. The population of the republic of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic was more than 60 percent Russian, but we were betrayed by our representatives in power, the Russians/Jews sold seats in parliament, seats in the leadership of the republic in the regions, 20 percent of us remained, mostly old people.

The Soviet people - the Russians did not have their own identity (they were not self-organized) unlike the Caucasian peoples. The Russians lost, now we are outcasts, we are not in the leadership of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic and business (with the rare exception of 1 percent). What is happening in your Stavropol region happened to us - "one to one". I'm very worried about you - hang in there!

We can start with the fact that the city of Cherkessk was founded on the site of the victory over the Turks and Caucasian peoples in 1825 as the village of Batalpashinskaya. In my opinion, the population of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic now is 50% Karachais, 30% Circassians and Abazas, 20% Russians, this is a rough estimate, there are a few more - Nogais, Chechens, Armenians, Greeks, etc.

Throughout the 90s, there was a struggle for power in the republic between the Karachais and the Circassians/Abazas, the Karachais won, seizing the government, the police and all profitable enterprises in the republic, all this took place against the backdrop of squeezing out Russians from everywhere. There

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was an active resettlement of Karachais from villages to the city. Russians were oppressed at all levels, at school, at work, on the street they could be severely beaten, those who could left.

By 2007, the seizure and redistribution of spheres of influence ended, no one rebelled anymore, everyone accepted Karachay's superiority as a given. (In the parliament of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, each nation is represented by deputies in a number proportional to the number of this people; this is a puppet government). Over the past 25 years, the Russians have been trying to send their children away with instructions not to return.

Since 2010, life has become calmer in terms of the manifestation of open nationalism, everyone started making money, legalizing illegal things, but the trouble is that Russians in this action were given the maximum role of workers; of course, there can be no talk about any leadership positions. It's the same in the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russians were ousted from there by various methods.

You can also mention the annual Moscow commissions in the government and the Ministry of Internal Affairs; it is not difficult to guess that they are greeted with special hospitality and sent back significantly richer. The situation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs is interesting, there were years when Moscow appointed leaders within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, fat men came, imposed tribute on all city and district police departments and district police departments and lived here like ambassadors from the "Golden Horde." Naturally, all this burden fell on ordinary people in the form of extortion and cop setups. Everyone in the republic knew how this scheme worked.

God forbid that a Russian gets into the Karachay-Cherkess Republic in a "mintovka", they will hang all the hang-ups on you, sell your house, car, force you to take out a loan to get out and still close it for show.

I will never say that all Caucasians are bad, they helped me out many times in different situations, but just as many times they created problems for me. There are decent people among them, but if the question becomes which of your friends will you marry, a right Russian or a wrong Russian, the answer is obvious - for your friend in any case, no matter how wrong he is.

My son is in the first grade, out of 31 students, only three are Russian, at first it was hard for him, he fought every day, he came in torn clothes, scratched, once he came all bitten, but he showed character, did not allow himself to be broken, now he is calmer. Parents scold Russian children for fighting at school, but with Caucasians it's different - the woman is silent, and the father will always praise if his son beat someone and teach him how to fight if he loses. I think I'll send him somewhere to Russia later.

I myself work in a small organization among the Karachays, the team is good, I have no complaints

about the leadership, they are decent people, but I also have no future in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic. I know that in many regions of the Stavropol region, the heads of the internal affairs department are Caucasians and the service personnel are gradually changing their nationality - this is a disaster. I hope the Russians of Stavropol still have a chance to organize themselves and rectify the situation, I really hope.

And maybe I haven't heard of such a phenomenon yet - "shabai". This is the name given to Russian slaves who are kept by force on the farms of the Karachays; there are such people in the Stavropol region. The power structures know that the situation in the Stavropol region has long been developing according to a scenario unfavorable for Russian statehood. At the level of regional leadership and law enforcement agencies of the Southern and North Caucasus federal districts, meetings are regularly held where alarming information is made public. Most operational and analytical generalizations boil down to the fact that in the Stavropol Territory, the squeezing out of the Russian and Russian-speaking population continues at a rapid, let us emphasize, rapid pace. The eastern regions of the region take the lead in this regard. The Cossack and Russian population of villages, former farmsteads and villages is declining due to the outflow of people to other regions of Russia. In addition, the natural decline of old-timers continues.

According to law enforcement agencies, the Stavropol region is inhabited mainly by immigrants from Chechnya and Dagestan. In addition to the fact that the purchase and seizure of agricultural land is underway, the eyes of the new population of the region are turned to the well-maintained and promising region from the point of view of tourism development in the Caucasian Mineral Waters region.

The situation is so alarming that in a conversation with a Segodnya.ru correspondent, one of the representatives of the government structures stated directly: "We have lost the Stavropol region." I think this statement doesn't really need any commentary. The only thing we can add is that in the next two years there will be no reaction to the reduction of the Russian range in the North Caucasus. They will try not to tritely advertise the crisis situation, for example, due to the 2014 Winter Olympics, a global event.

However, a similar practice of silence and concealment exists not only in the North Caucasus, but throughout Russia, when clashes on national and religious grounds are classified as "everyday life", and the notorious Article 282 is mainly used in relation to the media and public figures, which made it possible to openly and directly declare the genocide of the Russian people.

Where is the mass exodus and extinction of the Russian population in the Stavropol region? Considering the tendency and the federal center's

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emphasis on powerful national Caucasian clans, which is clearly demonstrated by the prosperity of Chechnya, one can assume that even after the Olympic competitions, the de-Russification of the Stavropol Territory will not cause any special emotions in Moscow. To this end, they will hold a couple of seminars and conferences on the topic of tolerance and mutual respect between peoples in Pyatigorsk, which is turning into a multicultural center, and they will also put an end to the plenipotentiary's report.

The exclusive promotion of Plenipotentiary Khloponin to the Cossacks, which caused so much misunderstanding among the Cossacks, apparently brought little to the Terek Cossack Army as a whole, which never recovered into a single whole after the genocide of the early 20th century.

But the situation is such that the church is no longer silent. In particular, the head of the Synodal Committee for Interaction with the Cossacks, Bishop Kirill of Stavropol and Nevinnomyssk, sounded the alarm about what was happening. The clergy finally began to realize that along with the construction and decoration of churches, which is facilitated by local authorities, there is another, hidden trend - the number of parishioners in these churches is declining. And the day is not far off when a priest will have to make his way to a service in a Cossack village, bypassing entire clearings of Russians bent over in prayer.

One can give an example of the Grozny fortress, the development of which was contributed by General Ermolov, hated in de-Russified Chechnya. Until recently, residents of the neighboring Stavropol region were brought to the restored Grozny Church of St. Michael the Archangel for Easter, and the rector of the temple now has to live on the territory of a guarded complex of government buildings. Otherwise it's not safe.

"The main reason for the outflow of the indigenous population can be called uncontrolled migration from neighboring republics. Maybe migrants come with good things. But, having a completely different mentality, culture and religion, they cannot always integrate into the environment in which they come to live," Bishop Kirill said in an interview published in the Stavropol Blagovest newspaper.

According to the bishop, aliens often behave "very aggressively, forcing Russians to leave their lands," although "Russian and Caucasian peoples lived quite peacefully for centuries," and this needs to be learned again, "to learn the culture of living together."

Bishop Kirill is especially concerned about the situation in the east of the region, where "terrorist attacks and Wahhabism" are a big problem. In this regard, the bishop, who received "the blessing of His Holiness the Patriarch to support the Russian-speaking population," gave the task to his assistants to analyze the situation in the eastern deaneries, began to

collect information from various sources himself, held several meetings at which we developed a program for intensifying spiritual, educational, missionary and social work in the eastern regions of the Stavropol Territory."

Of course, the Word of Christ was preached in incredibly difficult, terrible circumstances both in the first centuries of Christianity and in subsequent times. Confessing Christ is a sacrifice of oneself, in which there are no compromises, which is confirmed by the feat of Yevgeny Rodionov, who accepted martyrdom in Chechnya, and hundreds of other examples of confession in the North Caucasus today.

It is obvious that the Russian world, shrinking like shagreen skin, is faced with a different, aggressive environment that does not accept dissent. We will reap the fruits of this development of events again and again. In this regard, the words of one of the Orthodox elders that Russians need to prepare for martyrdom, otherwise they will have to forget about their Russianness, sound more relevant than ever. There is no other option for survival. Soul survival.

And you shouldn't be so skeptical about the words of the old men from the Taman department of the Kuban Cossack Army, who believe that they will live to see the border again pass along the Kuban River, like two centuries ago. History, as we know, develops in a spiral.

Conclusion

Thus, the ideas of "Russian separatism" or the introduction of apartheid will not solve any of the pressing problems of the complex region and Russia as a whole. On the contrary, their practical implementation can provoke new conflicts, spur the isolation of various parts and ethnic groups of Russia, as well as the fragmentation of the country as a whole. However, the statement of this thesis does not mean at all that the authorities defending the current status quo can limit themselves to just routine criticism of extremists. The idea of "escape from the Caucasus" is fueled not only by catchy populist slogans, but also by the inaction of those who, by their status and position, should be involved in the prevention of ethnic and religious excesses, and the legal resolution of property, household and other disputes.

Consequently, the main task of today remains the real, and not the formal, arrival of the Russian state in the North Caucasus. In the form of an integrating force, a fair arbiter and a guarantor of security. Take, for example, such a story as the conscription of young men from the North Caucasus republics into the Russian army. In a multi-ethnic state, the conscript army becomes not just a power structure, but the most important tool for the integration of different segments of society. For the overpopulated and labor-abundant Caucasus, with its high unemployment rate and average age of 26-28 years, the army can become a good social elevator and a real alternative to the

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underground and criminal business. Speaking about the socio-economic development of the region, we should focus primarily not on the interests of large metropolitan businessmen, but on projects that will provide opportunities to the local population (jobs, involvement of small businesses), which in turn will create additional “anchors” for loyalty. And, of course, with the help of effective internal migration programs, the state will solve several problems at once (development of neglected and sparsely populated regions, reducing the demographic burden on the Caucasus, involving its residents in all-Russian processes). State support for civil society institutions in the Caucasian republics could create mass support for countering clanism and corruption. However, when discussing these measures, one should keep in mind: outside the all-Russian context, changes in the North Caucasus will not happen. Without qualitative changes in the entire state mechanism and a radical reform of national policy, transforming it from a complex of folklore and ethnographic holidays into a

strategy for the formation of a Russian citizen, an oasis of prosperity cannot be created.

Thus, the change in ethnic proportions in the North Caucasian republics is in favor of the titular ethnic groups, the proportion of which has increased from 66% to 80%. The share of the rest of the population decreased from 34% to 20%. This has led to significant changes in the political, economic and cultural space, in which representatives of non-titular ethnic groups are beginning to feel increasing discomfort. This, in turn, means that without making serious efforts to change the social climate towards the Russian population to a more favorable one, the task of returning Russians to the North Caucasus remains a utopia.

Only if the state realizes that the declared modernization of the North Caucasus requires a massive return of Russians to the North Caucasus Federal District, and therefore the creation of appropriate conditions for this, can the goal be achieved in the foreseeable future.

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SOI: [1.1/TAS](#) DOI: [10.15863/TAS](#)

International Scientific Journal Theoretical & Applied Science

p-ISSN: 2308-4944 (print) e-ISSN: 2409-0085 (online)

Year: 2024 Issue: 01 Volume: 129

Published: 01.01.2024 <http://T-Science.org>

Issue

Article



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THE INFLUENCE OF CHANGES IN THE ETHNIC STATUS POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN POPULATION IN THE PERCEPTION OF MULTIETHNIC YOUTH OF THE CAUCASUS REPUBLICS

Abstract: *in the article, the authors analyze the causes of intolerance, religious extremism, terrorism, radicalism among youth, problems in interethnic relations. Factors of interethnic tension that have regional specificity, in contrast to continental Russia, are considered. Particular tension in interethnic relations is caused by territorial disputes, the solution of which, even in the legal field, carries the danger of interethnic split, especially in such multi-ethnic entities as the Republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Adygea, Chechnya and the southern regions of the Stavropol Territory. The authors believe that the reason for this situation in the southern regions of the Russian Federation is the unovercome consequences of the political and economic crisis in the North Caucasus. The significant outflow of the Russian population from the region associated with the dramatic events of the 1990s, the subsequent low rates of socio-economic development and negative demographic dynamics led to a decrease in the role of Russians in the North Caucasus. This actualizes the scientific significance of the issues of changing the ethnostatus positions of the Russian population in the views of modern multiethnic youth.*

Key words: *extremism, radicalism, interethnic schism, North Caucasian republics, polyethnicity, outflow of the Russian population, identity, restoration of ethnic business, modernization, development of the regions of the North Caucasus Federal District, rights of peoples, migration problems, Russian Federation, Soviet history, social memory, Russian population, the youth, North Caucasus.*

Language: English

Citation: Shuvaeva, E. R., Voronina, K. Yu., Blagorodov, A. A., Prokhorov, V. T., & Volkova, G. Yu. (2024). The influence of changes in the ethnic status position of the Russian population in the perception of multiethnic youth of the Caucasus republics. *ISJ Theoretical & Applied Science*, 01 (129), 132-153.

Soi: <http://s-o-i.org/1.1/TAS-01-129-9> **Doi:** <https://dx.doi.org/10.15863/TAS.2024.01.129.9>

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OAJI (USA) = 0.350

Scopus ASCC: 2000.

Introduction

UDC 316.66:326.55.

When studying socio-political processes in the North Caucasus in the USSR, Russians made up a quarter of the population. The Soviet period is important for the analysis of the role of the Russian population for the national republics of their rural population on the dynamics of its influence on the loyalty of the Caucasus to the USSR and were one of the main actors in the socio-economic and cultural development of their regions. The dramatic events of the 1990s, a sharp decline in the level and quality of life and the subsequent low rates of socio-economic development led to a decrease in the number of Russians living in the North Caucasus.

The North Caucasus is a “frontline” region where peoples and cultures interact. Features of the North Caucasus region is the interaction of peoples with different sociocultural traditions, different ethnocultural and religious foundations. In the region, there is an interaction between different civilizations, religions and cultures, the stabilizing basis of which is the all-Russian identity. Russians, acting as carriers of the Russian language, culture and statehood, have historically contributed to the inclusion of the North Caucasian peoples in the single socio-cultural space of Russia. The decrease in their numbers, associated with migration and negative demographic trends, affects the pace of socio-economic development of the region and can actualize the destructive potential of interethnic relations. The article focuses on the ideas of the region's youth about the role of Russians in the North Caucasus in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. This issue is relevant for understanding the dynamics and direction of modern socio-cultural and socio-economic processes in the region, scenarios for their further development and assessing the risks of potential conflict.

The purpose of the study is to determine the perceptions and assessments of multiethnic youth of the North Caucasus about the role of Russians in the region in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.

Russians in the North Caucasus have become, along with state authorities, the main actor in the formation and strengthening of the Russian state in the region, and conductors of Russian cultural institutions. During the Soviet period, they played a significant role in the development of the economy, social sphere, education and culture of the national republics. In modern Russia, the politicization of the past, the transformation of historical memory into a resource for the development of the North Caucasus is determined by the difficult period of deep socio-political transformations of the 1990s. and a painful exit to the path of stabilization and development. This occurred in connection with the discrediting of Soviet

ideological narratives, a painful process of democratization that made possible the “public articulation of versions of the collective past that were previously suppressed and hushed up.” Social memory is one of the basic elements in the formation of conceptual models of modern all-Russian identity in the North Caucasus. An all-Russian identity will make it possible to integrate the multinational North Caucasus into the large Russian multicultural community. In this regard, a number of Russian historians emphasize the important role of public strategies in shaping attitudes towards the past, as well as commemoration practices in the formation of unifying historical narratives. The reflection and perception of these changes on the part of individuals is of great importance. Scientists from the South of Russia dealt with the issues of changing the ethnic status positions of the Russian population and the problems of interethnic relations in the North Caucasus. The study of young people's ideas about the role of Russians in the North Caucasus makes it possible to determine the state, nature and direction of changes in the position of the Russian population in the region. Consideration of the role of Russians in the North Caucasus is assumed within the framework of several methodological approaches identified by the authors, namely:

- an ethnic approach that allows us to identify the social well-being of the Russian population, the presence/absence of migration attitudes;
- a regional approach, which involves determining the role and place of Russians in the socio-economic development of the region, the position of Russian culture and the Russian language in the national republics;
- an institutional approach that allows us to determine the implementation of the main socio-cultural institutions that underlie the all-Russian identity, the implementation of the main strategies of national and youth policy of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus.

Russians in the North Caucasus have historically acted as carriers of the all-Russian institutional matrix, which they implemented in the sociocultural relations of the various peoples of the region. This position actualizes the present study of assessments and ideas of modern multiethnic youth in the region about the role of Russians in the history of the North Caucasus and their modern significance. Considering the ideas of young people, the authors proceeded from the fact that the individual ideas of young people include a collective memory that goes far beyond the boundaries of personal experience. As the authors note, in the human mind the memory of an individual, a social group, the political collective of a nation and the memory of culture are always combined.

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According to research results, young people are especially susceptible to the experience gained; the age period from twelve to twenty-five years becomes decisive in the formation of ideas and attitudes for the rest of a person's life. Determining the assessments and perceptions of modern youth in the region will make it possible to clarify the policy of constructing and strengthening the all-Russian identity of youth in the region, and make an additional contribution to knowledge about the role of Russians in the North Caucasus in history and modern times. Empirical data revealing young people's assessments and ideas about the role of Russians in the North Caucasus in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods was obtained based on a questionnaire survey conducted in February-March 2022 d. The instrument included checklist, tabular, rating, and open-ended questions. The subjects of the survey were students aged 18–24 years from leading universities of the North Caucasus, accumulating young people, representatives of all subjects of the North Caucasus Federal District: North Caucasus Federal University, Stavropol State Agrarian University and Stavropol State Medical University (Stavropol), Pyatigorsk State University . The choice of students from leading universities in the North Caucasus as an object is due to their significant share in the cohort of young people aged 18–24 years old receiving higher education in the region and their leading role in the formation of the value foundations of identity in the region due to their education and socio-political activity.

The sample by gender was 54% girls and 46% boys. To analyze the results of the study by ethnicity, answers to the question “What nationality do you consider yourself to be?” were united into two main groups: 1) Russians; 2) the peoples of the North Caucasus. The 2022 sample included 50% Russians.

40% are North Caucasian peoples and 10% consider themselves to be other peoples of the region. The presence among the respondents of a significant number of young people who came to study from the republics of the North Caucasus allows us to extrapolate the results of the study to the youth of the North Caucasus region. The division of the sample population into ethnic Russians and those who classified themselves as North Caucasian peoples is due to the objectives of the quantitative study: identifying and comparing similarities/differences in respondents' ideas about the role of Russians in the region. In total, more than a thousand respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted online.

In the North Caucasus, those problems that are characteristic of Russia as a whole are presented in concentrated form. What today belongs mainly to this region, tomorrow may become the “property” of the entire country. The North Caucasus still remains a testing ground for social experiments by the authorities, and some crisis management technologies

that have been tested in the south are already recognizable in other regions of Russia.

In the perception of the majority of residents of the country, the North Caucasus is not just one of the subsidized territories of the Russian Federation. This is a “hot spot”, a zone of smoldering war, which was “pressed down” in Chechnya, but which has spread throughout the entire region.

Almost every day, the media report new terrorist attacks, killings of security forces and militants. Despite the victorious reports, the terrorist underground remains in the republics. According to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Yu. Chaika, in 2011, 576 crimes of a terrorist nature were committed in the region. According to official data, 204 militants were killed and 187 wounded in Dagestan alone last year. At least 169 armed clashes took place. According to estimates by the Memorial human rights center, in 2011, 171 law enforcement officers were killed in the North Caucasus and another 327 were injured. This, however, is a third less than in 2010, but still too much to talk about qualitative changes in the fight against terrorism.

Russian public opinion has developed a stable idea of the North Caucasus as a problem area and a source of increased danger. Residents of other regions of Russia do not understand the Caucasians, do not know their culture and customs, and see the peoples of the North Caucasus (it does not matter whether they are Muslims or Christians) as a potential threat. All this creates an unfavorable psychological atmosphere in the country. As a July 2012 study by the Public Opinion Foundation showed, for more than half of Russians the phrase “North Caucasus” evokes purely negative associations, such as war, hostilities, armed conflicts (22%); explosions, terrorist attacks, militants, bandits, crime (10%); violence, death, anxiety, fear (10%); disorder, instability, tense situation, “pain point” of Russia (8%); excessive spending of funds, money laundering, ruin, unemployment (2%); rejection of Caucasians, reluctance to live with them in the same country (3%). 62% of respondents say that the situation in the North Caucasus remains unstable; 55% believe that the situation is not changing or is even getting worse; 40% are convinced that the authorities do not control the situation in the region. Russians look with great concern at the flow of refugees, displaced persons and labor migrants coming from the North Caucasus, who, due to ethnic, religious, and cultural differences, create problems for the indigenous population and cause hostility on their part, which, in turn, provokes conflicts and clashes.

Gradually, an increasing number of people are coming to the conclusion that financial injections cannot solve the problems of the North Caucasus. If in 2005 20% of respondents believed that the Russian authorities should pay more attention to the North Caucasus than to other regions, now only 12% share

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this point of view. A concentrated expression of this kind of sentiment was the slogan “Stop feeding the Caucasus!”, which was supported not only by the nationalist audience.

These sentiments are also known to many residents of the North Caucasus republics:

As I see it, the North Caucasus is a thorn, a sore point for Russia, but one that Russia does not want to solve at all. There is absolutely no national verified policy that would be understandable to the population, which would be implemented in stages, and we would see a certain meaning in the movement (Kabardino-Balkaria, focus group, older age).

This, so to speak, is the Caucasian problematic background at the level of mass consciousness. But, despite the reality of the problems noted above, the situation in the republics of the North Caucasus is much more complex and multifaceted. The Caucasus is seething and creating difficulties for the rest of Russia because it is an area of complex socio-economic disaster and acute ethno-confessional contradictions.

To clarify the essence of numerous problems in the region, their causes and possible ways to mitigate,

including with the help of republican and federal authorities, the Institute of Social Marketing conducted in 2011 a comprehensive sociological study “Public opinion and the effectiveness of state policy in the North Caucasus”, which included mass population surveys (sample of 3,500 respondents, representing the population of all six republics of the North Caucasus Federal District), as well as a series of focus group discussions and expert interviews. The materials of this study formed the basis of this article. The study revealed a high degree of dissatisfaction among Caucasians with the state of affairs in their republics. In the region as a whole, 60% of respondents are dissatisfied with them to one degree or another versus 39% of those who are satisfied. Residents of Dagestan (76% completely or rather dissatisfied), Kabardino Balkaria (70%) and Karachay-Cherkessia (68%) assess the situation in their republic most negatively. The population of North Ossetia (62%) and Ingushetia (56%) are slightly less pessimistic. Chechnya stands out sharply against the general background, with the state of affairs in which 85% of residents are satisfied (Table 1).

Table 1. Results of a survey of dissatisfaction with violence among residents of the Caucasus republics

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KB	CC	CCO	HH
Completely satisfied	8	33	99	22	33	33	333
Rather satisfied	31	119	335	227	228	334	552
Rather not happy	43	552	337	449	550	551	111
Completely dissatisfied	17	224	119	221	118	112	11
I find it difficult to answer	1	22	00	11	11	11	33

Main part

The settlement of Russians in the North Caucasus has historically been a multidirectional and complex process. The areas of Russians in the region changed depending on government policy, sociocultural and demographic processes in Russia. Modernization development in the North Caucasus mainly occurred during the Soviet period of history. The significant role of Russians in the modernization of the region was determined to a greater extent not by the national policy of the Soviet state, but by their contribution to the development of industry, education, health care and culture of the region. The Russification of the sociocultural life of the North Caucasus was a logical continuation of modernization, which included industrialization, the development of collective forms of agriculture, education and healthcare, and the propaganda of

Soviet ideology and culture. This position of Russians followed from the logic of Soviet modernization, based on industrial development and the formation of a supporting social sphere. The Russian population was the bearer of the basic institutions of Russian culture, statehood, and the core of the scientific and technical intelligentsia. Russian specialists made a great contribution to the formation and development of the national intelligentsia of the North Caucasian peoples and became conductors of Soviet modernity. They contributed to the modernization of the main state, social and economic institutions of the national republics. In the late Soviet period, the territorial expansion of Russians ended, their demographic indicators deteriorated, and processes of depopulation and aging of the Russian population in the North Caucasus began.

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The main factors determining the position of Russians in the post-Soviet period were disintegration trends associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a deep crisis in the socio-economic sphere, and the weakening of state power, which led to a surge of separatism and nationalism. During this period, a large-scale and intensive outflow of the Russian population began, and the role and social status positions of Russians in the region decreased. The large and quite influential Russian population in the national republics of the region began to experience socio-psychological discomfort, which they did not encounter in Soviet times. A significant factor, most acutely manifested in the 1990s - the first half of the 2000s. and what contributed to the increased outflow of the Russian population from the regions of the North Caucasus was the combination of the high birth rate of the North Caucasian peoples and the lack of active economic growth. This led to mass unemployment, especially among young people. In the 2020s, despite a significant increase in the level of security and intensification of the anti-corruption fight, measures to support the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus Federal District did not ensure rapid development. It was not possible to significantly reduce the unemployment rate, and the average salary in the regions is still below the Russian average. The problems of subsidizing the budgets of the subjects of the North Caucasian Federal District of the Russian Federation and the development of social infrastructure continue to persist.

Low rates of modernization development in the 2020s. contributed to the high level of corruption and low efficiency of public administration in the regions of the North Caucasus. A serious obstacle to the development of the region was the outflow of the most qualified specialists - representatives of the Russian population. The vast majority of Russians who left the republics of the North Caucasus were representatives of the humanitarian and technical intelligentsia - teachers, doctors, engineers, scientists, and specialists in the field of high technology. For example, the activities of enterprises of the military-industrial complex in Dagestan, which provided 80% of the republic's economy, were stopped. The change in the position of Russians in the North Caucasus in the post-Soviet period was influenced by such factors as:

- accelerated development of economic processes based on market relations, leading to the transformation of values, social roles, norms and rules of behavior;
- intensification of migration processes due to the destruction of Soviet industry and the agro-industrial complex, rising unemployment, falling living standards, and lack of personal prospects;
- the outflow of the Russian population from areas of outbreaks of interethnic conflicts, including those of an armed nature;

- the hidden squeezing out of Russian specialists from the spheres of public administration, education and healthcare, the creation of moral and psychological discomfort in various spheres of public life;

- the impact of globalization processes on the Russian urban population, the formation of new living standards, modern values and life strategies;

- the ongoing movement of the Russian rural population to cities due to the technologization of agriculture, growing unemployment in rural areas, as well as the departure of young people to study and work in cities.

One of the most important factors in the situation of Russians in the North Caucasus is the social well-being of the Russian population, while young people are not in sufficient demand and are at risk of deteriorating their social position. The region's youth make up a significant part of its population, are distinguished by a high level of socio-political activity, and the demand for their potential remains low. The social well-being of young people is a kind of marker that includes the level of consumption, the degree of social security, opportunities for personal success and self-realization. At the personal level, this is a balance between the level of people's social aspirations and the degree of satisfaction of their most important needs. The main concerns of young people, which are exacerbated during the crisis, are associated with a drop in living standards, income levels and job loss. The social well-being of young people in the North Caucasus is characterized by a tendency towards a decrease in the level of satisfaction with living conditions in the region, opportunities for self-realization and prospects for further personal and professional growth. In the course of a study of the social well-being of youth in the North Caucasus, the degree of concern of young people about the main problems of public life was determined. The biggest problems, according to the young people surveyed, are economic, such as inflation, rising prices for goods and services, falling income levels and unemployment. At the same time, unemployment is more of a concern for the youth of the North Caucasian peoples. Also of great concern are socio-political problems, such as social justice, clannishness and corruption, democracy and human rights, as well as extremism and radicalism. Problems of social justice, clanism and corruption, democracy and human rights are of greater concern to the youth of the North Caucasian peoples (Figure 1).

The religious factor does not play a noticeable role when considering the main problems troubling the youth of the region. Respondents, regardless of religious affiliation, consider economic problems such as inflation and rising prices for goods and services, falling income levels and unemployment to be decisive for themselves. Socio-political problems are no less significant for them (Figure 2). It can be


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assumed that national and religious factors have virtually no influence on young people’s perception of the main problems of public life. The concern of the vast majority of young people about these problems increases migration sentiment among young people. A significant part of young people do not see prospects for personal growth and successful self-realization.

Migration sentiments are manifested in the desire of respondents to continue their studies and

search for work in another region. So, when answering the question “Do you plan to continue your studies or look for work in another region?” 51% answered “yes” or “most likely yes.” The religious and national affiliation of respondents also has virtually no effect on their migration attitudes (Table 2).



Picture 1. Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question “Are you concerned about the following problems of social life?”

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


Figure 2. Distribution of respondents' answers to the question "Are you concerned about the following problems of social life?"

Table 2. Distribution of respondents' answers to the question "Do you plan to continue your studies or look for work in another region?"

Possible answer	Nationality		Religion			Total, n=1235
	Russians	peoples North Caucasus	Orthodoxy	Islam	to no purpose	
Yes	25	26	27	25	24	26
Most likely yes	25	25	22	25	29	25
Probably not	21	22	22	21	17	20
No	13	10	13	11	12	12
I find it difficult to answer	16	17	16	18	18	17

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Figure 3. Distribution of respondents' answers to the question "If yes, then for what reasons?"

As the main reasons for the desire to leave the region, respondents identified the lack of prospects for development and self-realization, poverty and unemployment, as well as clanism and corruption. Other reasons are less significant (Figure 3).

Along with problems of social well-being, the desire of some young people to leave the region is influenced by a number of long-term factors, such as:

the desire of young people to receive a quality education and find a prestigious job;

- insufficient demand for highly qualified labor due to the small number of high-tech companies and modern industrial enterprises;

- the transformation of cities primarily into centers of trade and services that do not require highly qualified specialists and do not have a large number of highly paid jobs;

- partial archaization of social relations, re-actualization of such phenomena as clanism, ethnic complementarity, which sharply reduces the functioning of the mechanisms of vertical mobility. The ideas of modern youth about the role and place of Russians in the North Caucasus during the Soviet period, mainly, due to their age, are formed not with the help of their own life experience, but on the basis of perception and reflection on social memory, including the experience of previous generations, its representation in the media and in the education

system. Parents, teachers and the environment in which young people communicate play an important role. According to respondents, the determining factor in the formation of ideas about Soviet history and the role of the Russian population of the North Caucasus in it is the inner circle, parents, relatives and communication environment, school teachers and university professors, as well as textbooks and educational literature. The Soviet cultural heritage - films and fiction - plays a large role in shaping the views of young people, while the blogosphere and social networks, leading media, modern films and literature play a lesser role. The perceptions of Russian respondents by nationality are more influenced by the environment in which they communicate, parents and close relatives, educational literature, as well as Soviet films and literature, than the surveyed North Caucasian youth by the place of Russians in the North Caucasus during the Soviet period. It can be noted that the blogosphere and social networks of peoples (Figure 4). It can be assumed that young people of the North Caucasian peoples are more interested in subjects related to the history of national republics and the historical fate of their peoples. The problem of Russians in the North Caucasus during the Soviet period is not so relevant for them.

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


Figure 4. Distribution of respondents' answers to the question "Do the following reasons, in your opinion, contribute to the outflow of Russians from the regions of the North Caucasus?"

The religious factor does not play a significant role in the formation of young people's ideas about the role and most influence the views of young people who do not identify themselves with any religion, and least of all the ideas of Muslims.

An important component of the study was determining the impact of Russians during the Soviet period on the economy, social sphere and culture of the regions of the North Caucasus. Respondents were asked to rate their influence on a 5-point scale (extremely negative - 1; and 2, 3, 4, 5 - completely positive). 52% of respondents assessed the influence of Russians positively (as "4" and "5"). There are 66% of such assessments among Russians, and 46% among respondents of North Caucasian peoples. This can be explained by the fact that for ethnic Russians, the

contribution of the Russian people to the development of the North Caucasus during the Soviet period is more significant, due to greater complementarity and ideas about the achievements of the Soviet period that are preserved in social memory. Negative ratings ("1" and "2") range from 1-5%, regardless of nationality (Table 3).

At the end of the Soviet period, the outflow of the Russian population beyond its borders began in the North Caucasus. If during most of the Soviet period the Russian population in the region grew and reached its maximum values in 1989 (3,089 thousand people) - 42.4%, then later the outflow of Russians from the region began, caused by a complex of socio-economic, ethnopolitical and demographic factors.

Table 3. Distribution of respondents' answers to the question "Assess the influence of Russians during the Soviet period on the economy, social sphere and culture of the regions of the North Caucasus?" (not at all satisfactory - 1; and 2, 3, 4, 5 - completely satisfactory)

Answer options	Nationality		Religion			Total, n=1235
	Russians	peoples of the North Caucasus	Orthodoxy	Islam	to no purpose	
1	1	3	1	4	1	2
2	1	5	1	5	1	3
3	32	46	29	45	42	38

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4	36	27	35	25	33	32
5	30	19	34	21	23	25

According to the 2020 census, the Russian population of the region decreased to 2,854 thousand people, which is 30.2% of the population of the North Caucasus Federal District, of which the majority live in the Stavropol Territory - 2,232 thousand people. Thus, in 2020, only 622 thousand Russians lived in the national republics of the North Caucasus Federal District. In general, since 1959, the national republics of the North Caucasus have lost approximately half of their Russian population. The decrease in Russians in Chechnya and Ingushetia was catastrophic (by 12.5 times), in Dagestan there was a decrease by 2.5 times, and in Kabardino-Balkaria by 2 times. The trajectory of internal migration of the population of the mountains and foothills of the North Caucasus to the plain, which took shape back in the 1960s. and received a “second wind” after the collapse of the USSR, changes the ethnic composition of the population, contributes to the growth of sociocultural contrasts and creates additional risks of interethnic tension.

During the study, respondents were asked to indicate the main reasons for the outflow of Russians from the regions of the North Caucasus. The most important reasons, according to respondents, are

socio-economic: lack of prospects for development and self-realization, poverty and unemployment. The second most important reasons are ethnopolitical: clanism and corruption, tension in interethnic relations. Next come moral and psychological reasons: a feeling of insecurity, fear for one’s future and moral and psychological discomfort. The least significant, from the respondents’ point of view, are discrimination based on nationality and the threat of terrorism and extremism. These are the reasons that were decisive in the 1990s. and the first half of the 2000s, are today the least significant for young people, which indicates the continued macropolitical stabilization in the region. There is a big difference in determining the reasons for the outflow of Russians from the region depending on the nationality of the respondents. Russians, more than the peoples of the North Caucasus, point to socio-economic, ethnopolitical and moral-psychological reasons for the outflow of the Russian population (Figure 5). It can be assumed that, despite the stabilization of the situation in the region, Russian youth are more aware of possible threats and risks for their future and the lack of prospects for development and self-realization.




Figure 5. Distribution of respondents’ answers to the question “Do the following reasons, in your opinion, contribute to the outflow of Russians from the regions of the North Caucasus?”

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 SJIF (Morocco) = 7.184

ICV (Poland) = 6.630
 PIF (India) = 1.940
 IBI (India) = 4.260
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In determining the reasons for the outflow of Russians from the regions of the North Caucasus, the religious factor mostly coincides with the ethnic one. Among the young people surveyed from the North Caucasus, 85% consider themselves Muslims, and among Russians, 57% consider themselves Orthodox. There are differences in the degree of concern about the reasons for the outflow of Russians between

Muslims, Orthodox Christians and those who do not identify themselves with any religion. Most of all, the reasons for the outflow of Russians from the regions of the North Caucasus are pointed out by Russians who consider themselves to be Orthodox and do not consider themselves to be of any religion (Figure 6).




Figure 6. Distribution of respondents' answers to the question "Do the following reasons, in your opinion, contribute to the outflow of Russians from the regions of the North Caucasus?"

The population of the North Caucasus is constantly compares living conditions in his republics with the situation in neighboring regions and Russia as a whole. And, as a rule, this comparison is not in favor of the republics, which encourages Caucasians to move to other regions of the country.

Despite a very critical attitude towards the situation at home, residents of the North Caucasus differ in their assessment of specific problems in their republics, their severity and the urgency of measures to solve them. At the same time, there are major problems that are common to all, affecting all others and creating an atmosphere of popular discontent and protests.

Contrary to popular belief, the problem of terrorism, religious extremism and armed clashes between security forces and "forest brothers," while certainly extremely relevant, is not the main one for

residents of the region. The main problem of the North Caucasus is economic stagnation caused by the collapse of the Soviet economic system, and its most important consequence is the degradation of the traditional labor market, mass unemployment, which primarily affects young people. The problem of corruption is also extremely acute there, both in the upper echelons of power and in the everyday lives of people. As for other (and very numerous) social problems, the degree of their urgency varies from republic to republic (Table 4).

The number one problem for the North Caucasus is unemployment. It leads in the perception of residents of five of the six North Caucasus republics, and assessments of its importance are on average twice as high as assessments of the importance of the next problem, namely, corruption.

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Table 4. List of social problems of violence that residents of the Caucasus republics are not happy with

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	CCO	HH
Unemployment, creation of new jobs	42	440	447	446	338	338	448
Corruption; corruption in government and law enforcement agencies	21	333	221	221	118	88	113
Terrorism, fight against terrorism	15	442	33	114	00	44	33
Low level of salaries and incomes of the population, rising prices	15	88	223	119	225	118	55
Underdevelopment of industry, agriculture, road construction, science, personnel problems	10	77	227	110	118	99	55
Healthcare	6	44	55	66	99	22	112
Education, lack of schools, child care facilities	6	11	111	44	55	88	110
Low quality of social security, social protection, low level of pensions, scholarships, benefits	9	22	110	77	113	116	55
High cost, inaccessibility of housing, low quality of housing and communal services	8	33	113	66	118	115	44
Religious extremism	3	44	00	110	11	00	11

Only in Dagestan are concerns about unemployment somewhat inferior to concerns about terrorism. Surveys record the difficult emotional state of the population, their fatigue and irritation due to the inability to find work. It is precisely the lack of work that respondents often explain when young people go

“to the forest.” The dynamics of perception of the unemployment situation by republic are reflected in Table 7.

An equally important problem in the regions in the eyes of public opinion is the dynamics of the unemployed in them.

Table 7. Dynamics of the unemployed in the Caucasus republics

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	CCO	HH
Improved	6	33	110	33	22	11	221
Hasn't changed	40	338	550	334	223	334	662
Worsened	51	555	335	661	772	664	115
I find it difficult to answer	3	44	55	22	33	11	22

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In the North Caucasus. Everyday corruption that permeates all spheres, corruption in law enforcement agencies, lower and higher authorities has turned into a kind of regulator of social relations, defining the rules of people’s behavior.

In the republics of the North Caucasus, which are relatively small in terms of territory and population,

facts of corruption in the upper echelons of power quickly become known to a wide range of citizens, fueling general ideas about the corruption of management structures. At the same time, the majority of the population believes that the situation with corruption continues to worsen (Table 8).

Table 8. Characteristics of corruption in the republics of the North Caucasus

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	CCO	HH
Decreasing	5	33	99	77	22	66	110
Rising	41	554	336	334	550	225	331
Does not change	46	338	554	551	440	555	448
I find it difficult to answer	8	55	11	88	9 8	114	111

When assessing the extent of corruption in this way, the population’s perceptions of the government’s position become extremely important—whether it is trying to cope with corruption (and if so, how successfully) or, due to its own corruption, has no desire to fight this evil in principle. The distribution of opinions on this matter is reflected in Table 9.

The scope of corruption is indicated not only by residents’ general assessments of the state of affairs in the republics, but also by their descriptions of their

personal experience of involvement in corrupt practices. The survey results are impressive: about half of respondents report that over the past year or two they have encountered a situation where an official asked or expected from them “unofficial payment or favors for their work.” It is equally important that many have come to terms with the need for bribes. They see no other way to solve their life problems.

Table 9. The effectiveness of the fight against corruption in the republics of the North Caucasus

	North Caucasian Federal District	D D	AI	KKB	KKCH	CCO	HH
Effectively	7	11	111	77	55	77	117
Not effective	50	449	553	446	552	446	555
Has no desire to fight corruption	34	442	336	336	336	229	119
I find it difficult to answer	9	88	00	111	77	118	99

For a fifth of the residents of the North Caucasus, corruption has already become the norm of life, and they give bribes without hesitation, and half are ready to “give” depending on the effectiveness of the offering, that is, on the degree of adequacy of the amount requested to the expected result. And only a quarter of Caucasians are not going to give bribes (and, apparently, do not) “under any circumstances.”

These sentiments and attitudes can be clearly seen in group discussions.

The culture of giving bribes has become so ingrained in our country that it will take a long time for it to leave our country. This cannot be eradicated

at once, with reforms alone. If a person knows that in order to do something, he needs to unfasten himself, this is even without question (Karachaevo - Cherkessia, middle age).

The problem of terrorism, whose rating is on average equal to the rating of the problem of poverty, is very unequal for the population of individual republics. Dagestanis are most concerned about it: 42% of them consider it the most acute problem, even surpassing in severity the problem of unemployment (40%), which is explained by the real prevalence of terrorism in Dagestan. At the same time, in other republics this problem is not perceived as the main

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one: in Kabardino-Balkaria it was considered such by 14% of respondents, in North Ossetia - 4%, in Ingushetia and Chechnya - 3% each, and in Karachay-Cherkessia it was not included in the list of the most acute ones at all.

What was introduced to us - Wahhabism, militants, bandits - is the most painful topic. We live under fear, I have children. Until people feel calm, there will be no schools, no hospitals, nothing will be here (Ingushetia, focus group, older age).

In our republic there is such a problem connected with extremism. We constantly carry out some kind of operations with Wahhabism. Like some kind of crowd of people, some kind of sound, something was blown up again. I want to live a simple, peaceful life. There is a little bit of this fear. Wahhabism. Terrorism (Dagestan, focus group, middle age).

Naturally, there is high unemployment, a shortage of jobs. People are ready to work, ready to work. And these shortages, this instability create the ground for the next stage: this is a terrorist threat. There is fertile ground for this... If a person does not know how to work, does not have the opportunity to exist normally, he searches. Or rather, they search for him, and on this basis they put him in a negative position (Ingushetia, expert).

Whether people feel protected in their cities, villages and the republic as a whole or, on the contrary, they fear for themselves and their loved ones, largely depends on trust in law enforcement agencies - the police, the prosecutor's office, the courts. The level of trust in these bodies in all republics, with the exception of Chechnya, is extremely low and is one and a half to two times lower than the level of mistrust. Even in Chechnya, where trust exceeds mistrust, about 35% of the population does not trust law enforcement agencies.

Participants in group discussions, as well as experts, universally expressed little trust in these structures.

I think that terrorism is not so dangerous for us as our valiant police are dangerous, because there are

many cases where people disappear, when young people are beaten and maimed. There are no changes due to the fact that the police were renamed to police (Dagestan, focus group, older age).

There, in the police, there are a lot of scoundrels, a lot of scoundrels, some of them are frostbitten scoundrels. This is one of the reasons that pushes people into the forests (Dagestan, expert).

We don't have honest cops like in "Our Russia". An honest cop is a dead cop (North Ossetia, focus group, younger age).

It should be noted that most of the terrorist acts are directed specifically against law enforcement officers - as revenge for the illegal, violent actions of the law enforcement officers themselves, which causes implicit approval of the population.

To public opinion in Russia, the North Caucasus appears to be a single "hot zone" with regular terrorist attacks, widespread religious fanaticism and extremism, and constant national conflicts, where the majority of the population does not feel safe. As the study showed, in the eyes of the residents of the North Caucasian republics themselves, the situation does not look so gloomy and hopeless, and its assessments in different republics differ greatly.

In two republics the situation is assessed as alarming. These are Dagestan, 52% of whose residents say that security problems are growing versus 4% who hold the opposite opinion, and Kabardino-Balkaria, where the ratio of people reporting a deterioration and improvement in the security situation is 40 to 12. In Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia and North Ossetia the level anxiety is significantly lower, although even there the proportion of those indicating some decrease in security exceeds the proportion of those who record the opposite process (21 to 15, 20 to 18 and 19 to 17, respectively). And finally, Chechnya stands out in particular, with almost half of the population feeling an increase in security and only 9% - a weakening (Table 10).

Table 10. Characteristics of the safety of the population of the republics of the North Caucasus

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	CCO	HH
Improved	17	44	118	122	115	117	449
Hasn't changed	48	440	558	443	660	663	335
Worsened	30	552	220	440	221	119	99
I find it difficult to answer	5	44	44	55	44	11	77

People's ideas about the increase/decrease in the level of security in their republic closely correlate with assessments of the authorities' success in the fight

against terrorism. Over the past year or two, the overall situation with terrorism in the region has improved somewhat: 34% of Caucasians are

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convinced that countering terrorism has been successful, 43% do not notice any changes, and 18% believe that it has become worse. At the same time, the state of affairs in this area in the republics is far from the same.

The most difficult situation is developing in Dagestan: 33% of respondents pay attention to the worsening situation in the field of countering terrorism there, and only 15% believe that it has improved. In Kabardino-Balkaria, where the terrorist

underground has noticeably intensified over the past two years, people, nevertheless, note serious successes in the fight against terrorism: according to 47%, the effectiveness of this fight has increased. Significant progress in terms of countering terrorism is felt by the population of Ingushetia, as well as, although to a lesser extent, Karachay-Cherkessia and North Ossetia. But the residents of Chechnya feel the calmest, the vast majority of whom (70%) talk about the success of the fight against terrorism (Table 11).

Table 11. Assessment of the struggle of the population of the North Caucasus republics against terrorism

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	CCO	HH
Improved	34	115	335	447	229	227	770
Hasn't changed	43	446	448	228	558	556	222
Worsened	18	333	113	220	77	116	44
I find it difficult to answer	5	66	44	55	66	11	44

These problems, which are largely specific to the republics of the North Caucasus, are followed, in order of importance from the point of view of mass consciousness, by social problems that are, in principle, characteristic of modern Russia: shortcomings in the healthcare system, education, social security, and the housing problem. This hierarchy of problems in the perception of the population of the North Caucasus republics largely determines their expectations regarding the federal and regional authorities.

Here, for example, are statements from participants in a youth focus group in Dagestan.

Where to find a job? How to get children into kindergarten?.. How to get kids into school? What kind of education will they even receive, considering the current level in general? I wonder whether we will see each other tomorrow or not, because this is what we have now. Terrorism. Corruption. It's all over here. Even if there are jobs, the wages are low. Here are the most pressing problems identified in mass surveys. They are constantly repeated in people's assessments.

The main problem is power. All the forces of the republic, all its capabilities are in the hands of a few people who sit higher in position. And people do not receive the raw materials, not only natural ones, that they can have in the republic and realize themselves in this, in this same republic, but they get leftovers and what they throw in. So that we don't rebel (North Ossetia, focus group, younger age).

A person cannot go to a hospital and receive qualified medical care. This is the most painful topic (Ingushetia, expert). The main mass problem is housing. And housing and communal services. Over

the past 10 years, or even more, there was no concept of "municipal, social housing"; not a single person received housing. There is no social housing (Kabardino-Balkaria, expert).

Residents of the North Caucasian republics feel like strangers in Russia, relegated to the status of second-class citizens. Proposals coming from the central government to improve life at home, rather than come to more prosperous regions "with their own rules," are perceived as discrimination. The feeling of alienation in one's own country creates an almost irresistible negative emotional background. This provokes the strongest to fight, which in the North Caucasus most often takes the form of religious confrontation. The Islamic factor works as a protective mechanism that allows one to preserve identity and rely on the brotherhood of fellow believers. The feeling of lack of rights and alienation from power is recorded by both mass surveys and expert interviews. We need to give people the opportunity to become participants in certain decisions. This means that it is necessary to create a normal political system and institutions of civil society. Media, plus civil society. There is no other way out..For the regions of the North Caucasus this is the most painful issue (North Ossetia, expert).

Measurements show: three quarters of the population of the republics have no doubt that both the central and republican authorities are well aware of their needs. A completely different result is obtained when people are asked whether the government takes these needs into account when making important decisions, whether it listens to the opinion of the people. Two-thirds of Caucasians believe that they

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“mostly” or “not at all” listen. This point of view is especially characteristic of Karachay-Cherkessia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia; it is shared to a slightly lesser extent by residents of Ingushetia. Against this background, Chechnya again

stands out sharply, where the majority believes that their opinion means something to the authorities, although here, too, 30% believe that this is not so (Table 12).

Table 12. Characteristics of the population of the North Caucasus republics on the interest of the authorities to be aware of the needs of the population

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	MTR	HH
Always listening	5	22	77	33	22	11	115
Listens more often	26	118	336	224	116	118	552
Doesn't listen often	40	443	334	443	551	447	223
Doesn't listen at all	23	331	222	226	226	222	77
I find it difficult to answer	6	66	11	44	55	112	33

Residents of the North Caucasus rate the effectiveness of the state's solution to the problems that concern them rather low. The republican authorities are the ones most criticized. If we exclude from consideration Chechnya, whose population in recent years has expressed (at least in public opinion polls) satisfaction with the activities of the republic's leadership, it turns out that only 1% to 9% of regional residents give a “high” assessment of the work of the republican authorities (table 13). In all republics,

except Chechnya, the activity of the federal government is rated somewhat higher than that of the republican government. It is noteworthy that, at the same time, Chechnya also stands out for its unusually low share of those who question the effectiveness of federal structures - 7% versus 27-41% in the other republics. The study showed that negative attitudes towards the republican authorities continue to intensify (Table 14).

Table 13. Assessing the work of the Republican authorities

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	CCO	HH
How high	10	11	99	11	22	11	556
Like average	37	330	445	445	331	446	330
How low	45	559	445	448	554	447	44
I find it difficult to answer	8	110	00	66	114	66	110

Table 14. Characteristics of the assessment of the population in relation to the regional branches of power in the North Caucasus

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	CCO	HH
Do not notice	18	112	222	111	117	88	446

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Intensifies	43	550	335	555	443	556	111
Remains unchanged	28	330	334	226	331	330	118
weakens	5	22	99	44	11	22	118
I find it difficult to answer	6	77	11	55	88	55	77

Similar results were obtained during surveys conducted in the North Caucasus republics in April and July 2022. Participants in group discussions also demonstrated deep dissatisfaction with the activities of the authorities. I would take pictures of all the leaders, organize a referendum, find out what the people want. After that I would start doing it. I would take off the heads of absolutely everyone (North Ossetia, middle age).

We are a subsidized republic, why not control where this money goes? (Karachaevo - Cherkessia, older age).

They adopted the “South of Russia” program. Did anyone notice something? Although tens, hundreds of billions have left (Karachaevo-Cherkessia, older age).

According to the results of the study, elders enjoy the greatest trust in the North Caucasus. The level of trust in them exceeds 70% everywhere, and in Kabardino-Balkaria and Chechnya reaches 84 and 90%, respectively. Next come the President and Head of the Government of the Russian Federation. On average across the republics, about 65% trust them. They inspire especially high trust in Chechnya and

Karachay-Cherkessia, the lowest in Dagestan and Ingushetia. People express almost the same trust (from 63 to 65%) in republican and central media - television, radio, newspapers. Then come religious figures - representatives of the muftiate, Islamic clergy, imams, whom on average are trusted by 60% of the region's residents (in Chechnya and Ingushetia the figures are 86% and 75%, in North Ossetia with a predominantly Christian population - 19%). In most republics, trust in them is one and a half to two times higher than distrust. An average level of trust, but still exceeding the level of distrust, is shown by Caucasians towards the Russian army, the United Russia party and scientists. The Russian army is most trusted in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia; “United Russia” - in Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Chechnya; scientists - in Karachay-Cherkessia and North Ossetia. Formally, the heads of the republics also fall into the same category (with the exception of R. Kadyrov, whose level of trust is 93%), however, despite all this, the residents of the republics (again, except for Chechnya) perceive them as Moscow appointees and, if they will, - and free, fair elections - would change their leaders (Table 15).

Table 15. Level of trust of the population in the republican authorities

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	MTR	HH
Current leader	29	112	228	332	116	222	885
Another man	47	558	772	445	339	555	33
I find it difficult to answer	24	330	00	223	445	223	112

The least trusted people in the region are the authorities at both the federal and republican levels, big business and Wahhabis, and religious extremists: there are fewer people who trust them than those who don't. Particularly prominent in this regard are religious extremists who call themselves fighters for the purity of the Muslim faith. In four out of six republics, distrust in them exceeds trust by 85%, and in the remaining two - Ingushetia and Chechnya - they are trusted by only 12 and 9% of residents, respectively.

Dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the republics, disbelief in the ability and desire of the

authorities to solve pressing problems create the ground for protest sentiments, which, in turn, can result (and are already resulting) in protest actions. The possible range of such actions in the North Caucasus republics is wider than in other regions of Russia, and the population evaluates all these options one way or another.

One of the forms of protest actively used by residents of the North Caucasus over the past two decades is moving to other regions of the country or abroad. The most legitimate, democratic way is a change of power through elections. Considers the population and the possibility of participating in

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various kinds of street actions, rallies, etc. Specific North Caucasian forms of protest include support for the terrorist underground, “forest brothers,” and religious extremists. And finally, the most radical option is the separation of the region from Russia, as Chechnya tried to do during the time of Dudayev.

An important indicator of people’s dissatisfaction with life in their republic is the number of those who have chosen to move to other regions of

the country or abroad or are planning to do so as a means of solving their own problems. The results of the study showed to what extent and why the population of the region “votes with their feet.”

From the responses of survey participants, it follows that half of the residents of the North Caucasus republics have one of their close relatives who has already left for other regions of Russia or abroad (Table 16).

Table 16. Characteristics of those who left the republics of the North Caucasus and the reasons for their decision

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	CC	CCO	HH
No, no one left	51	41	68	47	62	53	44
Yes, we went to other regions of Russia	39	50	19	46	29	40	36
Yes, we went abroad	14	12	14	9	7	10	32
I find it difficult to answer	1	1	1	0	2	0	2

And this process continues: answering the questionnaire, 18% of respondents reported that they themselves or their close relatives were going to leave the republic in the foreseeable future. The most people affected by “suitcase sentiments” are in Dagestan (26%), the least in Ingushetia (11%).

It is important to note that, although only a little more than a third (34%) of those planning to leave have definitely decided to change their place of residence, that is, to leave their republic forever, in reality a little more than half (53%) intend to return. The rest have not yet decided. Thus, almost half of those who go to work or study in other regions of Russia or abroad are considering the possibility of staying in a new place. It is clear that their final choice will largely depend on whether they will be able to solve the acute problems of the republics discussed above. Focus group participants spoke about the reasons that encourage people to leave their republics, citing, among other things, their own experience.

I left here because I couldn’t find a job in my specialty and according to my needs. I returned here again, and it has become much worse here, enterprises are closing, specialties such as economist and lawyer are not in demand (North Ossetia, middle age).

Because of terrorism, many young people form this opinion in order to leave Dagestan. I myself think that after graduating from my university I will go

where I need to go, to Russia (Dagestan, younger age). Survey data indicate that the population of the North Caucasus does not believe in the effectiveness of elections as a means of expressing mass requests and demands and an instrument for changing the government itself, and cast doubt on the high activity of North Caucasian voters. Judging by the responses of respondents, almost half of the residents of the republics, as a rule, do not go to vote (Table 16). One can only guess where the almost universal turnout for the elections, recorded in the official reports of election commissions, comes from. The non-participation of residents of the region in the elections is largely explained by their doubt that the expression of the will of citizens has any influence on the outcome of the electoral process. In most republics, less than a third of the population believes in the integrity of elections, and only in Ingushetia and Chechnya - about half (Table 16). And this is not just about the electoral procedure. People do not believe in the political system itself, its ability to nominate representatives of the people to government bodies who are ready and able to express their interests. Therefore, their main reaction to the situation is not a demand to ensure the integrity of the elections, but a boycott of them. It is no coincidence that the slogans of the Moscow rallies do not enjoy any significant support here.

Table 16. Assessing the reliability of the elections taking place in the Caucasian republics

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	MTR	HH
Honestly	6	32	111	33	33	33	221
Generally fair	20	110	229	221	117	118	336
Generally not fair	38	443	336	440	445	441	119
Totally unfair	22	332	221	221	119	119	111
I find it difficult to answer	14	114	22	115	1177	220	114

According to the results of the study, the majority of residents of the North Caucasus have never encountered situations in which they would want to take personal part in collective protests. And although up to a third of respondents do not exclude the possibility of such participation (for example, in Kabardino-Balkaria, where 11% answered the corresponding question: “definitely yes”, and 22% - “rather yes”), from declaration to real actions - quite long distance.

Conclusion

Thus, respondents, regardless of nationality and religion, identify socio-economic factors as the main reasons for the outflow of Russians from the regions of the North Caucasus. Ethnopolitical and socio-psychological reasons are of less importance for young people. Differences in the degree of significance of the reasons for the outflow of Russians from regions of the North Caucasus, related to the ethno-religious identity of respondents. It can be assumed that Russians are more concerned about the main reasons for the outflow of the Russian population from the regions of the North Caucasus.

The results of the study showed that young people’s ideas about the role and place of Russians in the North Caucasus are characterized positively. The vast majority of respondents, regardless of nationality and religion, positively assess their contribution to the development of the economy, social sphere and culture of the regions of the North Caucasus. However, when answering questions requiring analytical assessments and determining forecasts for the situation of Russians in the region, about half of the respondents found it difficult to answer. This indicates the insufficiency of the cognitive foundations of the views of the young people surveyed. It can be assumed that analytical questions that require a deeper understanding of the socio-political problems of the region cause difficulties for them. The ideas of modern youth about the role and place of Russians in the North Caucasus during the Soviet period were mainly formed under the influence of their close circle of friends, parents, teachers and

teachers. The Soviet cultural heritage - films and fiction - played a major role in shaping the views of young people. During the study, respondents noted that the decline in the Russian population, associated with the outflow of Russians from the regions of the North Caucasus, is of concern to many young people, regardless of nationality. As the main reasons for the outflow, respondents identified the lack of prospects for development and self-realization, low living standards and high unemployment, clanism and corruption, as well as tension in interethnic relations. No less important was the feeling of insecurity and moral and psychological discomfort. The majority do not consider reasons such as discrimination based on nationality, the threat of terrorism and extremism, to be significant. Russian youth are more aware of possible threats and risks for their future and the lack of prospects for development and self-realization. Most likely, these same reasons have led to the fact that about half of young people want to continue their studies or work in another region. Young people are concerned about problems such as rising prices, falling income levels, unemployment, as well as issues of social justice, democracy and human rights.

Historically, the Russian population acted as the bearer of the basic institutions of Russian culture, statehood and the core of the scientific and technical intelligentsia. The Soviet period in the history of the North Caucasus was determined by the significant role of Russians in the modernization of the region, their contribution to the development of industry, education, healthcare and culture. This position of Russians followed from the logic of Soviet modernization, based on industrial development and the formation of a social sphere that supported it. The return of Russians to the region is a complex and systemic task that can only be solved within the framework of successful modernization of the economy, social sphere and cultural life. Modern modernization of the North Caucasus, based on the development of new high-tech industries, can make the region attractive to young people, solve problems of employment and social ill-being. The development of interethnic relations along the lines of goodwill,

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respect for the traditions and cultures of the peoples of the region, and the formation of attitudes towards cooperation and solidarity are still significant.

Results studies have shown that the vast majority of respondents, regardless of nationality and religion, positively assess the contribution of the Russian population to the development of the economy, social sphere and culture of the regions of the North Caucasus. Respondents consider the main reasons for the outflow of Russians in the post-Soviet period to be changes in the socio-political life of the region, lack of prospects for development and self-realization, low living standards and high unemployment, clanism and corruption. The Soviet period of the history of the North Caucasus in the views of young people was determined by the significant role of the Russian population in the development of the region. The outflow of Russians from the regions of the North Caucasus continues to be a pressing problem and reduces the possibilities for further socio-economic development. Reducing the outflow of the Russian population and reducing the migration attitudes of young people is possible as part of the successful modernization of the economy, social sphere and culture.

Focus group participants in Kabardino-Balkaria listed a number of factors preventing the widespread spread of public protests in the republic. These include:

- national mentality, which is characterized by showing respect for authority;

- traditions that do not allow a member of the clan to go against their own (younger members of the clientele still consider themselves part of the family and hope that they will be protected, and perhaps rewarded). In Kabardino-Balkaria, with its complex interweaving of kinship relations, both voting “for” and speaking “against” depend on whether the subject is one of the relatives or not;

- unemployment, when any not only action, but also word can lead to loss of work, and, consequently, to loss of livelihood;

- fear of reprisals: any protester can be labeled a terrorist and be not only punished, but destroyed;

- lack of organizations capable of leading masses of people;

- discrediting (and self-discrediting) of potential leaders of the protest movement, who are suspected (and not always without reason) of self-interest.

Under these conditions, protests in the republic are usually local in nature, and for them to arise a specific reason is needed that directly affects people: arrest, disappearance or murder of a relative, seizure of land or house, dismissal, etc.

It is known that public opinion polls are not always able to capture the seriousness of the population’s protest intentions, which inevitably affects the forecasts based on them. In this regard,

focus group monitoring and expert panels are a more sensitive tool.

Until a mass of anger accumulated sufficient to bring people out into the streets (Cool, focus group, Russians).

There was a very criminal situation, people took to the streets and attended rallies. Both the parents of militants and the parents of policemen (Nalchik, focus group, Kabardians).

Why is there no protest? I protest. Why can’t we make sure there are decent salaries? Why are salaries different in different regions? Why is the standard of living different in different regions? Only I protest “to myself” (Prokhladny, focus group, Russians). Protest rallies achieve nothing! (Expert).

The anti-terrorist fight and the fight against extremism, this fight has a very negative impact on the opinion of residents. The authorities need to be more open in this matter, especially the federal authorities... (Kashkhatau, focus group, Balkars).

We are more inclined to wait for a very long time. It’s very patient to wait and hope that a miracle will happen and that something will change (Nalchik, focus group, Balkars).

Despite the active fight against terrorism, the terrorist underground continues to be fueled, support for the “forest brothers” and militants who provide armed resistance to the authorities and security forces continues. It is clear that the degree of people’s involvement in terrorist activities and the population’s support for them is difficult to measure. At the same time, some information on this matter can be provided by respondents’ assessments of the “personnel reserve” of the resistance. These assessments are based to a greater extent on the personal experience of the respondents rather than general assessments of the success of countering terrorism, which are based more on media materials and official statements by authorities.

In all republics except Chechnya, from a third to a half of respondents say that the terrorist underground has a “personnel reserve”; in three republics it is noted that there are more people ready to join its ranks, in three others - that there are fewer of them, while in Chechnya, according to residents of the republic, they have almost disappeared. It is quite remarkable that in the same Karachay-Cherkessia, which, from the point of view of its population, has achieved tangible success in countering terrorism, 24% indicate an increase in supporters of the “forest brothers” - the second highest figure after Dagestan, where the problem of terrorism is most acute (Table 17). This kind of data testifies not only to the unresolved problem of terrorism in the region, but also to the contradictory perception of the situation in this area by public opinion. It cannot be said that the idea of creating an independent state or federation of the North Caucasian peoples is completely alien to the inhabitants of the region, but most of them consider

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such a turn of events disastrous and unacceptable. No matter how critically the population assesses the situation in Russia.

Table 17. Characteristics of countering terrorism in the North Caucasus republics

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	CO	HH
More	22	39	14	22	24	13	3
As many	18	22	20	24	13	17	8
Less	21	10	28	28	5	12	52
There are no such people at all	16	2	36	6	24	17	22
I find it difficult to answer	23	27	2	20	34	41	15

The overwhelming majority (82%) cannot imagine the existence of their republic outside of Russia, be it in the form of an independent state or as part of some kind of federation. Even in Ingushetia

and Chechnya, where separatist sentiments are strongest, more than two-thirds of citizens choose Russia (Table 18).

Table 18. Attitude of the population of the North Caucasian republics to living outside Russia

	North Caucasian Federal District	DD	AI	KKB	KKCH	CO	HH
As part of Russia	82	85	67	89	85	98	68
Independent state	7	2	17	3	6	1	15
Federation of Caucasian Peoples	5	3	15	4	2	1	8
I find it difficult to answer	6	10	1	4	7	0	9

The population of the North Caucasus is expressing growing dissatisfaction with both numerous socio-economic problems, the main of which are unemployment and low living standards, and the poor performance of government structures in solving them. The stagnation of the regional economy does not allow the allocation of significant funds to the social sphere, and subsidies from the federal budget often do not reach the population due to the corruption of republican and local authorities. Popular discontent is still only smoldering and for the most part does not manifest itself openly. Residents of the republics do not believe that electoral mechanisms are capable of bringing honest people who care about the interests of citizens into power, and they boycott the

elections. Fear of losing their jobs and being subject to reprisals keeps them from participating in public protests. The consequence of the ineffectiveness of democratic methods of influencing the authorities is the undying support of the terrorist underground. Another, sometimes the only method of protest available to Caucasians is “voting with their feet,” a mass exodus to other regions of Russia or abroad in search of work and a better life. Solving the problems of the North Caucasus, including those related to the “spreading” of terrorism, requires a significant increase in the effectiveness of state policy, regional and federal, and bringing it into line with the real demands and priority needs of the population.

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SOI: [1.1/TAS](#) DOI: [10.15863/TAS](#)

International Scientific Journal Theoretical & Applied Science

p-ISSN: 2308-4944 (print) e-ISSN: 2409-0085 (online)

Year: 2024 Issue: 01 Volume: 129

Published: 01.01.2024 <http://T-Science.org>

Issue

Article



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THE REASON FOR THE PRESENCE OF ACUTE PROBLEMS THAT WORRY THE POPULATION OF THE NORTH CAUCASIAN FEDERAL DISTRICT AND PROVOKE THEM TO THE GREATEST DISCONTENT

Abstract: In the article, the authors analyze public opinion in 6 republics of the North Caucasus on the main issues that concern residents, causing mass discontent and protests. The empirical basis for the analysis is the results of a sociological study conducted by the authors in July-September 2023: mass representative surveys in all republics with a sample of 500 to 1000 people, 18 group discussions - focus groups and 13 in-depth interviews with experts and public opinion leaders. The study is a continuation of the 2021 survey, which allows us to identify the dynamics of public opinion on the main issues. The study showed a slight increase in positive assessments of the situation in the republics; more people note development and progress rather than decline. At the same time, the republics of the North Caucasus are characterized by the presence of authoritarian forms of government; people are afraid to publicly express critical views regarding political institutions and the leadership of the republics, they tend to more often give socially acceptable answers to pressing questions, and evaluate the successes of the republic higher than they do in private conversations. At the same time, when discussing specific life problems, people give more realistic assessments. As the study showed, in recent years the set of the most pressing problems worrying the population in the republics of the North Caucasus has remained virtually unchanged. The four problems that far outstrip the others in terms of their severity in population estimates are unemployment, corruption, poverty and terrorism. Over the past three years, a fifth problem has been added to them - the high cost of housing and communal services. Each republic has its own pain points that cause the greatest dissatisfaction among residents. In Chechnya, the population calls unemployment the most pressing problem; in Dagestan, in addition to unemployment, they name corruption, in In Kabardino-Balkaria, along with unemployment, there is terrorism, in Karachay-Cherkessia - poverty, low incomes; in Ingushetia - terrorism and in North Ossetia - poverty. Research has shown that the population's dissatisfaction with unsolvable problems and the activities of the authorities did not lead to an increase in separatist sentiments; the majority of the population of the republics does not see their existence outside of Russia.

Key words: public opinion, North Caucasus, socio-economic problems, social tension, discontent, criticism of government, unemployment, terrorism, corruption, poverty, housing and communal services, healthcare, education, crime, youth, separatism.

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Language: English

Citation: Prokhorova, Yu. I., Blagorodov, A. A., Kozachenko, P. N., & Volkova, G. Yu. (2024). The reason for the presence of acute problems that worry the population of the North Caucasian Federal District and provoke them to the greatest discontent. *ISJ Theoretical & Applied Science*, 01 (129), 154-178.

Soi: <http://s-o-i.org/1.1/TAS-01-129-10> *Doi:*  <https://dx.doi.org/10.15863/TAS.2024.01.129.10>
Scopus ASCC: 2000.

Introduction

UDC 316.44:326.33.

Research conducted in the republics of the North Caucasus has shown that, given the mass dissatisfaction of the population with unsolvable acute problems in the republics, over the past 2-3 years there has been a certain positive shift in residents' assessments of the situation in their republics. In most of them, the number of people who are satisfied with the state of affairs, and who also believe that the republic as a whole is characterized by development and progress, has

noticeably increased. The only exception is North Ossetia, where scores have deteriorated slightly compared to 2021.

In all republics, with the exception of North Ossetia, noticeably more people note progress than 2 years ago. Only in Alanya the assessments have decreased - 2/3 speak of stagnation and decline. Residents of Chechnya are especially optimistic, first of all comparing the current situation with what it was like during two recent wars. Table 1 provides assessments of the state of affairs in the republics in 2023 and 2021.

Table 1. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the republic, %

Republic	Years	Completely satisfied	Rather satisfied	Rather not happy	Not happy at all	I find it difficult to answer
Dagestan	2021	3	19	52	24	2
	2023	8	34	39	15	6
Ingushetia	2021	9	37	37	13	4
	2023	30	45	14	11	1
CBD	2021	2	27	49	21	1
	2023	4	44	40	12	0
KCR	2021	3	28	50	18	1
	2023	3	42	43	8	4
North Ossetia Alania	2021	3	34	51	12	1
	2023	2	33	47	17	1
Chechen Republic	2021	33	52	11	1	3
	2023	38	48	11	2	1

These assessments are rather based on people's personal experience, but more general assessments of the direction of the republic's movement – progress, stagnation or decline – are also close to them. The trends here are the same - respondents in Chechnya and Ingushetia are the most optimistic,

with Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria occupying the middle position. The estimates are lower in Dagestan and North Ossetia, although residents of Dagestan now express more optimism than 3 years ago (Table 2).

Table 2. How would you describe in general what has been happening in the republic in recent years, %

Republic	Years	Development and progress	Almost nothing changes, stagnation	Decline	I find it difficult to answer
Dagestan	2021	15	60	21	4
	2023	25	34	15	6
Ingushetia	2021	19	63	18	1

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	2023	60	32	7	1
CBD	2021	22	55	19	4
	2023	32	44	14	2
KCR	2021	26	50	18	6
	2023	41	46	8	5
North Ossetia (Alanya)	2021	27	46	11	14
	2023	23	56	12	8
Chechen Republic	2021	88	7	1	4
	2023	91	7	1	1

The results of mass public opinion polls in the republics of the North Caucasus must be approached critically. These republics are characterized by the presence of authoritarian forms of government and insufficient development of freedom of speech and press. People are afraid to publicly express critical views regarding the political institutions and leadership of the republic; they tend to give socially acceptable answers to fundamental, political questions more often, and evaluate the successes of the republic higher than they do in private conversations. This is especially characteristic of the population of Chechnya, and recently, to an increasing extent, of the residents of Ingushetia. Meanwhile, when discussing more specific life problems, people give much more realistic assessments. Residents of the republics are more outspoken and critical in group discussions. Their estimates often provide the necessary balance to the results of a mass survey. We present the opinions of residents of the North Caucasus republics, expressed during group discussions in focus groups, and the judgments of experts.

The situation, one might say, is good. No bombing, no kidnappings. We have been reborn, one might say, from the ashes, thanks to our leadership. But there are problems that have not yet been resolved in our country. We hope, there is hope (Chechnya).

There is no decline. They say that everything is bad with us, nothing like that. On the contrary, everything is growing here. In fact, we have very little industry left. Rostov, Moscow, Krasnoyarsk dismantled our entire economy, we were left with small things. Even so, we have growth. Growth is underway (Dagestan).

Life is great. Because you know that if, God forbid, something happens, everyone in your family will help you and raise money. It's more of a tradition here. People are sympathetic, kind, sincere. At the same time, unfortunately, everything here is corrupt. Without money you won't get a job, without money you won't advance, you won't earn anything (CBD).

Today one category lives luxuriously, the other category lives in poverty. Therefore, the category of suppliers, utilities, all this is robbery. Doctors are bribe takers! Unemployment. There is no life in the

areas. The family contract is ruining us. The Chechen becomes a leader and wins over all his relatives. Clannishness. The rich rob everyone! This tragedy is for all of Russia, not only for Chechnya! (Chechnya).

We are comparing everything here with the year 2000. Therefore, a lot has changed for the better. To say that we are thriving is a fallacy. In a material sense, people live very hard. Unemployment. Hundreds, thousands of young people cannot find an application for their strength. This is a very big problem. I often come across the fact that outside our republic they believe that Chechnya is prospering and money is pouring in on us. One Russian newspaper wrote: "There is no public transport in Chechnya, everyone there drives their own car." Not really. There are social problems, they are very acute. The same as in the whole country (Chechnya).

There are problematic republics, and there are less problematic ones. If, for example, Chechnya fought a war, it deserves the money it receives. And if Ossetia was silent, it gets what it gets. Wahhabism comes from Chechnya. I'm not sure that today the militants who have come to power live off subsidies. If today they are deprived of these subsidies, they will go back to the forest (SO-A).

If in assessments of the situation in their republic optimism is slowly increasing along with criticism of the situation in many areas, then residents of the republics assess the situation throughout Russia mainly critically. The all-Russian background makes it possible for residents of the republics of the UK to more balancedly assess the state of affairs at home.

There is development in some segments. And maybe this development is not based on today's developments, maybe these are developments that have existed since Soviet times, or the groundwork that was laid in those years. Probably, in 10–15 years, hydroelectric power stations will fail. Other large enterprises that are already behind technologically may also fail. But today we can note development (Dagestan).

In Russia it's a nightmare! I'm sorry. If you take Central Russia, climb into some village, it's a nightmare! It's not like decline. All the young people are drinking there! Again, because there is no work! (Dagestan).

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The entire Black Earth Region, which produced millions of tons of grain. Now these collective farms are completely collapsed! Agriculture has collapsed, livestock farming has collapsed. Everything that exists in this country is falling apart. We see that ships have begun to be ordered abroad, armored personnel carriers have begun to be ordered. Industry

and agriculture - everything in this country is falling apart (Ingushetia).

The general assessment of the situation in the republic is revealed in the answers to the traditional question in sociological surveys: in which direction is the republic moving - right or wrong. There is also a shift in the positive direction compared to estimates 3 years ago (Table 3).

Table 3. Do you think things in the republic are now going in the right direction or do you think that the republic is moving along the wrong path?, %

Republic	Years	Things in the republic are going in the right direction	The Republic is heading down the wrong path	I find it difficult to answer
Dagestan	2021	21	47	32
	2023	52	17	31
Ingushetia	2021	48	49	3
	2023	71	24	5
CBD	2021	35	45	20
	2023	45	44	5
KCR	2021	35	46	19
	2023	52	24	12
North Ossetia (Alania)	2021	27	46	27
	2023	26	49	25
Chechen Republic	2021	85	5	10
	2023	88	7	5

The assessment of the course taken varies greatly between the republics: in Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia and Chechnya it is higher, in Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia it is significantly lower. This is rather a vote of confidence in the top leadership of the republic, the president, and a “degree of optimism” among the population.

I'm glad I live here. I was born and raised here. He went to St. Petersburg for two years, lived there and returned home. Now I have a job, the salary is small, but enough. If you compare in St. Petersburg and here, our people are kinder, somehow nicer, simpler (KBR).

Kadyrov wants to return us to the fold of Sharia. But it won't work. Because today the Chechen nation is a nation where there is complete lack of spirituality, immorality, and crime. Children are involved in this (Chechnya).

At least we have stability, unlike other republics (Chechnya).

Overall, I like everything. But very slowly. There must be a demand from everyone so that they respond in their place. Then it will be faster. Some adjustments can be made, but, in general, they are going in the right direction, we need to speed up the pace (Ingushetia).

Development is happening because what was stolen from us over the previous 20 years is being tried to somehow get back on its feet (Dagestan).

The stagnation is already clear, because not a single enterprise that existed before now operates normally (KCR).

At the moment, the Czech Republic, against the backdrop of the entire North Caucasus, looks like Las Vegas, compared to a provincial town. But since all issues are decided in the Kremlin, then to say that the UK has its own policy, while the Chechen Republic has a completely different policy, then this is not true (Chechnya).

There is probably some progress. But if you dig deeper, we stand still, the economy in the republic is not developing, neither industry nor agriculture (KCR).

I don't see any improvement. Some beauty appears in the city, but this doesn't make it any easier for anyone (SO).

The republic cannot take the wrong path; the federal center will not allow it. And the fact that it is slow, yes (Ingushetia).

Assessing your own life situation, expectations from the future.

To a large extent, people's assessments of the situation in their republic, the severity of problems,

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the activities of the authorities and protest moods are formed on the basis of their assessments of their own lives, the financial situation of the family, its improvement or deterioration. And here the opinions of respondents differ significantly between the

republics: in Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria they are on average 2 times higher than in Karachay-Cherkessia, Dagestan and North Ossetia (Table 4).

Table 4. How can you describe the financial situation of your family?, %

Republics	Years	good	Rather good	Average, satisfactory	Rather bad	Bad	I find it difficult to answer
Dagestan	2021	9	15	54	15	6	0
	2023	8	16	59	11	5	1
Ingushetia	2021	11	18	53	12	7	1
	2023	22	46	27	3	1	0
CBD	2021	8	14	57	18	4	0
	2023	10	28	48	11	3	0
KCR	2021	5	21	54	15	4	1
	2023	4	22	59	11	3	0
North Ossetia Alania	2021	3	15	57	21	4	0
	2023	5	16	52	20	6	0
Chechen Republic	2021	27	33	32	5	1	2
	2023	31	28	33	5	3	0

At the same time, in all republics people note some improvement in their financial situation compared to the situation 2-3 years ago. It should be noted that in most republics people prefer to give their financial situation neutral assessments - "average, satisfactory," in other words, "like everyone else," avoiding calling their financial situation "bad." It is believed that mountain pride does not allow people to say that they live worse than others. Meanwhile, in focus groups, many described the situation of various population groups as difficult or disastrous. In the Caucasus, it is a shame to admit that you are poor. Even the poorest person, living very modestly, will not allow himself to demonstrate his poverty. This is where the traditional way of life

has the greatest impact. Although, the gap is, of course, very serious! (KCR).

People live normally, much better than before. There is simply no demand for normal development. There is no demand for education or development. Nobody asks anything, nobody is interested (Dagestan).

It must be said that self-assessments of their standard of living have changed little in all republics since the last measurement in 2021. At the same time, hopes and optimistic expectations have grown noticeably - in all republics except North Ossetia, the majority of residents hope for a better life in two years (Table 5).

Table 5. Do you think you (your family) will live better in 2 years than now?, %

Republic	Definitely yes	Most likely yes	Probably not	Definitely not	I find it difficult to answer
All	15	45	25	5	11
Dagestan	8	35	26	7	24
Ingushetia	38	52	6	1	3
CBD	11	51	31	4	3
KCR	10	50	26	5	10
North Ossetia Alania	4	32	50	8	5
Chechen Republic	24	59	7	1	8

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This is a clear indicator of the level of optimism/pessimism in the republics - optimists predominate in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria; Now residents of Dagestan have joined them. Only in North Ossetia are there almost twice as many pessimists as optimists. Optimistic moods rather characterize the psychological mood, the general social well-being of people in the republics, which is largely associated with a positive assessment of their presidents. However, this does not reduce their critical assessment of specific social and economic problems that cause difficulties in life.

Since Dagestan is a subsidized republic, one cannot expect much. We don't have our own economy, we live on subsidies, we can't count on much (Dagestan).

Naturally, in 2-3 years people will live better. This progress is not immediate. It is not done for 2-3 months. We simply cannot notice what positive things have happened to us within one month. There is progress, it is happening. And we will live better, because 3 years ago we lived worse than now! (Dagestan).

In two or three years there will be a very strong rise in the cost of living. And this will certainly affect

the stratification of the population and the standard of living in general (KCR).

Main part

Now we are not talking about people, but about what our government provides. If it changes, maybe something will change. But if the power is not radically changed, it seems to me that nothing will happen in two or three years (SO-A). The most pressing problems in the republic that require solutions from the authorities. As the study showed, in recent years the set of the most pressing problems worrying the population in the republics of the North Caucasus has remained virtually unchanged. The four problems that are far ahead of the rest in their severity in respondents' assessments are unemployment, corruption, poverty and terrorism. Over the past 3 years, a fifth problem has been added to them - the high cost of housing and communal services, identified by the population as one of the most difficult and troubling. A comparison of residents' assessments of the most pressing problems in 2021 and 2023 is shown in Table 6.

Table 6. What do you think is the most pressing problem in the republic that requires an immediate solution from the authorities?, %

Republic	Years	Decrease in unemployment	Fight against corruption	Poverty, low income	Terrorism	Housing and communal services problems, high prices
Dagestan	2021	33	18	3	29	2
	2023	31	19	8	10	2
Ingushetia	2021	38	14	6	2	2
	2023	27	15	4	14	1
CBD	2021	44	13	5	8	2
	2023	31	11	11	14	6
KCR	2021	31	9	12	1	5
	2023	23	7	16	1	13
North Ossetia Alania	2021	32	5	6	3	4
	2023	29	8	10	2	10
Chechen Republic	2021	46	7	3	2	1
	2023	39	9	5	1	8

Unemployment remains the main and most pressing problem everywhere. The threat of terrorism is perceived less acutely by the population. However, if earlier this was a problem mainly in Dagestan, now, while its severity in Dagestan has decreased (according to population estimates - by 3

times), concern about terrorism in Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria has increased significantly. The survey found out what problem in each republic residents consider to be the main, most pressing one (Table 7).

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Table 7. What do you think is the most pressing problem in the republic that requires an immediate solution from the authorities?, %

Problems	All	Dagestan	Ingushetia	Kabardino-Balkaria	Karachay-Cherkessia	North Ossetia Alania	Chechen Republic
Reducing unemployment and creating new jobs	30	31	27	31	23	29	39
Fight against corruption	12	19	15	11	7	8	9
Low wages, low income, low standard of living	9	8	4	11	16	10	5
Terrorism, fight against terrorism	7	10	14	14	1	2	1
High prices for housing and communal services, improvement of work	7	2	1	6	13	10	8
Social protection of the population (pensions, benefits, assistance to large families, disabled people, scholarships, etc.)	4	2	2	6	8	6	4
Health situation	4	1	2	2	4	7	14
Education	3	2	3	2	3	2	8
Road condition, traffic situation	3	2	3	1	3	6	1
Fighting crime	2	3	1	2	2	2	1
Ecological situation, state of the environment	2	1	2	1	1	5	2
Fight against rising prices	2	0	1	2	6	3	0
Housing problem, high cost of housing	2	1	0	4	5	2	1
Religious extremism	1	3	1	2	1	0	0

It should be noted that these are assessments of people who were asked in the survey to name one, the most pressing problem in the republic, requiring an immediate solution by the authorities, without mentioning other concerns and threats that may be no less important for a particular person. With a softer formulation of the question, when people

could name several of the most troubling problems, the picture of the problem field that fuels dissatisfaction with the authorities and protest sentiments turns out to be more representative (Table 8).

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Table 8. What do you think are the most important problems in the republic that the government should solve first?, %

Problems	All	Dagestan	Ingushetia	Kabardino-Balkaria	Karachay-Cherkessia	North Ossetia Alania	Chechen Republic
Unemployment, creation of new jobs	43	40	37	43	48	44	47
Corruption, nepotism in power, arbitrariness of officials	35	46	27	46	34	26	24
Income, standard of living of the population	31	28	14	38	52	32	21
The situation in housing and communal services (housing and communal services)	28	15	26	34	33	42	30
Prospects for youth	27	29	15	32	38	27	21
Work of medical institutions	21	24	14	13	17	26	33
Terrorism	19	27	36	27	1	6	8
Housing construction (shortage, high cost of housing)	14	13	10	17	21	10	14
Quality of education in the republic	14	15	17	9	11	11	18
The work of law enforcement agencies, the fight against crime	10	15	13	7	4	12	6
Social protection of the population	9	8	8	10	16	9	6
Road condition	7	8	8	4	7	9	7
Agricultural development	5	6	4	4	3	4	4
Industrial production growth	5	7	3	6	3	4	8
Ecology	5	3	3	2	2	12	7
Construction and equipping of facilities for physical culture and sports	3	2	11	0	2	1	2
Land problem. Registration of property, prevention of seizure and redistribution of land	3	5	4	2	1	1	3
Public transport operation	2	2	3	1	0	1	5
Increasing the attractiveness of the republic for tourism	2	2	5	2	2	1	3

With this formulation of the issue, the population also includes among the most important problems such as the prospects of youth, or rather, the lack of prospects, healthcare, housing problems, education, the work of law enforcement agencies, social protection of the population, problems of industry, agriculture, road construction and others.

When assessing the potential for dissatisfaction with the authorities and protest sentiments, it is important to understand what causes the greatest emotional dissatisfaction and indignation. It would seem that the higher people rate the severity of the

problem, the greater their dissatisfaction and the rating of dissatisfaction should coincide with the rating of the severity of the problems. However, for some problems, emotional discontent, which obviously fuels protest sentiments, is noticeably higher than people's assessment of the severity of the problems at the societal level, for the entire republic. The range of such problems often includes problems of different real weight, from the point of view of experts. These include, for example: the threat of terrorism, poor work of law enforcement agencies, social protection of the population, as well

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as the condition of roads, environmental problems, the land problem - redistribution of land ownership. According to them, the level of discontent is one and a half times higher than the assessment of the relative importance of the problem for the republic. For example, given the widespread idea that the level of terrorism is decreasing everywhere - the average regional rating of the severity of this problem is 19%, this threat causes emotional dissatisfaction in the republics of the North Caucasus in general among 26% of the population, in Kabardino-Balkaria, where it is considered the most important 27%, it causes "emotional dissatisfaction" in 50% of the population. In general, regarding the problem of terrorism, people's concern and anxiety significantly exceed their assessment of the real danger of terrorism. Issues of interethnic relations are one of the key issues. The second is corruption. Openness of power is also a key problem. And the level of education of the population. You can list more, but these are the main ones (KCR, activists of public organizations). Youth are, first and foremost, the pillar of the future. Education, medicine. Ecology! (SO-A).

The first is employment. One of the main problems. Because when a person has nothing to do, he immediately becomes an easy prey for those people who will find something to do and direct his energy in a direction that is beneficial to them (Dagestan).

The first problem for the UK is countering extremism and terrorism. The fact that today, for example, we are carrying out counter-terrorist

actions, killings of law enforcement officials, the journalistic community and others, this is the subject of people's dissatisfaction (Dagestan).

Safety comes first. Because without security we cannot talk about the achievements of culture, economics, sports, politics, and so on. In the background is the development of economic infrastructure and industry. If there is no economy, there will be no culture, no social sphere, nothing! And unemployment - employment of the population (Ingushetia).

Everything cannot be solved or explained by one standard of living. This is important - employment, salaries. But there is something else that lies outside the sphere of economics. This is a state idea, this is a spiritual sphere. The strength of social ties, the strength of civil society - this determines a lot (CBD). According to public opinion, unemployment is the main problem in the region. If over 3 years its severity in the comparative rating of problems decreased slightly - from 36% who considered it the most acute in 2021, to 30% who called it the main one in 2023, this was due to an increase in concern about other problems. Comparing the situation with unemployment in recent years, a majority of 51%, in the region as a whole, believe that it has worsened, and only 9% note an improvement, with 37% believing that it has not changed, i.e. remained as high as 3 years ago. Residents of the republics' assessment of changes in the unemployment situation is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1 — Assessment of the unemployment situation, %

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According to residents, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria are in the worst situation with unemployment; almost no one sees the situation improving here. The situation in Dagestan is not much better. But even in Chechnya and Ingushetia, where people note positive changes in various areas of life over the past 2-3 years, more people talk about increasing unemployment than about its weakening. Young people have nowhere to go, nowhere to work! I work in a public organization, friends and relatives constantly call me - help me with my work! How are the youth now? All lawyers, all economists! There are not enough engineers! A very difficult question is to reorient the economy so that education is in demand! This is a major problem that is closely related to the economy! (SO-A).

The problematic issue is employment. Unemployment, especially among youth. In villages they live on their parents' pensions. Some leave and look for work in the center. Many people worked in Sochi at these facilities, but soon everything will end

there too, our guys will return here. Naturally, these people without work become good prey for certain forces that do not work in the interests of the Russian state (KBR). The main problem, the basic one, is unemployment. Even if you talk to Russian people who left, they say that ours would return if there was a place to work here. This is the beginning of all beginnings. But our federal center (Chechnya) stubbornly refuses to resolve this issue.

Many associate the reason for high unemployment with stagnation in the republic's economy, primarily in industry, with significant differences in estimates across the republics. In Chechnya, a noticeable majority note an improvement in the situation in industry; they are more optimistic about the situation with industry in Ingushetia. In the remaining republics, especially in Karachay-Cherkessia and North Ossetia, the population does not see progress in industrial development (Table 9).

Table 9. Support and development of industrial production, %

Republic	Improved	Hasn't changed	Worsened	I find it difficult to answer
All	16	37	34	14
Dagestan	7	38	27	28
Ingushetia	31	39	27	3
Kabardino-Balkaria	7	44	36	13
Karachay-Cherkessia	2	25	56	17
North Ossetia Alania)	2	38	55	5
Chechen Republic	54	34	9	3

As for large enterprises, none are working. Everything is divided into small workshops in which private traders work and fulfill their small needs for enrichment (Dagestan).

This is a result, a consequence of decay. It goes from there. At the same time, with the collapse of Dagestan, they simply threw it out and left it. Chechnya was blocked, and Dagestan was simply forgotten. All factories stopped, raw materials, mutual settlements, everything was lost. If Dagestan lived according to Russian laws, we would have died out long ago! Dagestan lives by its own laws, with its own efforts! With your grip, helping each other. Some neighbor will give you a kilogram of meat, someone will buy bread! There's something else there. We had days when there was no bread to buy! Not relatives - people from the street helped! (Dagestan).

The Republic could be very advanced. It is unique in its natural resources and climatic conditions. No industry! It needs to be restored. There is no fishing industry, no canning industry. It is not developing, agriculture has actually collapsed. Wool, production, it is depreciated. Or we could have the entire cycle - from wool production to the final product. All the people who worked in this area trade in the markets (Dagestan). People are somewhat more optimistic about the situation in agriculture. Chechnya is also the leader here; most of its residents talk about improving things in this area. Noticeable improvements are noted in Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia. The situation in rural areas in Karachay-Cherkessia and North Ossetia, as well as in Dagestan, is assessed negatively (Table 10).

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Table 10. Support and development of agriculture, %

Republic	Improved	Hasn't changed	Worsened	I find it difficult to answer
All	19	39	30	11
Dagestan	12	41	26	21
Ingushetia	23	48	25	4
Kabardino-Balkaria	27	42	20	10
Karachay-Cherkessia	4	29	51	16
North Ossetia Alania)	5	42	48	6
Chechen Republic	50	33	15	2

Agriculture is developing. Now the gardens are grown using Italian technologies, in greenhouses in recent years (CBD). There are breakthroughs in favor of development in agriculture. Last year, more than two thousand head of cattle were imported. And this is a great help for agriculture (KCR). There are some areas that are developing very well. Here is the Levashinsky district. In my opinion, they provide the whole of Russia with their cabbage (Dagestan). No potatoes! No carrots! It's a shame that they brought it to Dagestan from Israel! The entire rural population moves to Makhachkala and sells some small items there. There is no work (Dagestan). The land problem is very big. She doesn't dare. In the 90s, when this problem was raised, that it was necessary to transfer land into private ownership, opponents of these reforms said that the land would fall into the hands of grabbers, and there was little land, and the bulk of the rural population would be left with nothing. This was the main argument. What did we get? Formally, the land is not privately owned, but in fact it ended up in the hands of an absolutely small group of officials on a district or republican scale. And the issue is not resolved. And social tension on this basis is growing every day (CBD). Of particular note is the situation with development and employment in the tourism sector, given the grandiose plans for the North Caucasus Resorts project and the ski cluster in the region. Information about these plans and the construction that has begun is gradually reaching the residents of the republics, and where there is some economic activity in this direction, they note the development of the tourism sector. In particular, in Chechnya a significant majority - 77% - talk about progress in this area. Some growth is noted in Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Although in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, despite having the most developed ski center in the country, progress has stopped due to constant terrorist attacks and the introduction of a regime of counter-terrorism operations.

In general, the population of the republics does not yet see significant reserves for increasing employment in the field of tourism - only 2-3% name increasing the attractiveness of the republic for tourism as an important task facing the authorities. The tourist complex begins to develop: Arkhyz, Bai, Mahar, etc. And we are drawn into this activity. For example, real estate and tourism services (KCR). Tourism? People are intimidated by the North Caucasus. The Internet and the media play a very bad role in this matter. Tourism was developed on Elbrus during Soviet times, but now it is in absolute decline (KBR). They seem to be trying to develop tourism here. But there were several terrorist actions, and again everything died down. Investors began to disappear. It is clear that they will not invest money where everything has fallen. Now there is hope that in connection with the Olympics, investments will again flow here, in the Elbrus region; the majority of the population hopes that by 2024 there will be no Wahhabism here (KBR). I hope that there will be a leader in Dagestan who will change the situation for the better. And it will be like a little Switzerland here. After all, we have excellent natural resources for this - the sea and the mountains! The same France and Switzerland, where people go to resorts. There is simply no one to take care of all these tourist aspects (Dagestan). The development of tourism is a prospect, this is the future. It will start working in 5, 10 years. This is the case if the situation in the Caucasus (CO-A) stabilizes.

The majority of residents of the republics believe that corruption is one of the main social diseases of society, preventing the solution of many other problems. In popular opinion, there are two approaches to explaining the growth of corruption. According to one, it's all about "high-level" corruption, the theft of money coming in the form of subsidies and transfers to local budgets from Moscow. According to another, the reason is "grassroots" corruption, bribery and nepotism in all spheres of everyday life in the republics; when obtaining work, education, treatment, various

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benefits and compensation. Focus group discussions showed that among the people there is a widespread scenario of “top-level” corruption. It is believed that from one third to half of the money allocated from the federal budget in the form of subsidies and targeted programs is embezzled and “sawed up” in Moscow by corrupt politicians and officials. Then half of the remaining half is appropriated by the local, republican ruling clans, and only the remainder reaches the population. Often, the construction of, for example, a hospital, for which funds were allocated, is replaced by the construction of a shopping center in favor of persons influencing the distribution of funds. “Grassroots” corruption is quite widely known to many residents who have personally encountered it in their lives. This is a payment for getting a job, especially in state or municipal authorities, for career advancement; admission to a university, tests and exams, obtaining a diploma; compensation for a house or apartment destroyed as a result of hostilities; for material assistance during resettlement as a result of resolving territorial conflicts, etc.

If people consider reducing unemployment to be possible at least in principle, thanks to investments in industry, the development of agriculture using new technologies, and the construction of resorts and hotels, then corruption is presented as a destructive, but well-established, habitual norm of life, a departure from which, especially at the top, impossible without political

will in the upper echelons of republican and/or federal government. Corruption begins in the Kremlin itself. It all starts from there. I can’t wrap my head around it when “Arguments and Facts” write that under Yeltsin, the governor came to Moscow, signed for the amount, and took 60% to the regions. And now Putin and Medvedev leave 60, but 40% reaches the regions! But why do you want us to have order, if in the Kremlin... It’s the same with us - it’s impossible for a person to get a job based on his working qualities, you either have to pay, or you have to be a nephew. These problems are all over the country, we are not alone. Because we live in Russia, in a wild country! (KCR). Studying at a university is pure corruption. It’s one thing to give when you enroll, but another thing to pay every session! (Dagestan). There was a huge tungsten-molybdenum plant in Tyrnyauz. This is the only plant in Balkaria. It was of federal significance. And since 1993 it has remained inactive. Many times we tried to restore it, but it never worked. Of course, we would really like the federal center to create some kind of official, authorized organization here that is not related to corruption. This corruption is corroding the Caucasus! Send people here who are not associated with the so-called kickback! (CBD). Residents of all republics believe that their level of corruption is extremely high. It is rated highest in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia, less critically in Chechnya and Ingushetia (Table 11).

Table 11. In your opinion, is the level of corruption in the republic today high, average or low?, %.

Republic	Years	High	Average	Short	I find it difficult to answer
Dagestan	2021	75	16	4	5
	2023	62	26	3	9
Ingushetia	2021	52	39	9	0
	2023	39	43	16	2
CBD	2021	66	24	4	6
	2023	56	35	6	4
KCR	2021	67	22	5	6
	2023	53	29	7	11
North Ossetia Alania)	2021	52	32	1	15
	2023	47	36	4	14
Chechen Republic	2021	39	42	7	12
	2023	26	52	19	2

In all republics except Chechnya, the population believes that the level of corruption continues to rise. Only in Chechnya over the past 3 years has the vector of assessment changed: now slightly more residents of the republic are confident that corruption is decreasing than those who still see

it increasing. It is noteworthy that the majority of residents of the North Caucasus republics do not believe that their level of corruption is higher than in the rest of Russia. It is difficult to say what these assumptions are based on: local patriotism - we are no worse than other regions, or media information -

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about the large scale of theft and corruption at the federal level. This probably alleviates some of the people's anger at local corruption. In addition, there are changes, at least in Chechnya - the majority now believe that their level of corruption is lower than in

all of Russia (Figure 2). Do you think the level of corruption in the republic is higher, lower, or the same as in all of Russia? (V %).




Figure 2 - Comparison of the level of corruption in the republic and in Russia as a whole, %

Over 3 years, the situation from the point of view of personal experience has changed little - according to residents, the corruption of life in Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia has decreased slightly, has remained virtually unchanged in

Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia, has increased slightly in Karachay-Cherkessia, but the changes are close to the size of the statistical error (Table 12).

In general, more than a third of the population personally find themselves in corruption situations.

Table 12. Over the past year or two, have you personally encountered any official asking or expecting unofficial payment or favors from you for their work?, %

Republic	Yes	No	I find it difficult to answer
All	37	55	8
Dagestan	43	43	15
Ingushetia	29	68	3
CBD	32	64	3
KCR	45	45	10
North Ossetia Alania	35	58	7
Chechen Republic	32	64	4

The moral and psychological background around the corruption situation in the republic is also stable - personal readiness or unwillingness to give a bribe to solve one's problem. Only a quarter of respondents - both now and 3 years ago - claim that

they do not and will not give bribes under any circumstances. 17% are ready to give a bribe without hesitation, since it has become the norm in our lives, and another 48% are ready to give a bribe depending on the situation (Table 13).

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Table 13. If you had to pay a bribe to achieve your goal, what would you do?, %

Republic	I would give it without hesitation - this has become the norm in our society	Depending on the situation	No, I would not give it under any circumstances	I find it difficult to answer
All	17	48	27	7
Dagestan	20	47	20	14
Ingushetia	22	46	29	2
CBD	16	51	30	2
KCR	18	45	27	30
North Ossetia Alania	14	47	33	6
Chechen Republic	13	56	29	3

Judging by the statements at the focus groups, for many it is the need to participate in corrupt situations, contrary to their own moral standards, that causes feelings of rejection and protest. In addition, people believe that it is the corruption of the authorities and the inability to achieve justice that pushes young people “into the forest”, to fight with the authorities. Let's say there is a conflict between two people. It is clearly visible that this is the injured party, this is the criminal. The victim is openly told: “You are right, but in order to confirm that you are right, you must pay so much. Otherwise we will get it from him!” (KCR). Why do young people go to the forests? They feel hopeless! Whatever they undertake, they are faced with corruption, dishonesty of this society! Recently, the rector of the medical

academy was caught. And they published information in the press about what they were doing there. There, the rector himself, or his vice-rector, gives instructions. Those students who did not pass three exams received one hundred thousand each as a bribe! Many of those who go into the forests are looking for an alternative to the social injustice that exists in society (Dagestan). At the same time, residents blame the authorities, ruling circles and authorities for creating and maintaining a climate of corruption in society (Figure 3).

From your point of view, is the government effectively fighting corruption or not effectively, or does the government have no such desire at all? (V %).




Figure 3 - Effectiveness of the fight against corruption, %

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In four republics, half of the population believes that the government is fighting corruption ineffectively, and a quarter believes that the government has no desire to fight corruption at all. Chechnya stands out, whose residents highly appreciate the fight of the republican authorities against corruption; a significant shift in sentiment has occurred over the past three years in Ingushetia, where the assessment of the effectiveness of the government’s fight against corruption has tripled. The effectiveness of the fight against corruption in Chechnya was explained in the following way at a focus group: I am very glad that Ramzan Kadyrov is now testing a very simple but effective mechanism to combat bribes in universities. He said that he would send his people everywhere offering bribes, and if anything happened, he would remove the head of the university. They say that now they are afraid to take bribes. Probably, there will be only one year

when it is unlikely that at least one teacher will take a bribe (Chechnya). The threat of terrorism, according to people's assessments, in the North Caucasus as a whole is receding; in absolute assessments of the severity of problems, it moved from second to fourth place, after unemployment, corruption and poverty. When posing a question in a sociological questionnaire about the problems that concern people, when it was possible to name several of the most important problems that the authorities should solve, terrorism also came out of the first place.

Over 3 years, the assessment of the severity of the problem of terrorism in Dagestan has halved, and in Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria the situation has changed little (Figure 4). Please tell me, over the past one to two years, the situation has improved, remained unchanged, or worsened in the following areas: countering terrorism (in%)




Figure 4 - Results of countering terrorism, %

These assessments are also heard in focus groups. Compared to Dagestan, where there are militants, we have peace. We stop all this. Thanks to the FSB for working like this (SO-A).

We had a period last year or the year before when one policeman was killed every day. Every day! (CBD).

Here there is simply a war going on between bandits and security forces. They don't kill a single civilian (CBD).

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The word “extremism” does not fit here. These are simply criminal elements who used to be thieves in law and so on - now they have simply risen to a new flag and are walking under it. This slows down the development of the tourism business (CBD).

People celebrate successes in countering terrorism by the authorities and at the same time continue to express concern about the problem itself in their republics. At the same time, many assume that supporting terrorism, or, rather, the state concept of a terrorist threat, is beneficial to some state or other structures. The security forces have lists of all these bandits. Why can't they show them anything? Some people are happy with this, so we are developing all this. (CBD). We now see that despite the fact that there is a fight against terrorist activities and gangs, nevertheless, they arise again and again. It is difficult to say how their activities will turn out. I am afraid that certain forces are interested in the development of such aggressive Muslimization of the Caucasus, Islamization, Wahhabization, which can lead to serious consequences (KCR). If there are no fundamental changes in the country, both in Dagestan and the UK, of course, terrorism and armed resistance will grow (Dagestan). Today the population is being deceived by the state. With the

help of television, with the help of everything else. Indeed, today we have very important problems: unemployment, corruption, and, in principle, lack of industrial development. But with all this, today we have a counter-terrorism operation that is spread over the entire North Caucasus. And today all these problems are becoming secondary, because every day on TV we are told about this operation and the threat of terrorism. Already an international threat of terrorism! (CBD). They are not fighting terrorism here now, they are creating the impression that it exists. This is a way to make money (CBD).

As for the problem of terrorism in the North Caucasus, I have always said and will continue to say: first the fight against terrorism appeared here, and then terrorism itself (KBR).

At the same time, people are concerned about their safety not only in connection with the terrorist underground, but also with the arbitrariness of law enforcement agencies, under the pretext of fighting terrorists, carrying out “clean-up operations,” detaining, and prosecuting those suspected of supporting the “forest brothers.” The level of these concerns can be seen from the answers to the question about how the situation in the field of human safety has changed (Table 14).

Table 14. Assessment of the human safety situation, %

Republic	Years	Improved	Hasn't changed	Worsened	I find it difficult to answer
Dagestan	2021	4	40	52	4
	2023	14	51	25	11
Ingushetia	2021	18	58	20	4
	2023	38	45	15	2
CBD	2021	12	43	40	5
	2023	23	57	19	1
KCR	2021	15	60	21	5
	2023	25	59	9	7
North Ossetia Alania	2021	17	63	19	1
	2023	22	65	10	3
Chechen Republic	2021	49	35	9	8
	2023	80	18	1	1

Improvement is noted in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Karachay-Cherkessia. A high level of concern is

also noted about the violation of civil rights and freedoms in the republics (Table 15).

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Table 15. Violation of the rights and freedoms of citizens, %

Republic	Years	Improved	Hasn't changed	Worsened	I find it difficult to answer
Dagestan	2021	4	47	41	8
	2023	11	53	19	18
Ingushetia	2021	15	58	23	4
	2023	38	38	23	1
CBD	2021	10	57	27	7
	2023	15	61	22	2
KCR	2021	11	59	24	6
	2023	18	64	10	8
North Ossetia Alania	2021	4	63	16	17
	2023	9	65	16	9
Chechen Republic	2021	37	41	11	12
	2023	58	35	5	2

Thus, reducing the threat of terrorism does not mean that people have nothing to fear: there is a criminal danger, threats to life and property. In addition, according to participants in group discussions, the threat often comes from law enforcement agencies exceeding their authority in the fight against terrorism or participating in conflicts on the side of criminals.

The concept of crime and leadership have merged into one whole. The people live one life, and on the other side of the curtain they live a completely different life: both showdowns and divisions. And the people had absolutely no confidence left in either the federal center or their own official. The people are trying to protect themselves from the police, from the court, and from the official (KCR).

We have no justice, no fairness. No one here trusts judges. Even when it comes to criminal issues, people in the Caucasus do not go to court, knowing that they will not find justice there; they sort things out themselves. I can give an example. Ten people -

the victims of the criminal in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, caught him themselves, brought him, and handed him over to the prosecutor. But the prosecutor took the money and released him. People realized that the government was toothless and corrupt. They went, found him in the CBD and killed him. Like this! (KCR).

At the heart of all problems is the violation of human rights. First of all, the right to life and so on. Dignity is violated. And the political right to vote and be elected. This is all at the core. And at the top lies corruption, and thus all this causes indignation (Dagestan).

The greatest dissatisfaction with the situation with the safety of individuals and society is expressed by residents of Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia. The population of Chechnya, along with other positive, optimistic assessments of the situation in the republic, now rates its security noticeably higher (Table 16).

Table 16. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation with ensuring the safety of the individual and society?, %

Republic	Satisfied	Not satisfied	I find it difficult to answer
All	44	49	7
Dagestan	23	65	12
Ingushetia	53	45	2
CBD	41	58	1
KCR	44	44	12
North Ossetia Alania	41	52	7
Chechen Republic	82	15	3

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Low financial status and poverty appear in population surveys as one of the most pressing problems that cause discontent and protest sentiments. It is on a par with corruption and the threat of terrorism, causing the greatest emotional dissatisfaction of people - it was named the most acute in this series by 27% (27% named corruption, 26% - terrorism). At the same time, only about 15% called their financial situation “bad” or “rather bad” (with a range from 4% in Ingushetia to 26% in North Ossetia). This reflects the reluctance of many respondents with low incomes to admit that they are incompetent owners, losers, “worse than others”; the majority describe their financial situation as “average, satisfactory.”

Everyone seems to live normally, and at the same time a large percentage are unemployed. Ossetia has a large percentage of unemployed people. Those people who do not receive income, but live off old people’s pensions and child benefits; They have no other income (SO-A).

In fact, there are no poor people here, no one dies of hunger! We help each other (Ingushetia).

It should be borne in mind here that many residents of the republics have an additional source of income and food in the form of a personal plot, a farm, their own livestock, a garden, or a vegetable garden. For the population of the North Caucasus republics, this is a “safety net” that does not allow them to slide into poverty, unlike many other regions of Russia.

As the results of the study show, for 45% of respondents the source of family income is wages at the main place of work (respondents could name several sources of income), 10% had one-time extra jobs, 20% received a pension, 4% received a stipend,

10% received social benefits. payments, subsidies, 4% - income from private business, 9% - cash or in-kind income from household plots, 13% - financial assistance from relatives or friends, 2% - income from renting out premises or property. Additional income, including from household farming, for many people accounts for more than a third of all family income. This was also noted in focus groups.

I agree that people are dissatisfied with the government and the state. But I can add that the standard of living of our people is higher than in Soviet times. And the standard of living in Dagestan is decided not thanks to the government and laws, but in spite of it (Dagestan).

Other vital needs of people are poorly met - housing, healthcare, education, for which the state and authorities are mainly responsible.

Dissatisfied! Because they are absolutely not concerned with the social problems of citizens. There are no places in kindergartens at all, neither for disabled people nor for forced migrants. People complain that they have to pay for kindergarten, for equipment. To the point that in Makhachkala the price is already up to 50 thousand for a place in kindergarten. This is already an unrealistic price! (Dagestan).

The majority of the region's population is dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the housing and communal services sector, while in four republics the dissatisfaction is very acute - dissatisfaction is twice as high as satisfaction. Only in Chechnya and Ingushetia are there more satisfied people, but even here the number of those dissatisfied with the situation amounts to between a third and half of the population (Table 17).

Table 17. In general, are you satisfied or not satisfied with the situation in the housing and communal services?, %

Republic	Satisfied	Not satisfied	I find it difficult to answer
All	34	61	5
Dagestan	26	63	10
Ingushetia	52	45	3
CBD	31	67	2
KCR	20	75	5
North Ossetia Alania	20	76	4
Chechen Republic	64	34	2

At the same time, in all republics, residents note progress in the gasification of settlements and in the development of water supply and sewerage systems. Many residents were positively impressed by the actions of local authorities to develop infrastructure and improve settlements - lighting, landscaping,

garbage collection, and improvement of appearance. These positive changes were also noted by focus group participants. Roads are being built. The infrastructure is improving. Due to my specifics, I see real progress. And I hope that we will live better.

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After all, now young people are very actively involved in improvement (KCR).

The only difference in our region, despite the fact that there have been wars, the roads are some of the best in the region. The infrastructure is one of the best, tourism is improving, there are good buildings, the appearance of the city is improving (Chechnya).

If we take my loved ones and relatives, at a purely everyday level the situation in my village has noticeably improved. We are laying gas (KCR).

The main complaint to the authorities in the housing and communal services sector is the non-

stop increase in fees for housing and communal services. Only in Ingushetia and Chechnya did residents somehow not notice this, or perhaps the authorities here slowed down such growth. In other republics, from 61 to 91% note that the cost of housing and communal services has increased. This is one of the problems that evokes feelings of acute protest among the population, however, it is quite in line with the critical sentiments in the rest of Russia (Figure 5).




Figure 5 - Cost of housing and communal services, %

Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria especially stand out in terms of the level of discontent. Housing and communal services tariffs alone are worth it. Local monopolists control prices themselves; they set these tariffs at their own discretion (KBR).

Housing and communal services have already reached their limits! (SO-A).

The main problem is housing and communal services! Because people are outraged by the increase in tariffs! Since Soviet times, electricians have not installed a single pole! And tariffs are rising and rising! And all this ends up in their pockets! (SO-A).

I believe that it is urgent to close this housing and communal services sector for a year and leave people alone!

Communications are not restored, nothing is being built! What should we pay for! The entrance is terrible! There are no repairs, nothing is being done! (SO-A).

As for housing and communal services, I have the opinion that if young people, and not the older generation, paid for utilities, then the war would have started long ago! And the old people just faint, they are pumped out (SO-A).

According to the level of severity of social problems that cause dissatisfaction among the

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population of the region, the level of medical care is also distinguished (Table 18).

Table 18. Quality of medical care, %

Republica	Improved	Hasn't changed	Worsened	I find it difficult to answer
All	20	46	31	3
Dagestan	10	50	37	3
Ingushetia	41	41	16	2
CBD	18	53	27	1
KCR	14	52	30	4
North Ossetia Alania	9	39	49	3
Chechen Republic	41	36	21	1

It is obvious that the quality of medical care for the majority is associated with the availability of paid medicine, and here in all republics except Chechnya and Ingushetia, the availability of treatment based on

its cost has significantly worsened (Figure 6). Please tell me whether the situation has improved, remained the same, or worsened in the area of affordable cost of medical services (in %).




Figure 6. Availability of medical services, %

The high cost of medical care and, accordingly, its inaccessibility for ordinary residents have increased significantly, with the exception of Ingushetia and Chechnya, where many note an improvement in the situation. In general,

dissatisfaction with the level of medical care remains an acute problem in most republics, fueling dissatisfaction with the activities of the authorities (Table 19).

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Table 19. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in healthcare?, %

Republic	Year	Satisfied	Not satisfied	I find it difficult to answer
Dagestan	2021	17	76	7
	2023	20	71	10
Ingushetia	2021	37	57	7
	2023	58	39	4
CBD	2021	12	79	9
	2023	36	60	3
KCR	2021	17	78	5
	2023	21	74	5
North Ossetia Alania	2021	19	72	9
	2023	16	76	8
Chechen Republic	2021	34	60	6
	2023	55	40	5

We are very dissatisfied with our medicine. But the same residents of Grozny, everyone is being treated in our hospitals, and the Ingush too. And they say - you just don't know what kind of medicine we have. Our children would die if they were treated in our hospitals. But we only see the downsides. Apparently, we strive for the best, but it could be worse (SO -A).

Compared to other republics, we have very poor medical care. Patients do not trust him and go to neighboring republics (Ingushetia).

There is a growing understanding in public opinion in the republics of the North Caucasus that the lack of work and prospects for a normal, successful life both at home and when traveling to other regions of Russia carries a charge of mass discontent and protest. North Caucasian youth increasingly believe that Russia has placed them in the position of outsiders, outcasts, alien to the interests, norms and customs of the rest of Russia, and, accordingly, unwanted guests in other regions of the country.

Along with the problems of employment and unemployment, young people in the republics of the North Caucasus are very concerned about the problems of education - a decrease in its quality and an increase in cost. These assessments emerge in group discussions. The common thing is probably receiving a low-quality education, first of all at school, that's the first thing. Because I, as a teacher, want to say that every new course taken at our university is something terrible. They come from school ignoramuses, some even write poorly (KCR).

There must be a growing generation, they must be specialists, they must be prepared. Where do they come from, trained specialists? These are high schools, universities, manufacturing. Where will they come from if there is no education in schools? (KCR).

If under Soviet rule our education could be rated at 4-5, now it is a two and a one. Why? 6 universities and 26 different branches. The same teachers teach. How can the same person work in 6-7 universities? What knowledge does it give? He comes and gives a recorded lecture on a floppy disk. Rewrite, get busy! (Dagestan).

No, it's more complicated than that, actually! One of the main problems of our republic and country is the economy. This is where the youth problem comes from. I spent the best years of my life in production. From worker to manager. And today there is nowhere to work! No education? Education in bulk! Under Soviet rule there were 4 universities, today there are 10! Every vocational school already has a law faculty! (SO-A).

Since the late 1980s. In the republics of the North Caucasus, as in other union and national republics of Russia, the ideas of national sovereignty with the possibility of secession from the USSR and the Russian Federation developed. As is known, the collapse of the USSR led to the formation of the CIS from three republics and the creation of 12 independent states. In the North Caucasus, the ideas of separatism, separation from the Russian Federation in the form of independent states or a North Caucasian federation were put forward by various circles in all the republics. These ideas received the greatest development in Chechnya under J. Dudayev, who proclaimed the independence of Ichkeria, which led to a protracted military conflict with thousands of casualties and destruction.

After the liquidation of the separatist governments in Chechnya and its return to the Russian Federation, the ideas of separatism were not officially put forward in any republic, however, there are ideas in the media that among the population there is still a widespread desire for the separation of one or another republic from Russia or the creation

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of a confederation of North Caucasian republics. Our research has shown that these ideas are far from reality.

Of course, residents of the republics have grievances against Russia - for the colonial policy of the Russian Empire, insufficient attention during the Soviet years, Stalin's deportation, lack of

understanding of the problems of the republics in recent times, unfair distribution of federal assistance between the republics, negative attitude towards immigrants from the Caucasus in the rest of Russia. However, the majority of the population has no illusions about the relativity of the possibility of the republics existing separately from Russia (Table 20).

Table 20. Do you think our republic will be able to achieve better results in economic, social and spiritual development while being part of Russia or is it better for us to develop separately, creating our own state or federation of Caucasian peoples?, %

Republic	Years	As part of Russia	Independent state	Federation of Caucasian Peoples	I find it difficult to answer
Dagestan	2021	85	2	3	10
	2023	85	2	2	11
Ingushetia	2021	67	17	15	1
	2023	68	17	13	3
CBD	2021	89	3	4	5
	2023	89	2	2	8
KCR	2021	85	6	2	8
	2023	95	1	2	2
North Ossetia Alania	2021	98	1	1	1
	203	94	0	2	4
Chechen Republic	2021	68	15	8	9
	2023	84	8	6	2

There is a massive desire of the population of the republics to remain part of the Russian Federation. Ingushetia stands out, where 30% of the population would prefer to exist as an independent state or as part of the North Caucasus federation. At the same time, in Chechnya, where 3 years ago ideas of separatism were just as widespread, their level has now dropped to 14%.

People understand that without Russia, not a single republic will survive economically due to lack of resources and economic underdevelopment. In addition, the republics' farms have long been part of the all-Russian economic complex and are integrated into the Russian economy. It is also important that Russia plays the role of a unifying force in the North Caucasus, resolving clashes of interests and frequent conflicts between the republics.

We will die without Russia! We don't have production. All the injections we have are a direct tranche from Moscow. Pensions, for example! How can you earn a pension if three cripples work! We have unemployment! (SO-A).

For Russia, the Caucasus is an important strategic unit. Because who is below us? — Eastern countries that are negatively disposed towards Russia. It would be convenient for them - the collapse of the South of Russia! (SO-A)

This idea did not last even two years. My categorical opinion is that the fate of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic and its peoples is always connected only with the Russian Federation (KCR).

We are connected by an umbilical cord to Russia, like all the republics of the UK. If in the Soviet Union we produced 2 billion rubles of products, today we produce practically nothing except vodka (SO-A).

History develops in a spiral. And appanage principalities never led to victory. Therefore, if a state is strong, then it is united. Even in Dagestan there are enough sensible people, there are simply too many nationalities there. They understand what this can lead to, because Russia is a deterrent (KCR).

If, without Russia, we immediately start fighting with the Ingush! (SO-A).

There have never been such sentiments in our republic. Such sentiments existed in Chechnya and Ingushetia. This is probably why the federal center feeds these republics. For example, I know for sure that if something ever starts, it will start from those republics. And the funds that pour in there go to support the Chechen army. If something happens, it will be from these peoples. They won't take anything into account! They, of course, will not be able to

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extinguish the entire federation, but they are most prone to separatism (SO-A).

There is no need to talk about any kind of confederation. Again, old conflicts that have reached open confrontation between Ossetians and Ingush, both Kabardians and Balkars are also constantly in a smoldering conflict situation. Karachais and Circassians. At what point this will all flare up, who will take which side and how it will all end is hard to predict! But all this will lead to chaos, to tragedy for people, for the population (SO-A).

Opposite to these ideas of separatism on the part of the residents of the North Caucasus are the ideas, increasingly prevalent among the population of the republics, as well as in the rest of Russia, that Russia itself will sooner or later leave the Caucasus, that this region is a burden for it, a source of terrorism and interethnic tension. These topics were also discussed in focus group discussions.

The people who live in Russia, in the depths, have a negative attitude towards both the Caucasus and the Chechen Republic. It is believed that our republic is allocated more funds in terms of security and economic development than other regions. But more funds are also exported from our republic than from other republics (Chechnya).

The militants will come here and that's it, there will be no protection without the protection of Russia. Militants from the south, from Afghanistan! (SO-A).

Our republic is the only one that is a Christian republic. Naturally, the war will go to capture the CO. And naturally, this will not come from anywhere, but from Iraq, Iran. There will be a religious war, there will be no other war! (SO-A).

I very much doubt that Russia will leave the Caucasus. A holy place is never empty. The Islamic factor will strengthen. The position of such states as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab world, which is not currently in crisis, will strengthen. Naturally, no one discounts the activities of the world policeman represented by the United States, which has been here constantly through certain projects and grant programs. To say that Russia will leave and peace, prosperity and prosperity will come? No way! The Caucasus is located in such a way that the interests of various large states will clash here. We are still seeing this today - the clash of these interests (SO-A).

There are no civil society institutions in Russia. Russia can be united by only one idea - against some enemy. But to engage in a peaceful, systematic process of intercultural, interethnic, building society, this does not exist in Russia. We need an enemy. At this stage, these are persons of Caucasian nationality (Chechnya).

I don't think they need a war here, but they don't need the North Caucasus to prosper. The federal center always needs the UK as a switchman, on

whom it can be blamed and given to the military to be devoured. This attitude is in the genes, I believe, of the Russian government, it has always been like this. It's very convenient. This is a powder keg, you can always create a mess here, you can always direct the attention of the average person in the Caucasian direction in order to divert attention from the fact that the country is not governed as it should (Chechnya).

I'll give you a layman's answer. Russia needs the UK for geopolitics. They don't need these lands. But we need borders with Azerbaijan and Georgia. But Dagestanis, Ingush, not a single representative of this people is sure that he is Russian. We do not have the feeling of a Russian. Because everywhere we are insulted and humiliated. And to feel part of the country - Moscow is my capital, no Caucasian has such a feeling. If some intellectual has such a feeling in the core, and he imagines himself as part of a big country, as soon as he is convinced of the opposite! I think they only need this land to strengthen their borders (Chechnya).

So, the study showed that the North Caucasus is still a zone of increased social tension, probably greater than in other regions of Russia. At the same time, its problems are also characteristic of other regions and republics of the country, especially subsidized ones. The exceptions are the problems of unemployment and the terrorist threat. It is the decline of the economy and unemployment, the loss of the region from the past, the Soviet national economic complex of the country that feeds here the mass sentiments of frustration, apathy, feelings of injured national pride, religious fanaticism, and separatism.

Conclusion

The results of the study allow us to draw the following conclusions.

1 The population of the North Caucasus notes some improvement in the situation in their republics. This is partly due to changes in leadership in individual republics and reflects hope for improvement in the future. At the same time, with the exception of Chechnya and Ingushetia, dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in their republic still prevails in the region.

2 With a slight increase in the level of optimism and hopes for the future, the population expresses extreme dissatisfaction and growing protests over unsolvable main problems: mass unemployment, corruption, the threat of terrorism, poverty and the high cost of living. In the last year, dissatisfaction with the rise in prices for housing and communal services has added to this.

3 Fears of terrorism and concern for the lives of loved ones moved from second to fourth place in the ranking of problems, but continue to remain one of the most pressing problems in Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. At the same time,

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people call the source of the problem not only militants and the armed underground, but also lawlessness on the part of security forces and authorities in general, who support armed confrontation and force young people to join illegal armed groups, "forest brothers."

4 Dissatisfaction with these problems individually is not enough for the emergence of mass protests and acts of civil disobedience, but in general they create a problematic background against which individual incidents, local conflicts, acts of arbitrariness on the part of the authorities can cause outbreaks of mass indignation and protest actions.

5 The inability or unwillingness of the authorities to solve the chronic problems of the North Caucasus is leading to growing dissatisfaction with the authorities in all republics, with the exception of Chechnya.

6 The situation in Chechnya causes an ambivalent assessment of the population. On the one hand, local residents, like residents of neighboring

republics, highly appreciate Chechnya's successes in restoring the economy, in construction, and in the practical eradication of the armed underground. On the other hand, especially in more frank discussions, they express critical views on common problems for the region - prohibitive unemployment, corruption and nepotism in power, lack of rights for ordinary citizens, the understanding that the successes of the republic are mainly caused by abundant financial injections from the federal center as compensation for losses in past wars.

The dissatisfaction of the population of the republics with the authorities, including the federal ones, did not lead to an increase in separatist sentiments. Most residents do not see the existence of the North Caucasian republics outside of Russia, although many believe that in the rest of Russia the North Caucasus is treated as a foreign body, the main source of problems, which is manifested, in particular, in the spread of the call "Stop feeding the Caucasus!"

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SOI: [1.1/TAS](#) DOI: [10.15863/TAS](#)

International Scientific Journal Theoretical & Applied Science

p-ISSN: 2308-4944 (print) e-ISSN: 2409-0085 (online)

Year: 2024 Issue: 01 Volume: 129

Published: 04.01.2024 <http://T-Science.org>

Issue

Article



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ISOLATION AND EVALUATION OF CARBONATE RESERVOIRS ON THE EXAMPLE OF DEPOSITS IN TURKMENISTAN

Abstract: The isolation and evaluation of the industrial value of complex reservoirs in the sections of exploration and parametric wells in Turkmenistan is a rather difficult task and is currently not completely solved. To study carbonate reservoirs in domestic and foreign practice, various methods of complex interpretation of diagrams of geophysical well research methods are used, most of which are based on comparing the specific or relative resistance with the readings of acoustic and neutron gamma logging.

The value of the carbonate deposits of Turkmenistan is associated with a wide variety of structural forms of their pore space, lithological heterogeneity, low-power formations, etc. As a result, the geophysical characteristics of carbonate rocks are ambiguous; the relationship established between different parameters for one lithological reservoir difference is often invalid for carbonate reservoirs of another lithology. Due to the low porosity of deep-lying reservoir rocks, the requirements for the accuracy of determining reservoir parameters from geophysical materials are significantly increasing.

Key words: porosity, conbonal rocks, resistivity, interpretation, cavernosity, saturation, logging, lithology.

Language: English

Citation: Deryaev, A. R. (2024). Isolation and evaluation of carbonate reservoirs on the example of deposits in Turkmenistan. *ISJ Theoretical & Applied Science*, 01 (129), 179-190.

Soi: <http://s-o-i.org/1.1/TAS-01-129-11> **Doi:**  <https://dx.doi.org/10.15863/TAS.2024.01.129.11>

Scopus ASCC: 2209.

Introduction

The secondary porosity of carbonate rocks is associated with the presence of cavities and cracks or a different combination of them, depending on the predominance of a particular type of container. With an increase in the depth of carbonate rocks, the value of fractured porosity increases, since the permeability of reservoirs is associated with its magnitude.

Currently, various techniques have been developed to isolate fractured intervals in well sections: a method for determining fractured porosity according to lateral or microblock logging; a method for extreme values of block resistivity; a method for

isolating fractured carbonate reservoirs by the value of critical resistance [1-4].

Let's consider the conditions of application of the latter method in the studied sections of Western and Central Turkmenistan. The deep-lying carbonate rocks of Western Turkmenistan (well No 23-Kara-Teke, interval 4000-5000 m) the Baram limestones are characterized by significant resistances reaching 1000 Ohms. The critical (limit) resistance $\rho_{l.f.}$ of the fractured collector, determined by the pallet (Fig. 1) at $\rho_f = 0.16$ Ohms, is 230 Ohms (the resistance of the rock block is 1000 Ohms).

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


Fig. 1. A pallet for determining the critical resistance of a fractured collector

The maximum possible resistivity corresponding to the critical value of the flow fracture porosity equal to 0.05% is taken as the critical (limit) resistance of the fractured collector. [5, 6]

Using the nomogram (Fig. 2) for formations with a resistance of less than 230 Mm, the value of crack porosity is determined. According to this method, the $K_{p.f}$ varies between 0.04-0.03%. When using the approximate formula for calculating the $K_{p.f}$, the values 0.04-0.5% were obtained.

$$K_{p.f.} = \rho_{f.} \frac{\rho_{l.r.} - \rho_{l.f.}}{\rho_{l.r.} \times \rho_{l.f.}} \quad (1)$$

When testing the STT (a set of test tools) interval, an influx of gas and reservoir water was obtained [7, 8, 9].

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


Fig. 2. Nomogram for determining fracture porosity

In conditions of highly mineralized drilling fluids in the exploration areas of Central Turkmenistan ($\rho_f = 0.03 - 0.065$ Ohms), the scope of application of the above pallet and nomogram is

moved to the left. At the same time, there is a need for a differentiated approach to the choice of the value of the $\rho_{l.r.}$.

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


Fig. 3. Isolation of reservoirs with fractured porosity (well No 2-Sabur, interval 2644-2836m)

The determination of the magnitude of the fractured porosity of the $K_{p.f}$ under such conditions is carried out as follows. The semi-logarithmic blank is marked with points whose coordinates correspond to the P_s and Jny of the selected layers (Fig. 3). A line of layers with granular porosity is drawn [10, 11].

The points located to the left of the line of granular rocks correspond to layers of dolomites or limestones with the presence of cavernous porosity; the points located below the line of granular rocks correspond to layers with fractured porosity.

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


Fig. 4. Isolation and assessment of layers with a complex type of porosity (well No 2-Sabur).

According to the above formula (1), depending on the rpb, we calculate the boundary values of the K_{lf} corresponding to 0.05%. Thus, layers with a K_{lf} of $<0.05\%$ will be located above the line, corresponding to $K_{lf} = 0.05\%$. These layers are not collectors and are excluded from further consideration.

Layers with a K_{lf} of $>0.05\%$ will be located below the boundary value, for these layers the value of the fractured porosity of the K_{lf} is determined by the nomogram in Fig. 3 or by formula (1).

As an example, consider the results of

interpretation of gas dynamic studies (GDS) materials in the carbonate section of well No.2-Sabur (interval 2644-2836 m).

According to the method described above, a comprehensive quantitative interpretation was performed, K_p^{NGL} , K_p^{AL} , K_p^{LL} were determined, taking into account which the rocks were divided according to the prevailing type of porosity (Fig.4). The magnitude of the fractured porosity varies within 0,05-0,9% [12, 13].

Isolation and evaluation of carbonate reservoirs with the presence of cavernous porosity. Cavernous

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rocks, the porosity of which is largely determined by cavities that have little effect on the overall electrical conductivity, have almost the same relative resistance as a rock with the same volume of intergranular porosity. Consequently, in cavernous rocks, the K_p^{LL} values will characterize the granular porosity. Cavernosity practically does not affect the results of determining porosity coefficients according to AL either. At the same time, the results of determining porosity by neutron gamma logging depend on the total porosity.

Thus, based on the well-known comparison of K_p^{LL} , K_p^{AL} , K_p^{NGL} , it is possible to determine the type of

reservoir and in some cases to separate fractured and cavernous rocks according to the K_p^{LL} , K_p^{AL} , K_p^{NGL} characteristic of fractured rocks and K_p^{NGL} , K_p^{AL} , K_p^{LL} for cavernous rocks. The amount of cavernous porosity in this case is defined as the difference between K_p^{NGL} and K_p^{AL} , K_p^{LL} [14, 15].

One of the main tasks of interpreting GDS materials is to determine the nature of reservoir saturation. For this purpose, electrical methods or a set of methods are used, which necessarily includes an electrometric one.




Fig. 5. Assessment of the saturation of carbonate reservoirs by the microlaterolog logging - lateral logging (MLL – LL) method

- not collectors;
- ◆ gas-saturated strata for testing;
- water-saturated layers for testing

Determination of the saturation character according to the lateral logging sounding (LLS). The use of LLS materials is based on the study of radial inhomogeneity in the resistance of the studied collector. A sufficient sign of reservoir oil and gas saturation is the production of a three-layer sounding curve characterizing the penetration of drilling mud filtrate, which reduces the resistance of the formation.

However, the use of the method is possible in layers of sufficient power to obtain the right branch of the sounding curve.

As noted above, the productive deposits of the studied sections are characterized by layers of medium and low thickness ($h \leq 4$ m), therefore, the use of the method in most cases is not possible [16, 17].

Determination of the saturation character by the

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MLL – LL_method. The method is effective for determining the nature of saturation of collectors of any capacity. Figure 5 shows a comparison for the tested objects of the studied deposits. A clear

separation of oil and gas saturated and water saturated reservoirs has been obtained. In this way, pore-cavernous and pore-fractured reservoirs are also separated according to the nature of saturation.




Fig. 6. The change in apparent resistivity (AR) on the curves of time measurements (well 5, Kzh. Dawali)

Determination of the saturation character based on temporary measurements of electrical logging.

The technique is applicable to assess the saturation pattern of reservoirs, both pore-type and complexly constructed. Figure 6 shows an example of the separation of a gas-saturated reservoir of the pore

type. The effectiveness of the method depends on the time elapsed after opening the interval and the first measurement of the electrical logging. The shorter this time, the more effective the method is. The analysis showed that the time between opening the interval and the first measurement should not exceed 5 days [18,

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19].

Determination of the saturation character according to LL and AL data. The method is based on the separation of reservoirs by critical resistance calculated from known porosity (AL) and reservoir water resistance (Fig. 7). The value of critical

resistance $\rho \frac{LL}{KR} = 4P_s \rho_w$ is calculated for $\rho_w = 0.012$ 0mm; 0.015 0mm; 0.018 0mm most characteristic of the conditions of the studied deposits and corresponds to $K_w = 0.5$.




Fig. 7. Assessment of the nature of reservoir saturation according to BC w AK data

The lines $\rho = \frac{LL}{KR}$ separate the collectors tested through the production column by the nature of saturation with a confidence of 0.87.

Determination of the saturation character by the diagnostic coefficient (K_d). To assess the saturation pattern of the matrix and the type of collector based on the results of a comprehensive interpretation of the

LL, NGL, AL data, it is proposed to use the diagnostic coefficient K_d :

$$K_d = \frac{K_p^{NGL} - K_p^{LL}}{K_p^{LL}} \quad (2)$$

K_p^{NGL} is the total porosity of the formation, determined according to (neutron-gamma logging) NGL data.

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K_p^{LL} is the block porosity of the formation, calculated by its specific resistance (with partial oil saturation of the intergranular space, K_p^{LL} is the water-saturated part of the lateral porosity, and $K_p^{NGL} - K_p^{LL}$ is the crack-cavern porosity of K_{pfc}) [20-23].

Table 1 shows a comparison of diagnostic

coefficients with the results of testing. Diagnostic coefficients are calculated separately for NGL-LL and AL-LL. As can be seen from the table, the coefficient values for AL-LL are slightly lower than for NGL-LL, which indicates the presence of cavernous porosity.

Table 1. Comparison of diagnostic coefficients with test results

Research interval	K_p^{NGL} %	K_p^{LL} %	K_p^{AL} %	$K_d = \frac{K_p^{NGL} - K_p^{LL}}{K_p^{LL}}$	$K_d = \frac{K_p^{AL} - K_p^{LL}}{K_p^{LL}}$	The results of the testing
Sabur square, well No. 1						
2882,0-2878,0	10,8	8,0	8,3	0,35	0,04	$Q_w = 15,8 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$
2878,0-2875,0	3,0	3,3	2,0	-	-	
2875,0-2873,0	4,4	4,2	3,8	0,05	-	
2866,0-2864,0	5,3	4,0	3,9	0,32	-	
2864,0-2861,6	4,5	3,5	3,9	0,28	0,11	
2861,6-2859,2	1,7	2,0	1,9	-	-	
2855,0-2851,0	7,5	9,0	6,1	-	-	
2847,0-2841,6	4,5	4,1	3,4	0,1	-	
2841,6-2838,6	7,0	5,5	6,1	0,27	0,11	
2838,6-2835,0	1,2	1,5	1,9	-	0,26	
2799,6-2796,0	6,0	5,8	5,3	0,03	-	$Q_w = 0,5 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$
2730,6-2727,6	6,0	5,3	3,5	0,13	-	$Q_w = 6,5 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$
Chirli square, well No. 1						
3114,4-3118,0	14,0	11,0	10,8	0,27	-	Water - saturated
3315,0-3317,6	14,0	12,0	11,0	0,16	-	
3409,6-3415,2	16,5	13,0	16,5	0,27	0,27	Non-industrial gas inflow was received
3420,8-3422,8	6,1	7,0	4,9	-	-	
3424,0-3426,0	6,4	10,0	7,0	-	-	
3439,2-3443,2	12,0	10,8	11,1	0,11	0,03	
3580,8-3583,6	10,8	11,0	8,4	-	-	Water - saturated
3585,0-3588,6	14,8	4,8	2,2	1,25	-	
3588,6-3591,4	16,3	10,8	6,7	0,51	-	
3724,0-	0	1,2	0	-	-	

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3728,8						
3740,2-3742,4	5,9	4,7	3,5	0,25	-	
Karadzaulak square, well No. 1						
4246,4-4249,6	5,3	6,2	3,6	-	-	
4336,6-4338,8	2,4	1,3	2,3	0,84	0,77	
4361,0-4365,6	14,0	7,0	11,3	1,0	0,61	Q _g =130 t m ³ /s
4367,0-4370,4	12,5	8,0	10,8	0,56	0,35	Q _w =500 m ³ /s
4374,0-4379,2	15,6	15,2	13,3	0,02	-	
Karadzaulak square, well No. 2						
3921,6-3925,6	3,2	3,0	2,6	0,06	-	Q _w =20 m ³ /s
3929,8-3934,0	7,3	7,8	7,8	-	-	
3951,2-3954,0	1,8	2,4	2,4	-	0,25	Q _w =130 m ³ /s
3955,2-3958,0	3,9	3,6	3,6	0,08	-	
North Halimergen square, well No. 1						
2806,0-2810,8	16,1	9,1	16,3	0,78	0,81	An influx of water and gas has been received Q _w =3.4 m ³ /s Q _g =non-industrial.
2810,8-2815,2	11,2	12,0	10,8	-	-	
2819,0-2822,4	5,4	4,8	2,4	0,12	-	
2825,0-2829,6	10,4	11,5	10,1	-	-	
2829,6-2839,4	11,7	17,0	11,6	-	-	
3219,2-3224,0	2,5	3,6	1,9	-	-	The inflow has not been received
3259,0-3262,0	3,2	2,4	2,4	0,33	-	
3262,0-3268,0	2,3	1,8	1,5	0,27	-	
3281,0-3283,6	2,2	2,3	1,9	-	-	Traces of gas
3285,4-3288,2	1,2	2,7	1,9	-	-	During testing, a weak gas inflow was obtained
3289,6-3293,6	1,6	2,8	1,5	-	-	
3293,6-3296,0	2,1	4,2	2,2	-	-	
3322,6-3327,2	2,9	5,0	3,3	-	-	
3327,2-3330,0	2,2	3,0	1,9	-	-	
Sabur square, well No. 2						
2763,4-2765,2	5,6	2,8	5,2	1,0		Q _w =7,3 m ³ /s Q _g =2,4 thousand m ³ /s
2773,0-2776,0	9,0	3,7	8,0	1,43		
2776,0-	11,0	7,7	10,5	0,43		

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2777,6					
2777,6-2779,0	13,5	6,5	13,0	1,1	

The insufficient number of productive layers does not allow us to confidently determine the limit value of the K_d , which separates reservoir layers into water-saturated and productive ones. However, it can be assumed that at $K_d < 0.7$ for NGL-LL (according to

AL-LL < 0.6), the layers are characterized as water-saturated, at $K_d > 0.7$ - as productive) [24, 25, 26].

In the presence of fractured porosity, the use of a diagnostic coefficient to assess the nature of reservoir saturation is impractical.

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Impact Factor:

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ICV (Poland) = 6.630
 PIF (India) = 1.940
 IBI (India) = 4.260
 OAJI (USA) = 0.350

SOI: [1.1/TAS](#) DOI: [10.15863/TAS](#)

International Scientific Journal Theoretical & Applied Science

p-ISSN: 2308-4944 (print) e-ISSN: 2409-0085 (online)

Year: 2024 Issue: 01 Volume: 129

Published: 06.01.2024 <http://T-Science.org>

Issue

Article



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ASPECTS OF TEACHING MATHEMATICAL MODELLING

Abstract: *Mathematical modelling is actively employed in various spheres. In some cases, the developed mathematical models do not have the required properties, which leads to irrational use of the mathematical modelling capabilities. This article covers some theoretical and methodological aspects of teaching mathematical modelling that enable rational use of the mathematical modelling capabilities. For this, the concept of “mathematical modelling” has been defined as a substitution of the object of study with a suitable mathematical model and the subsequent study of this model by well-known methods and techniques. A mathematical model is considered suitable if it sufficiently possesses the required properties in relation to the conducted research. These properties determine the requirements for the mathematical model. Such requirements are contradictory, and in practice can be fulfilled by a reasonable compromise; it is usually achieved by observing the rules and recommendations obtained by generalising the practical experience gained from building mathematical models. The principles of building mathematical models that are general and universal are of the most interest in this respect. This article presents a clear example of how to build a suitable mathematical model using a principled approach. Teaching mathematical modelling with consideration of the described theoretical and methodological aspects does not require a significant adjustment of the curriculum or the teaching process. The necessary applied problems can easily be obtained from already existing problems. Nevertheless, the implementation of such aspects develops the individual capabilities of the students and creates the conditions for improving their mathematical knowledge, both for the individual student and for the group as a whole. It also generates a strong mutual relationship between the studied disciplines, and prepares the students for their future profession in a rapidly changing world.*

Key words: education, mathematical model, mathematical modeling, principled approach, teaching.

Language: English

Citation: Markelov, G. E. (2024). Aspects of teaching mathematical modelling. *ISJ Theoretical & Applied Science*, 01 (129), 191-195.

Soi: <http://s-o-i.org/1.1/TAS-01-129-12> **Doi:** <https://dx.doi.org/10.15863/TAS.2024.01.129.12>

Scopus ASCC: 3304.

Introduction

Mathematical modelling is used in various spheres. Many scientific publications demonstrate the possibilities which are opened up by mathematical modelling as a method of research and obtaining new knowledge. Interdisciplinary research is increasing in importance, and new areas of study arise which demand an interdisciplinary approach. Publications that are relevant to this topic (see, for example, [1–5]) demonstrate the capabilities of mathematical modelling in solving scientific problems arising at the junction of several academic disciplines.

The emergence of new fundamental and applied problems requires further active use of mathematical modelling. This is due to a number of reasons, which include higher complexity and tighter time frames for research, increasing financial, energy and other costs of experiments, the need to solve environmental, social and other research-related problems.

The modern education system actively uses aspects of mathematical modelling. Problems related to teaching mathematical modelling are widely discussed in current scientific literature, and various points of view are considered (see, for example, [6–

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11]). Many scientists believe that learning mathematical modelling improves the mathematical literacy among students, develops their cognitive abilities, increases students' motivation and strengthens interdisciplinary links (see, for example, [12–15]).

Thus, it becomes important to teach mathematical modelling focusing on modern methods of building mathematical models, techniques for qualitative and quantitative analysis of mathematical models, and methods that permit rational use of the mathematical modelling capabilities.

The goal of this article is to present certain theoretical and methodological aspects of teaching mathematical modelling which form prerequisites for rational use of mathematical modelling capabilities. In accordance with this goal, the article refines the existing conceptual framework, outlines the stages of mathematical modelling which can be implemented by students, suggests a sample problem the solution of which creates the necessary skills, and provides methodological recommendations for planning the teaching process.

1. Concepts and definitions

Approaches to building a mathematical model and methods for studying such a model have been described in numerous academic and scientific literature (see, for example, [16–19]). However, in some cases the capabilities of mathematical modelling are not used rationally. One reason is that the built mathematical models do not have the necessary properties.

Based on the best teaching practices, we will refine the concept of “mathematical modelling”, which we will define as a substitution of the object of study with a suitable mathematical model and the subsequent study of said model using well-known methods and techniques. A mathematical model is considered suitable if it sufficiently possesses the required properties in relation to the conducted research.

1.1. Properties of mathematical models

A mathematical model can have many properties. Nevertheless, its use will not be effective if these properties do not include those that are required for the conducted research. Here, we will provide a brief description of certain properties of mathematical models [20].

Property of fullness. A full mathematical model reflects the properties and qualities of the object of study that are considered essential in the given context.

Property of adequacy. An adequate mathematical model provides a correct qualitative and precise quantitative description of the characteristics of the object of study that are of interest. For example, when studying engineering devices or systems, a

mathematical model is considered adequate if it describes the relevant quantitative characteristics with a relative error not exceeding the specified value δ_0 .

Property of productivity. This property relates to the availability of reliable input data. If this is missing, then the mathematical model does not have the property of productivity, and its subsequent use will become difficult or impossible.

Property of economy. If a mathematical model has the property of economy, then it is considered economical, and thus the study of said model will not require large amounts of time and resources. The simpler the mathematical model, the more economical it is.

After the properties required for the conducted research are determined, it is possible to formulate the requirements for the mathematical model of the object of study. Such requirements are contradictory and in practice can be fulfilled by a reasonable compromise reached when completing stages of mathematical modelling.

1.2. Stages of mathematical modelling

In general, the following main stages of mathematical modelling can be highlighted.

At the first stage of mathematical modelling, there is an informal transition from the object of study to its conceptual model. The conceptual model is a conventional description of the object of research. Such a description should include the features and quantitative characteristics of the object that are important from the point of view of the case being analyzed. At the same time, it is necessary to justify the assumptions and simplifications that allow not taking into account the features and quantitative characteristics of the object of research that are considered immaterial.

At the second stage, the conceptual model is described mathematically. A mathematical model of the object of study is obtained via this formal description. It is possible to develop not one but several mathematical models of the same object.

At the third stage of mathematical modelling, when a qualitative and estimative quantitative analysis of the mathematical model is conducted, a need may arise to clarify or review the conceptual model, leading to repetition of the first stage of mathematical modelling. Comparing the results of analysing various mathematical models enables a reasoned choice of the model for further detailed quantitative analysis. The final result of this stage is building a working mathematical model, i.e. a mathematical model designed for detailed quantitative analysis.

At the fourth stage, a computational problem is formulated; the results of solving this problem are then analysed, and this analysis can provide answers to the questions of interest.

At the fifth stage of mathematical modelling, a numerical method is reasonably selected or

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formulated. As a rule, the numerical method does not include many details that are required for using computer-based techniques. A detailed elaboration of all computational stages is needed to derive a usable algorithm of the computational experiment. The development of an effective algorithm for the computational experiment is the result of the sixth mathematical modelling stage.

At the seventh stage, the software that implements the computational algorithm is developed.

At the eighth stage, the software product is subjected to testing. A thorough check of the calculation results can detect shortfalls that must be eliminated by returning to the previous mathematical modelling stages. After all the identified shortfalls have been eliminated, the computational experiment begins. The computational experiment is the result of the ninth and final stage of mathematical modelling.

A reasonable compromise is normally reached by observing the rules and following the recommendations obtained as a result of generalising the practical experience gained in the process of building mathematical models. A special emphasis is placed on the principles of building mathematical models that are general and universal. Here, we will consider an example that illustrates the building of a suitable mathematical model.

2. Example of building a mathematical model

Let us build a suitable mathematical model of the object of study by predominantly applying just one well-known principle — the principle of gradual increase in difficulty. According to this principle, building a mathematical model of the object of study should start with the simplest mathematical models. If the model has the properties required for the particular study, then it will be used at the subsequent mathematical modelling stages. Otherwise, the next cycle of modifying the mathematical model is required, resulting in a more complicated model. Its suitability is then verified, and the process continues until a suitable mathematical model is obtained. This process results in building a set of models of the same object of study. Comparing the results obtained with the use of various mathematical models can not only enrich the understanding of the object of study under consideration, but also enhance the reliability of the results obtained.

2.1. Statement of the problem

Let us consider a resistor the resistance of which depends on temperature. The resistor is considered to be a body with high thermal conductivity, i.e. the dependence of the temperature T of the body on the spatial coordinates at any time point t is disregarded. The total heat capacity of the resistor is equal to the constant C_0 . On the resistor surface with area S , convective heat exchange with the environment

occurs; the ambient temperature is equal to T_0 , and the heat transfer coefficient is known and is equal to α . At the initial time point t_0 , the resistor temperature T is equal to the ambient temperature. Let the dependence of the resistor's resistance on temperature be as follows:

$$R(T) = R_0 [1 + \beta(T - T_0)],$$

where R_0 is the resistance of the resistor at $T = T_0$; β is the temperature coefficient, and $\beta > 0$. An electric current flows through the resistor, which is equal to

$$I = \frac{U}{R_0 [1 + \beta(T - T_0)]}, \quad (1)$$

where U is the constant difference in electrical potential on the poles of the element under consideration.

The current I is of interest in the study. Let us build a mathematical model of the object of study which sufficiently possesses the properties of fullness, adequacy, productivity and economy.

2.2. Solution

In order to solve the stated problem, we will build a hierarchy of mathematical models of this object and determine the conditions under which we can calculate the sought value I with a relative error not exceeding the specified value δ_0 .

If the difference $T - T_0$ is sufficiently small, then according to (1) the sought value can be calculated using the following formula:

$$I_0 = U/R_0. \quad (2)$$

Let us define the conditions under which the resulting formula is applicable. To do this, let us consider steady-state heat transfer. In this case, the heat output of the resistor's material is equal to the heat flow from the resistor, that is,

$$\frac{U^2}{R_0 [1 + \beta(T_* - T_0)]} = \alpha(T_* - T_0)S,$$

where T_* is the steady-state resistor temperature. The resulting equality allows us to easily calculate

$$T_* = T_0 + \frac{1}{2\beta} \left(-1 + \sqrt{1 + \frac{4\beta U^2}{\alpha S R_0}} \right),$$

and then find the steady-state value

$$I_* = \frac{U}{R(T_*)} = \frac{2I_0}{1 + \sqrt{1 + 4\beta U I_0 / (\alpha S)}}. \quad (3)$$

It is evident that $I_* \leq I \leq I_0$. Then the following is true for the relative error of I_0 :

$$\delta(I_0) = \left| \frac{I - I_0}{I} \right| = \frac{I_0}{I} - 1 \leq \frac{I_0}{I_*} - 1.$$

Therefore, if the condition

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$$\frac{I_0}{I_*} - 1 \leq \delta_0$$

is met, formula (2) may be used to find the sought value with a relative error not exceeding δ_0 . Then we obtain the following inequality:

$$\frac{\beta UI_0}{\alpha S} \leq (\delta_0 + 1)\delta_0. \quad (4)$$

When this inequality is satisfied, mathematical model (2) sufficiently possesses the properties of fullness, adequacy, productivity and economy.

Let us define the conditions under which mathematical model (3) is applicable. To do this, let us consider unsteady-state heat transfer. In this case, the change in the temperature of the resistor over time t is described by the following first-order ordinary differential equation:

$$C_0 \frac{dT}{dt} = \frac{U^2}{R_0 [1 + \beta(T - T_0)]} - \alpha(T - T_0)S,$$

and the initial condition is as follows:

$$T(t_0) = T_0.$$

Given that

$$I = \frac{I_0}{1 + \beta(T - T_0)},$$

let us formulate a Cauchy problem:

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \frac{I}{C_0 I_0} [\alpha S (I_0 - I) - \beta UI^2], \quad (5)$$

$$I(t_0) = I_0.$$

If the condition

$$\delta(I_*) = \left| \frac{I - I_*}{I} \right| = 1 - \frac{I_*}{I} \leq \delta_0$$

is met, formula (3) may be used to find the sought value with a relative error of no more than δ_0 when

$$\delta_0 < \frac{I_0}{I_*} - 1,$$

since otherwise formula (2) should be used. Then let us find the time point

$$t_* = t_0 + \frac{C_0}{\alpha S} \left[\left(\frac{I_0}{2I_0 - I_*} - 1 \right) \ln \left(2 - \frac{I_*}{I_0} - \delta_0 \right) - \frac{I_0}{2I_0 - I_*} \ln \left(\frac{I_0}{I_0 - I_*} \delta_0 \right) \right],$$

for which the following is true: $I(t_*) = I_*/(1 - \delta_0)$.

Then according to (5), the steady-state value I_* can be considered equal to $I(t)$ when $t \geq t_*$ with a relative error not exceeding δ_0 .

If condition (4) is not met, mathematical model (3) sufficiently possesses the properties of fullness, adequacy, productivity and economy when $t \geq t_*$.

Building a new mathematical model when creating a hierarchy of mathematical models for the

object of study may lead to refining the previously determined conditions for the applicability of the constructed mathematical models. Indeed, using mathematical model (5), we can refine the condition of applicability for formula (2). For this let us calculate the time point

$$t^* = t_0 + \frac{C_0}{\alpha S} \left[\left(\frac{I_0}{2I_0 - I_*} - 1 \right) \ln \left(1 + \frac{I_*}{I_0} \delta_0 \right) - \frac{I_0}{2I_0 - I_*} \ln \left(1 - \frac{I_*}{I_0 - I_*} \delta_0 \right) \right],$$

for which the following is true: $I(t^*) = I_0/(1 + \delta_0)$.

Then I_0 can be considered equal to $I(t)$ at $t \leq t^*$, with a relative error not exceeding δ_0 .

If condition (4) is met or $t \leq t^*$, then mathematical model (2) sufficiently possesses the properties of fullness, adequacy, productivity and economy.

2.3. Results

By constructing a hierarchy of mathematical models, we can identify a mathematical model that possesses the necessary properties to a degree sufficient for a particular study, while the researcher obtains a valuable intellectual product — an equivalent of the object of study for the considered instance. Indeed, if inequality (4) is satisfied, or $t \leq t^*$ in the scope of the conducted study, then (2) is considered the suitable mathematical model. If condition (4) is not met, and the time interval from t_0 to t_* may be disregarded in the conducted study, (3) will be chosen as the suitable mathematical model, otherwise (5) will be the suitable mathematical model. It is evident that the use of such a model reduces the costs and time spent on research and makes rational use of the mathematical modeling capabilities.

Conclusion

Teaching mathematical modelling with consideration of the described theoretical and methodological aspects does not require a significant adjustment of the curriculum or the teaching process. The necessary applied problems can be easily obtained from already existing problems. Nevertheless, the implementation of such aspects develops the individual capabilities of the students and creates the conditions for improving their mathematical knowledge, both for the individual student and for the group as a whole. It also creates a strong mutual relationship between the studied disciplines, and prepares the students for their future profession in a rapidly changing world.

This article may be useful not only for professors and teachers who use mathematical modelling elements in their work, but also for a broad range of

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readers interested in using the capabilities of mathematical modelling.

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SOI: [1.1/TAS](#) DOI: [10.15863/TAS](#)

International Scientific Journal Theoretical & Applied Science

p-ISSN: 2308-4944 (print) e-ISSN: 2409-0085 (online)

Year: 2024 Issue: 01 Volume: 129

Published: 09.01.2024 <http://T-Science.org>

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ON THE EFFECT OF HARMONIC WAVES ON AN ORTHOTROPIC CYLINDRICAL SHELL IN A VISCOELASTIC MEDIUM

Abstract: In this paper, we consider the dynamic reaction of an orthotropic cylindrical shell (pipe) in a viscoelastic medium that is subjected to seismic action. The cylindrical shell is infinitely long, therefore, the problem of a plane deformable state is considered. It is assumed that the shell is completely connected to an environment of infinite extent. Only axisymmetric and non-axisymmetric oscillations with an incident compression wave (transverse or shear) were studied. The results were obtained for different characteristics of viscoelastic media - hard, medium and soft. It was found that the orthotropic parameters do not affect the reaction of the cylindrical shell. The degree of influence of orthotropens strongly depends on the degree of rigidity of the environment.

Key words: wave, dynamic reaction, viscoelastic medium, seismic impact, shell.

Language: English

Citation: Kulmurov, N. R., Esanov, N. Q., & Ismoilova, Z. T. (2024). On the effect of harmonic waves on an orthotropic cylindrical shell in a viscoelastic medium. *ISJ Theoretical & Applied Science*, 01 (129), 196-200.

Soi: <http://s-o-i.org/1.1/TAS-01-129-13> **Doi:**  <https://dx.doi.org/10.15863/TAS.2024.01.129.13>

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Introduction

Setting the task. An infinitely long, homogeneous, isotropically deformable cylinder with an ideal compressible liquid, located in an infinite viscoelastic medium, is affected by a harmonic expansion wave (transverse or shear) (Fig.1). The front of the harmonic (or seismic) waves can be parallel to the axis of the cylinder. Here are the outer and inner radii of the cylindrical layer. The main purpose of the work is to determine the stress-strain state of the

cylindrical layer and the environment under the influence of longitudinal (or transverse) harmonic waves. Under the assumption of a generalized deformed state, the equation of motion in displacements has the form [1]

$$(\tilde{\lambda}_j + 2\tilde{\mu}_j) \text{grad div } \vec{u}_j - \tilde{\mu}_j \text{rot rot } \vec{u}_j + \vec{b}_j = \rho_j \frac{\partial^2 \vec{u}_j}{\partial t^2}, \quad (1)$$

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


Fig.1. Calculation scheme.

where λ_j and μ_j (in the index, $j=1, 2$, $j=1$ - refer to the environment, $j=2$ - to the layer) are the operator modulus of elasticity

$$\tilde{\lambda}_j f(t) = \lambda_{0j} \left[f(t) - \int_{-\infty}^t R_\lambda^{(i)}(t-\tau) f(\tau) d\tau \right],$$

$$\tilde{\mu}_j f(t) = \mu_{0j} \left[f(t) - \int_{-\infty}^t R_\mu^{(i)}(t-\tau) f(\tau) d\tau \right]$$

\vec{b}_j - vector of density of volumetric forces ($b_j=0$);
 $f(t)$ - some function; ρ_j - density of materials,
 $R_\mu^{(i)}(t-\tau)$ and $R_\lambda^{(i)}(t-\tau)$ -relaxation core,
 λ_{0j}, μ_{0j} -instantaneous elastic modulus of a viscoelastic material, $\vec{u}_j(u_{rj}, u_{\theta j})$ -displacement vector, which depends on r, θ, t . For velocity potentials of liquid particles, at pressures up to 100 MPa, motion in the liquid is satisfactorily described by wave motion. [2]

$$\Delta \varphi_0 = \frac{1}{C_o^2} \frac{\partial^2 \varphi_0}{\partial t^2}, \quad (2)$$

where C_o is the acoustic speed of sound in the liquid. The potential and φ_0 the fluid velocity vector are $\vec{v} = grad \varphi_0$ related by the dependence. The fluid pressure is $r=R_0$ determined using the linearized

Cauchy-Lagrange integral - the fluid pressure on the wall of the cylindrical layer and ρ_o - the density of the fluid. Under the condition of continuous flow of liquid, the normal component of the velocity of the liquid and the layer on the surface of their contact $r=R_0$ must be equal

$$\left. \frac{\partial \varphi_0}{\partial r} \right|_{r=R_0} = \left. \frac{\partial u_{r2}}{\partial t} \right|_{r=R_0}, \quad (3)$$

where are the displacements of the layer along u_{r2} the normal. At the contact of two bodies $r=R$, the displacements and stresses are equal (condition of rigid contact)

$$u_{r1} = u_{r2}; \sigma_{rr1} = \sigma_{rr2}; u_{\theta1} = u_{\theta2}; u_{z1} = u_{z2};$$

$$\sigma_{r\theta1} = \sigma_{r\theta2}, \sigma_{rz1} = \sigma_{rz2} \quad (4,a)$$

Note that in the case of sliding contact of the soil along the surface of the pipe, the last equation in (4) will take the form [3]:

$$\sigma_{r\theta1} = 0, \sigma_{rz1} = 0, \sigma_{r\theta2} = 0, \sigma_{rz2} = 0. \quad (4,b)$$

The boundary conditions free from load are set in the form:

$$r=a; \sigma_{rr} = 0; \sigma_{r\theta} = 0; \sigma_{rz} = 0, \quad (4,v)$$

where are normal $\sigma_{r\theta}$ and σ_{rz} are shear stresses. The corresponding stresses and displacements surrounding the cylindrical pipes in the displacement potentials have the following form [4,5]:

$$\sigma_{rr} = \lambda \nabla^2 \varphi + 2\mu \left[\left(\frac{\partial^2 \varphi}{\partial r^2} + \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left(\gamma \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial \theta} \right) + e \frac{\partial^3 \chi}{\partial r^2 \partial x} \right) \right];$$

$$u_r = \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r} + \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial \theta} + e \frac{\partial^2 \chi}{\partial r \partial \theta}, u_\theta = \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial \theta} - \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r} + e \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial \chi}{\partial \theta \partial x}$$

$$u_r = \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r} - e \left[\frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\partial}{\partial \gamma} \left(\gamma \frac{\partial \chi}{\partial r} \right) + \frac{1}{r^2} \frac{\partial^2 \chi}{\partial \theta^2} \right] \quad (5)$$

$$\sigma_{xx} = \lambda \nabla^2 \varphi + 2\mu \left[\left(\frac{\partial^2 \varphi}{\partial x^2} - e \left(\frac{\partial}{\partial x} \nabla^2 \chi - \frac{\partial^3 \chi}{\partial x^3} \right) \right) \right]$$

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_{\theta\theta} &= \lambda \nabla^2 \varphi + 2\mu \left[\frac{1}{r} \left(\frac{\partial}{\partial r} + \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial^2 \varphi}{\partial r^2} \right) + \frac{1}{r} \left(\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial \theta} - \frac{\partial^2 \varphi}{\partial r \partial \theta} \right) + e \left(\frac{\partial^2 \chi}{\partial r \partial \chi} + \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial^3 \chi}{\partial e^2 \partial \chi} \right) \right] \\ \sigma_{r\theta} &= \mu \left[2 \left(\frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial^2 \varphi}{\partial \theta \partial \chi} - \frac{1}{r^2} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial \theta} \right) + \left(\frac{1}{r^2} \frac{\partial^2 \varphi}{\partial \theta^2} - r \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left(\frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r} \right) \right) \right] + 2e \left(\frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial^3 \chi}{\partial r \partial \theta \partial \chi} \right) \\ \sigma_{rx} &= \mu \left\{ 2 \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r \partial x} + \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial^2 \varphi}{\partial \theta \partial x} + e \left[\frac{\partial^3 \chi}{\partial \gamma \partial x} - \frac{\partial}{\partial r} (\nabla^2 \chi) \right] \right\}; \\ \sigma_{\theta x} &= \mu \left\{ \frac{2}{r} \frac{\partial^2 \varphi}{\partial \theta \partial x} - \frac{\partial^2 \varphi}{\partial r \partial x} + e \left[\frac{2}{r} \frac{\partial^2 \chi}{\partial \theta \partial x^2} - \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} (\nabla^2 \chi) \right] \right\}; \\ \nabla^2 f &= \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left(r \frac{\partial f}{\partial r} \right) + \frac{1}{r^2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial \theta^2} + \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x^2}, \end{aligned}$$

We accept the integral terms in (1) as small, then the function, where is a slowly varying function $\varphi(t) = \psi(t)e^{-i\omega_R t}$ of time, ω_R is a real constant. Next, using the freezing procedure [6], we replace relations (2) with approximate ones of the form

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\lambda} \varphi &= \lambda_{01} [1 - \Gamma_\lambda^C(\omega_R) - i\Gamma_\lambda^S(\omega_R)]; \\ \bar{\mu} \varphi &= \mu_{01} [1 - \Gamma_\mu^C(\omega_R) - i\Gamma_\mu^S(\omega_R)], \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma_\lambda^C(\omega_R) &= \int_0^\infty R_\lambda(\tau) \cos \omega_R \tau d\tau; \quad \Gamma_\lambda^S(\omega_R) = \int_0^\infty R_\lambda(\tau) \sin \omega_R \tau d\tau, \\ \Gamma_\mu^C(\omega_R) &= \int_0^\infty R_\mu(\tau) \cos \omega_R \tau d\tau; \quad \Gamma_\mu^S(\omega_R) = \int_0^\infty R_\mu(\tau) \sin \omega_R \tau d\tau, \end{aligned}$$

- respectively cosine and sine Fourier images of the relaxation kernel of the material. We represent the vector of environmental displacements in the form of a potential

$$\vec{u} = \text{grad } \phi + \text{rot } \vec{\psi}, \text{div } \vec{\psi} = 0,$$

At each point, the components of the displacement vector of the surface of the cylindrical cavity are expressed in terms of longitudinal (φ) and transverse potentials ($\psi_r, \psi_\theta, \psi_z$), which satisfy the following partial differential equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \nabla^2 \phi - \frac{1}{c_p^2 \Gamma_\kappa} \frac{\partial^2 \phi}{\partial t^2} &= \mathbf{0}; \quad (7) \\ \nabla^2 \psi_z - \frac{1}{c_s^2 \Gamma_\kappa} \frac{\partial^2 \psi_z}{\partial t^2} &= \mathbf{0}; \\ \nabla^2 \psi_\theta - \frac{\psi_\theta}{r^2} + \frac{2}{r^2} \frac{\partial \psi_r}{\partial \theta} - \frac{1}{c_s^2 \Gamma_\kappa} \frac{\partial^2 \psi_\theta}{\partial t^2} &= \mathbf{0}; \\ \nabla^2 \psi_r - \frac{\psi_r}{r^2} - \frac{2}{r^2} \frac{\partial \psi_\theta}{\partial \theta} - \frac{1}{c_s^2 \Gamma_\kappa} \frac{\partial^2 \psi_r}{\partial t^2} &= \mathbf{0}. \\ u_r &= \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial r} + \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial \psi_z}{\partial \theta} - \frac{\partial \psi_\theta}{\partial z}; \\ u_\theta &= \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \theta} + \frac{\partial \psi_r}{\partial z} - \frac{\partial \psi_z}{\partial r}; \\ u_z &= \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial z} + \frac{\partial \psi_\theta}{\partial r} + \frac{\psi_\theta}{r} - \frac{1}{r} \frac{\partial \psi_r}{\partial \theta}. \end{aligned}$$

Here $c_p^2 = (\lambda_{01} + 2\mu_{01}) / \rho$; $c_s^2 = \mu_{01} / \rho$,

$$\Gamma_\kappa = 1 - \Gamma^c - i\Gamma^s, \Gamma_\lambda^c = \Gamma_\mu^c = \Gamma^c, \Gamma_\lambda^s = \Gamma_\mu^s = \Gamma^s, R_\lambda = R_\mu = R$$

The solution to equation (7) is sought in the form:

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi(r, \theta, z, t) &= \sum_{n=0}^\infty \varphi_n(\alpha r) \begin{Bmatrix} \cos n\theta \\ -\sin n\theta \end{Bmatrix} e^{\pm i\gamma_p z} e^{-i\alpha t}; \\ \psi_r(r, \theta, z, t) &= \sum_{n=0}^\infty \psi_{nr}(\beta r) \begin{Bmatrix} \sin n\theta \\ -\cos n\theta \end{Bmatrix} e^{\pm i\gamma_p z} e^{-i\alpha t}; \\ \psi_\theta(r, \theta, z, t) &= \sum_{n=0}^\infty \psi_{n\theta}(\beta r) \begin{Bmatrix} \cos n\theta \\ -\sin n\theta \end{Bmatrix} e^{\pm i\gamma_p z} e^{-i\alpha t}; \\ \psi_z(r, \theta, z, t) &= \sum_{n=0}^\infty \psi_{nz}(\beta r) \begin{Bmatrix} \sin n\theta \\ \cos n\theta \end{Bmatrix} e^{\pm i\gamma_p z} e^{-i\alpha t}, \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where n is an integer; γ_p - dimensionless propagation constant; ω - complex frequency; $r = \frac{r_1}{a_0}, z = \frac{z_1}{a_0}$.

Substituting (8) into (7), we obtain the following ordinary differential equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d^2 \varphi_n}{dr^2} + \frac{1}{r} \frac{d\varphi_n}{dr} + \left(\alpha^2 - \frac{n^2}{r^2} \right) \varphi_n &= 0; \\ \frac{d^2 \psi_{zn}}{dr^2} + \frac{1}{r} \frac{d\psi_{zn}}{dr} + \left(\beta^2 - \frac{n^2}{r^2} \right) \psi_{zn} &= 0; \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d^2 \psi_{\theta n}}{dr^2} + \frac{1}{r} \frac{d\psi_{\theta n}}{dr} + \frac{1}{r^2} (-n^2 \psi_{\theta n} + 2n\psi_{\theta n} - \psi_{\theta n}) + \beta^2 \psi_{\theta n} &= 0; \\ \frac{d^2 \psi_{rn}}{dr^2} + \frac{1}{r} \frac{d\psi_{rn}}{dr} + \frac{1}{r^2} (-n^2 \psi_{rn} + 2n\psi_{rn} - \psi_{rn}) + \beta^2 \psi_{rn} &= 0; \end{aligned}$$

Here are indicated:

$$\alpha^2 = \frac{\Omega^2}{\gamma^2} - \gamma_p^2; \quad \beta^2 = \Omega^2 / \Gamma_\kappa - \gamma_p^2; \quad \Omega = \frac{\omega \alpha}{c_s}; \quad \gamma^2 = \frac{2(1-\nu)}{1-2\nu} \Gamma_\kappa;$$

$$\Gamma^s = \frac{A\Gamma(\alpha)}{(\omega^2 + \beta^2)^{1/2}} \text{Sin}(\alpha \arctg \frac{\omega}{\beta}),$$

$$\Gamma^c = \frac{A\Gamma(\alpha)}{(\omega^2 + \beta^2)^{1/2}} \text{Cos}(\alpha \arctg \frac{\omega}{\beta}).$$

At infinity, the potentials of longitudinal and transverse waves as $r \rightarrow \infty$ satisfy the Sommerfeld

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radiation condition [7,8]. The first two equations in (7) obviously have the following solutions for the case of a cylindrical cavity:

$$\begin{aligned}\varphi_n(r) &= F_n H_n^{(1)}(\alpha r), \\ \psi_{zn}(r) &= M_{1n} H_n^{(1)}(\beta r).\end{aligned}\quad (10)$$

Here $H_n^{(1)}(\beta_k r)$ is the Hankel function of the nth kind, 1st order. To construct solutions to the remaining two equations in (7), it is advisable to consider their sum and difference. In this case, two equations are obtained, the solutions of which are expressed through Hankel functions of different orders

$$\begin{aligned}u_r &= \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \left[F_n \frac{dH_n^{(1)}(\alpha r)}{dr} + D_{2n} i \gamma_p H_{n+1}^{(1)}(\beta r) + M_{1n} n H_n^{(1)}(\beta r) / r \right] \begin{pmatrix} \cos n\theta \\ -\sin n\theta \end{pmatrix} e^{i(-\alpha r + \gamma_p z)}, \\ u_\theta &= \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \left[-F_n n H_n^{(1)}(\alpha r) / r + D_{2n} i \gamma_p H_{n+1}^{(1)}(\beta r) - M_{1n} \frac{dH_n^{(1)}(\beta r)}{dr} \right] \begin{pmatrix} \sin n\theta \\ \cos n\theta \end{pmatrix} e^{i(-\alpha r + \gamma_p z)}, \\ u_z &= \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \left[-F_n i \gamma_p H_{n+1}^{(1)}(\alpha r) - D_{2n} \left[\frac{dH_{n+1}^{(1)}(\beta r)}{dr} + \frac{n+1}{r} H_{n+1}^{(1)}(\beta r) \right] \right] \begin{pmatrix} \cos n\theta \\ -\sin n\theta \end{pmatrix} e^{i(-\alpha r + \gamma_p z)}.\end{aligned}\quad (11)$$

Expressions (11) contain three arbitrary constants F_n, D_{2n}, M_{1n} and satisfy Ω the equation of motion for arbitrary values of frequency. In the case of a stress-free cylindrical surface and when the normal ($\sigma_{rr} = 0$) and tangential stresses ($\sigma_{r\theta} = \sigma_{rz} = 0$) on it are equal to zero, the dispersion equation has the form:

$$\|c_{ij}\| = 0, \quad i, j = 0, 1, 2, 3. \quad (12)$$

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$$\begin{aligned}c_{11} &= (n^2 - 1 - \Omega^2 + \gamma_p^2) H_n^{(1)}(\alpha), \\ c_{12} &= (n^2 - 1 - \beta^2) H_n^{(1)}(\beta), \\ c_{13} &= 2(n^2 - 1) [\beta H_{n-1}^{(1)}(\beta) - n H_n^{(1)}(\beta)] - \beta^2 H_n^{(1)}(\beta), \\ c_{21} &= \alpha H_{n-1}^{(1)}(\alpha) - (n+1) H_n^{(1)}(\alpha), \\ c_{22} &= \beta H_{n-1}^{(1)}(\beta) - (n+1) H_n^{(1)}(\beta), \\ c_{23} &= (2n^2 + n - \gamma_p^2) H_n^{(1)}(\beta) - 2\beta H_{n-1}^{(1)}(\beta), \\ c_{31} &= \alpha H_{n-1}^{(1)}(\alpha) - n H_n^{(1)}(\alpha), \\ c_{32} &= (1 - \Omega^2 / 2\gamma_p^2) (H_{n-1}^{(1)}(\beta) - n H_n^{(1)}(\beta)), \\ c_{33} &= n^2 H_n^{(1)}(\beta).\end{aligned}$$

Equation (9) for each value $n = 1, 2, 3$, determines the relationship between the dimensionless frequency γ_p and Ω the dimensionless propagation constant at ν - Poisson's ratio. The most effective way to solve equation (12) is the Muller method [9,10], which was used here. Without revealing the frequency to determine, but by calculating at each step only Ω its

$$\begin{aligned}\psi_{rn}(r) &= D_{1n} H_{n-1}^{(1)}(\beta r) + D_{2n} H_{n+1}^{(2)}(\beta r), \\ \psi_{\theta n}(r) &= D_{1n} H_{n-1}^{(1)}(\beta r) - D_{2n} H_{n+1}^{(2)}(\beta r).\end{aligned}$$

After finding the functions of the radial coordinate, representations (10) will contain four arbitrary constants that have a certain redundancy. In what follows it is assumed: $D_{1n} = 0$, then $\psi_{rn} = -\psi_{\theta n}$. This is convenient from the point of view of subsequent satisfaction of boundary conditions on a cylindrical surface. Thus, the components of the displacement vector in the vicinity of the cylindrical cavity are represented as:

value for a fixed value, the indicated method can be used to find $\Omega = \Omega_R + i\Omega_I$ the natural complex frequencies. Damping coefficients allow us to judge the damping properties of the system under consideration. In technology, to estimate the rate of attenuation of oscillatory processes, another characteristic is used, namely, the logarithmic decrement of oscillation attenuation. It is related to the damping coefficient by the following formula:

$$\delta = 2\pi\Omega_I / \Omega_R.$$

All expressions for stresses and displacements have the form:

$$(\mathbf{Re} + i \mathbf{Im}) e^{-i\omega t} = (\mathbf{Re}^2 + \mathbf{Im}^2)^{1/2} e^{-i(\omega t - \gamma)}.$$

As you can see, the solution to the problem is expressed through special Bessel and Hankel functions of the 1st and 2nd kind. As their argument increases, series (8) converges. Therefore, based on numerical experiments, it was established that out of 5-6 terms of the series, the accuracy reached $10^{-8} - 10^{-6}$. As the relaxation kernel of a viscoelastic material, we take the three-parameter kernel

$$R(t) = \frac{A e^{-\beta t}}{t^{1-\alpha}} \quad (13)$$

Rzhanitsyn - Koltunov [11,12], which has a weak singularity, where A, α, β are the parameters materials. Equation (12) is $n \geq 0$ valid for all integers. Each value determines the properties of natural waves. For example, we have a family $n=1$ of bending natural waves. When $n=0$ the dispersion equation is reduced to the product of two factors of the element of the second row of the third column. The first of these factors gives the dispersion equation for the family of

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torsional natural waves. The second factor gives the dispersion equation for the family of longitudinal natural waves on the surface of the cavity.

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Signed in print: 30.01.2024. Size 60x84 $\frac{1}{8}$

«Theoretical & Applied Science» (USA, Sweden, KZ)
Scientific publication. The circulation is 90 copies.

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