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Article



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ON THE IMPORTANCE OF LIVING TOGETHER AND ENRICHING THE CULTURES OF RUSSIANS AND TATARS TO FORM MUTUALLY RESPECTFUL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THEM

Abstract: This article is devoted to the study of Russia's integration experience with respect to the Crimean Tatars in the period from the 18th to the early 20th centuries. In 2014, the Crimean Tatar issue received a new impetus for internationalization, which was associated with a number of factors. The foreign information space was filled with news reports, reports from international organizations on human rights violations in Crimea and the oppression of the Crimean Tatars. At the same time, in historical retrospect, Crimea has been integrated into the Russian space not for the first time. This socio-political experience and its technological dimension are of both applied and theoretical scientific interest. An analysis of the scientific literature has shown an ambiguous assessment of the shared historical past of Crimea and Russia. Researchers' opinions on the Russian experience of integrating the Crimean Tatars vary sharply, from positive to purely negative, indicating the deliberate centuries-long extermination of this ethnic group by tsarist and Soviet Russia. Therefore, the relevance of an objective study of the integration policy of the Russian Empire regarding the Crimean Tatars, based on primary sources and political literature, using scientific methodology, is beyond doubt. The article also formulates a forecast regarding the further development of the Crimean Tatar issue on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Key words: political technologies, socio-political experience, integration, Russian Empire, Crimean Tatars, government decrees, newspaper "Translator-Terdzhiman".

Language: English

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Introduction

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Since the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars to the territory of Crimea in the 1990s, the Crimean Tatar issue has systematically attracted the attention of the scientific community. At the same time, as a rule, the political and economic aspects (rallies, unauthorized seizure of the Crimean land fund by representatives of this ethnic group) have traditionally been in the foreground. However, the Crimean Tatar issue received international resonance as a result of the political events of 2014. This is evidenced by the discussion of the Crimean Tatar issues by the heads of various states, including Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Turkish Republic, numerous publications in the international media, as well as the close attention of international and non-governmental organizations (UN, OSCE, Amnesty International, the Initiative Group on Human Rights in Crimea, the Field Human Rights Center, Crimea SOS) to the situation of the Crimean Tatars in the territory of Russian Crimea. The beginning of the 21st century was the time of the emergence of hybrid forms of conflicts between great powers, which learned to operate in the "gray zone" - on the brink of war and peace, without entering into an open military conflict and without violating the norms of international law. Hybrid wars can use various methods of conducting military operations, including the replacement of traditional basic values of society with the moral and psychological attitudes of the aggressor, the falsification of history, the desacralization of significant events and personalities, the formation of ethnic nationalism, as well as the incitement of interethnic and interreligious contradictions in multiethnic regions. All of the above poses a direct threat to Russia as a multinational state. Therefore, the Crimean Tatar issue, being an internal problem of Russia, is simultaneously an object of confrontation between the great powers and a factor in either strengthening or weakening Russian influence in the Black Sea-Mediterranean region. Following the political events of 2014, the common past of Russia and the Crimean Tatars, as one of the means of shaping the worldview of the population, has acquired special interest and an increased level of politicization. This thesis is confirmed by contradictory assessments of the scientific community of the historical period of Crimea's existence as part of Tsarist and Soviet Russia (1783-1991). The opinions of researchers on the Russian experience of integrating the Crimean Tatars vary sharply from positive to strictly negative, with reference to the policy of deliberate destruction of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group during the Tsarist and Soviet periods of Russian history. This is explained by the fact that "history itself, as a science, is within the methodological framework of interpretation, which significantly varies the possibilities of obtaining,

interpreting and applying historical knowledge as a political ideology." In addition to the already well-developed principles of historical science - historicism, objectivity, alternativeness, three methodological approaches to historical science can be distinguished, namely:

- 1) history is the basis of any political ideology;
- 2) history is written by the victors, that is, the elites who won the political struggle with external or internal competitors;
- 3) "there is no limit to the interpretation of historical fact."

The above data form the relevance of an objective study of the Russian experience of interaction with the Crimean Tatar ethnic group. The purpose of the work is a systematic study of the joint history of Russia and the Crimean Tatars based on sources and political literature to identify functional socio-political technologies for integrating the Crimean Tatars into the modern all-Russian space. In order to achieve this goal, the following tasks are solved in the work, namely:

study government decrees of the 18th century that concern the Crimean Tatars;

to study the publications of the periodical "Translator-Terdzhiman" from 1883-1918;

classify publications of the periodical that demonstrate technologies for the integration of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group;


to determine the mechanisms for integrating the Crimean Tatars into the all-Russian space, as well as the main directions of the tsarist policy towards the Crimean Tatars.

The object of the study is the national policy of Russia. The subject is the integration policy of the Russian Empire in relation to the Crimean Tatars. The study was conducted within the framework of the developed scientific methodology, which consists in the application of systemic, civilizational and geopolitical approaches. The main research methods used are: chronological, institutional, induction, analysis, synthesis, abstraction, typology, comparison, generalization of the experience of interaction of the tsarist government with the Crimean Tatar ethnic group. Crimea first came under the jurisdiction of Russia on April 8, 1783. According to the Crimean researcher A. A. Irkhin, the annexation of Crimea and other territorial gains of Catherine II became possible due to the fact that the West was disunited and busy with internal conflicts between the leading powers - France and England, busy with the redivision of the world outside Europe. Russia, Prussia and Austria were engaged in continental affairs. Therefore, Russia had an objective opportunity for territorial expansion to the West within the geographical framework of the Baltic-Black Sea arc. It is in this arc that the historical and civilizational dispute about the border of Russia and Europe takes place. The signing of the manifesto "On

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the acceptance of the Crimean Peninsula, Taman Island and the entire Kuban region under the Russian state" set the Russian Empire a rather difficult task: to integrate the Crimean Tatar population into the Russian space, which belonged to another civilizational community and gravitated in the religious, cultural and political spheres to the Ottoman Empire. The special attention of the empress to the new subjects is demonstrated by the following promise of Catherine II to the Crimean Tatars: "to sacredly and unwaveringly for Herself and the successors to Our throne, to support them equally with

Our natural subjects, to protect and defend their persons, property, temples and natural faith, the free exercise of which with all legal rites will remain inviolable, and to allow in the end each of them the state of all those delights and advantages that such in Russia enjoys." The study of government decrees and literature made it possible to identify political technologies used in the 18th century by the imperial government to integrate the Crimean Tatars into the all-Russian space. These technologies can be classified in three directions.



Political technologies of integration in relation to the Crimean Tatar upper class (beys and murzas).

1. The involvement of the Crimean Tatar nobility in military service with the possible awarding of officer ranks to "appropriate persons" (15861, 15945).
2. Granting to the highest class of Crimea – beys and murzas – all the rights and privileges of the Russian nobility (15936).
3. Granting civil ranks to many murzas and beys (the rank of collegiate councilor was granted to Memet-bey Shirinsky, the position of regional conscientious judge – to Kazyndar Megmet-aga, etc.).
4. Creating conditions for activating the socio-political activity of the Crimean Tatar elite – providing representatives of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group with positions of district leaders of the nobility. These positions were received in the Simferopol district by Abduveli-aga Topechokraksky, in Feodosia by Major Atay-murza Shirinsky and others.
5. Allocation of land resources of the Tauride province for use by eminent Crimean Tatars.

Imperial integration technologies aimed at representatives of the Crimean Tatar clergy and the religious feelings of the Crimean Tatars.

1. Ensuring respectful attitude towards the religion of Muslims by representatives of other faiths. As evidenced by the order issued by G. A. Potemkin, which stated: "... the most severe punishment will be imposed on anyone who dares to disregard respect for

their sacred places and violates the prayer of Muslims as a church rebel."

2. Demonstration of the government's attention to the Muslim religion. Catherine II allocated funds for the repair of Crimean mosques and assistance to the poor Muslim clergy.
3. Establishing control over the local Muslim clergy through the creation of the supreme body of spiritual authority in 1794 [Muslims VTauride region](#) – Tauride Mohammedan Spiritual Administration (the activities were regulated in 1831 by the Regulation on the Tauride Mohammedan Clergy), as well as through the government appointment of muftis.
4. Popularization of knowledge of the state language among the clergy by providing greater social prospects to those who mastered the Russian language. "If there were several candidates for a spiritual position, preference was to be given to those who knew Russian."
5. Spreading the Russian language among the Crimean Tatars, through individual representatives of the clergy who spoke the state language. Since, in addition to performing liturgical duties, the clergy managed the sphere of Muslim education.
6. Creating conditions for the recognition of the authority of Russian rulers by the highest Muslim clergy.
7. Demonstration of respect for the traditions of the Crimean Tatars by granting the clergy a certain judicial power.

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8. Formation of a positive attitude of the Muslim clergy towards the Russian government by exempting representatives of this class from paying taxes.

Integration policy of the Russian Empire in relation to the Crimean Tatar peasant class.

1. Ensuring freedom for the Crimean Tatars. Peasants belonging to the Crimean Tatar ethnic group were equated with state peasants, to whom serfdom did not apply.

2. Provision of benefits to Crimean Tatars (peasants and settlers) in the form of exemption from military service (from recruitment), as well as from the duty of billeting troops.

3. Popularization of military service among the Crimean Tatars, through the creation of national military formations, entry into which occurred on a voluntary basis, and a salary was paid upon enrollment in the military.

Despite the loyal policy towards the Muslim population of Crimea, the consolidation of the Russian Empire's position on the peninsula was quite problematic. This is evidenced by the waves of emigration of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group to the Ottoman Empire. The reasons for this process were: panic caused by the change in the usual way of life and the difference in cultures, liberties of officials and Russian troops on the ground, as well as contradictions in the issue of land ownership. It is worth noting that the new administration did not create any obstacles for the departure of the Crimean Tatars, but in every possible way persuaded them not to leave their homeland with the help of the Muslim clergy and the allocation of land plots. And it worked: many Crimean Tatars who left their homeland returned back. The process of including the Crimean Tatars in the political, economic and cultural all-Russian space was permanent, due to external influences from the West and the Ottoman Empire, as well as internal objective reasons: the closed nature of the Crimean Tatar society; lack of patriotism towards the Russian Empire; ignorance and misunderstanding of the internal processes occurring in Russian society; insufficient education of the Crimean Tatars and ignorance of the legislative framework of the Russian Empire; lack of knowledge of the government about the cultural and everyday characteristics of Russian Muslims; inconsistent integration activities of the government. Therefore, even a hundred years later, the issue of integration of the Crimean Tatars remained relevant for the Russian government. In the 19th century, the tsarist government began to use the information sphere, namely, it gave permission to a prominent representative of the Crimean Tatars I. Gasprinsky to publish the first Crimean Tatar newspaper of the Russian Empire, *Perevodchik-Terdzhiman*, of which he was the author and editor, with the aim of influencing the Crimean Tatar public. The start of publication of the newspaper was timed to

coincide with the 100th anniversary of the annexation of Crimea to Russia. The periodical was published from 1883 to 1918, its format was informational and educational, it covered all the most striking and important events of the late 19th - early 20th centuries. It is interesting that the newspaper, performing a special state function, was private. In modern scientific literature, there is conflicting information about the political views of I. Gasprinsky. In works published before 1991, it was stated that in his beliefs he was an "all-Russian patriot" and advocated for the rapprochement of the entire East with Russia. In studies published since 1992, I. Gasprinsky is already demonstrated as a fighter against the Russian autocracy. A study of Gasprinsky's works: "Russian Islam. Thoughts, notes and observations of a Muslim", "Russko-Vostochnoye Agreement. Thoughts, notes and wishes", as well as materials from the newspaper "Translator-Terdzhiman" did not confirm the latter concept. Based on the study of the publications of the newspaper "Translator-Terdzhiman", It is possible to highlight the following aspects of integration technologies that were communicated to the Crimean Tatar ethnic group through the newspaper and systematically displayed on the pages of the periodical, namely:

1. Philological technologies, which were expressed in the bilingual nature of the periodical (the newspaper was published in Russian and Crimean Tatar languages).

2. The authoritative figure of I. Gasprinsky in the role of a conductor of the views of the Russian government and the publisher-editor of the newspaper.

3. Demonstration and popularization of peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Christians within the Russian Empire.

4. Fostering a sense of patriotism towards Russia, popularizing the ideas of state affiliation with the great Russian power.

5. Communicating the orders and innovations of the Russian authorities to the Crimean Tatar population.

6. Criticism of the Turkish state, which was one step below in the sphere of education and printing.

7. Demonstration of Russia as an advanced civilizational center, the most acceptable for Muslim life in comparison with European countries.

8. Propaganda for raising the level of secular education and empowering representatives of the higher clergy of Crimea with administrative functions.

9. Demonstration of the active participation of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group in the socio-political events of the country.

10. Dissemination of the idea of the need to improve the level of secular education for the successful implementation of representatives of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group in the professional sphere.

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11. The formation by the editor-publisher of "Translator" of a two-level state identity of the Crimean Tatars under the name "Russian Islam".

12. Popularization of military service in the Russian army for representatives of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group.

13. To popularize the observance of Russian celebrations in the Crimean Tatar community.

14. Informing Crimean Tatars about the history of Russia with a positive assessment of the activities of the rulers of the Russian Empire.

15. Communicating the orders and innovations of the Russian authorities to the Crimean Tatar population.

16. Demonstration of the authority of the Supreme Ruler of Russia and the privileged position of the Crimean Tatars on the territory of the Russian Empire.

17. An appeal to the Crimean Tatars to comply with the laws of the Russian Empire.

18. Popularization of the study of the Russian language by demonstrating the great social prospects of specialists who have mastered the Russian language.

19. Demonstration of freedom of religion and the authorities' respectful attitude towards the religious rites of Muslims in Crimea.

20. The dissemination of the idea of the need to create a military-political alliance between Turkey and Russia, in opposition to the policy of Western civilization, which, trying to use the ethnic and religious closeness of the Crimean Tatars and Turks, sought to clash the interests of the Ottoman and Russian empires in Crimea.

21. Information counteraction to the emigration of Crimean Tatars to Turkey.

22. Formation of a common enemy for the Russian and Turkic population of Russia in the form of the West.

A study of the Russian integration experience in relation to the Crimean Tatars, foreign political literature, and media publications on this topic made it possible to identify a number of factors that at the present stage may prove to be relevant problems for the process of integration of Crimea into the Russian space, namely:

1. Large area, low population density and multicultural composition of Russia.

2. The closed nature of the Crimean Tatar society in the political, economic, social and spiritual spheres.

3. Civilizational differences between the Russian and Crimean Tatar populations.

4. Negative mythologization of the shared historical past of Russia and Crimea, as well as the lack of systematic counter-activity by Russia in the sphere of "soft power".

5. Systematic work of foreign countries to create a socio-cultural environment through

educational grants (Türkiye Scholarships programs SWPS University), events and scientific research; publications, videos ("Strangers in Their Own Land. Imperial Attack on the Rights of the Crimean Tatars", "Who Are the Crimean Tatars", "Find Erwin") in the media; cinema and theatrical performances; scientific literature. These actions are aimed at forming a stereotype among the Crimean Tatars: "Russia has been oppressing the Crimean Tatars for centuries and deliberately pursuing a policy of extermination and displacement of this ethnic group from the territory of Crimea."

The Russian state is based on a synthesis of the Russian Orthodox core and the Turkic-Muslim population, which is reflected in the internal structure and external appearance of the state, and the Turkic peoples and the Muslim community make up a significant part of Russian society. However, this condition is maintained with a strong central government and the project activity of the Russian elite. As soon as the era of weakening of the Russian state begins, which has a pattern of repeating itself in Russian history, Russia begins to crumble into segments, where national and civilizational factors serve as the basis for tearing the empire apart. Therefore, to create stability in the relationship between Moscow and the Crimean Tatar ethnic group, it is necessary:

1. Strong central authority.

2. Reforming the state economy and exiting the peripheral position in the capitalist system.

3. Formation of an elite oriented towards the national interests of the state, and not towards its own. Since "in the overwhelming majority, the Russian political and economic elite is fully integrated into the Western project, therefore, by its nature, it is liberal: it evacuates its finances to the West, buys real estate there, sends its children there to study and live."

4. Creating a unified identity among the population and a clear project for the future vector of the country's development.

5. Improvement of the quantitative and qualitative indicators of the "soft power" technologies of the Russian Federation in working with the Crimean Tatar ethnic group (more actively disseminate the positive experience of interaction between Russia and the Crimean Tatars in the media, create various educational projects, cultural events, lecture courses at the state level, publish scientific and journalistic works on this topic in compliance with the principle of historicism).

6. Considering the eastern mentality of the Crimean Tatars and the special role of national authorities for this ethnic group, it is necessary to popularize pro-Russian national heroes of the Crimean Tatars, as well as to form an authoritative, pro-Russian political leader.

7. Work systematically to create a pro-Russian Crimean Tatar political, economic and cultural elite,

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which can be achieved through the previously mentioned “soft power” technologies, as well as the presence of “social lifts” for the population.

To sum up, it is necessary to note the following, namely:

Firstly, the policy of the Russian government towards the Crimean Tatars in the 19th–early 20th centuries has evolved compared to the 18th century and reached a new qualitative level. This is clearly demonstrated by the quantitative indicators and the diversity of integration technologies;

secondly, the integration of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group into the all-Russian space since 1783 has been a permanent and difficult to achieve process due

to a number of objective reasons. Therefore, it requires systematic work by the regional and federal government to resolve this issue;

thirdly, the identified experience of integration of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group into the Russian space of the 18th–early 20th centuries can be functional in the modern historical period of integration of Crimea into the all-Russian space. Tatars and Russians, how do they get along: what will happen if Tatarstan becomes sovereign. The Cathedral of Our Lady of Kazan has been restored in Kazan. Symbolic. After all, it was this monastery that Ivan the Terrible ordered to be built after the capture of Kazan by Russian troops.



Picture 1.

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The cathedral was a symbol of Russian power in the region for a long time. It was demolished in 1932.

Patriarch Kirill today in the broadcast of the channel "[Russia24](#)" said:

"Of course, this is a historic event... A monument to the spirit and strength of our people has been restored"



Picture 2.


There are many Russian patriots in Kazan now. In Russian Tatarstan, after the collapse of the USSR, they began to talk about sovereignty and the restoration of the culture of the Kazan Khanate.

In 1996, the mosque, which was liquidated by the Russian Tsar Ivan the Terrible, was restored.

That is, in Kazan there was a religious symbol with the name of the head of the resistance against

Russia, and the Orthodox symbol of Russian power lay in ruins. And many consider the name of the Kazan cathedral mosque to be provocative. It is called "Kul Sharif". This is the name of the imam who fought against Russian troops and died fighting for the independence of the khanate.

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Picture 3. Kul Sharif Mosque. Photo: fotokto.ru

Now the authorities of Tatarstan are maneuvering between Islamic identity and all-Russian identity. So far, it is working somehow. Rustam Minnikhanov, President of the Republic of Tatarstan, said:

"I am confident that we will be able to restore the entire complex of the Cathedral of the Mother of God, once again turning it into a center of All-Russian and international pilgrimage." At the same time, the Tatarstan authorities made a decision to build a Muslim university in Kazan. And it is no coincidence

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that in the administrative system of Russia there are only two presidents - the Russian and the Tatar. [Administrative reform is overdue](#). Having visited Kazan, one can say that for the most part, there are not many interethnic problems that are immediately

noticeable. Everyone communicates calmly in Russian. There are approximately equal numbers of Russians and Tatars both in Kazan itself and in the republic as a whole. But there is also nationalism, it is raising its head, although not very high yet.



Picture 4.

It's not without this in Kazan
 Tourists from Naberezhnye Chelny noted that:
"Many Tatars see themselves in a separate state in the future. Many believe that inclusion in Russia stopped the development of the theater, but we could have created a Tatar Empire. From the Volga to the Pacific Ocean. This is somewhat reminiscent of the situation in Kazakhstan during the Soviet era. There

were also equal numbers of Russians and Kazakhs. There were even slightly more Russians. Thirty years after the split of the Union, there are no more than 18% Russians in Kazakhstan and many say that they left because of national pressure. Nevertheless, for now in Kazan it seems that the excellent tradition of uniting Turks and Slavs continues. Together we are invincible.

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Picture 5.

It is no coincidence that when the Poles occupied Moscow in 1612, regiments from Kazan joined the Russian militia assembled in Nizhny Novgorod by Minin and Pozharsky. The Tatars have been practically a part of the Russian people for hundreds of years, and there was even a Tatar Tsar in Russia.

But there are forces that want to change this. There are people in Tatarstan whose goal is to separate from Russia. A number of Tatar figures, directly or indirectly, set the goal of separating Tatarstan from Russia. Some celebrate the entry of Kazan into the Russian Tsardom as mourning. This was in 1552.

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Picture 6. Drawing: A mourning rally in memory of those who were against integration with Russia

It is no coincidence that this year the prosecutor's office demanded the liquidation of the All-Tatar Public Center (VOTs) and the recognition of VOTs as extremist. Now it is an organization whose activities are banned in Russia, and criminal cases are being opened against former participants.

"Tatar writer Fauziya Bayramova, deputy chairman of the VTOC Galishan Nuriakhmet and former imam Airat Shakirov were fined under Art. 20.3.1 Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation (incitement of hatred or enmity)" It is no coincidence that the All-Russian Center (an

organization whose activities are banned in the Russian Federation) has been organizing rallies every year in memory of the "defenders of Kazan who died defending the city in 1552 from the troops of Ivan the Terrible." No matter how much they say that this is simply a cultural event, this should not mislead anyone. An opaque hint at separatism. If real sovereignty of Tatarstan is declared, this could have catastrophic consequences for Russia as a whole, and for the Russians of Tatarstan in particular. Russians will simply gradually disappear here, the example of Kazakhstan is before our eyes.

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	GIF (Australia)	= 0.564	ESJI (KZ)	= 8.100	IBI (India)	= 4.260
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Picture 7. Drawing Kazan.

For Russia, Tatarstan is the basis of power in the Volga region and it is through it that Moscow's connections with the Urals and Siberia pass. That is why the idea transfer the capital of Russia to Kazan no

longer seems fantastic. This will help Tatars and Russians to fully unite into a single whole and remember that we are also one people. What do you think about this? Is such an action possible?

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Main part

2014 will go down in modern Russian history as the year of Crimea. After being part of independent Ukraine for twenty-two years, the Crimean peninsula became part of Russia as two separate federal subjects. The Russian Federation gained an area of 27 thousand square kilometers and a population of 2 million people. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a precedent has been created for changing the jurisdiction of part of the territory of one state in favor of another based on the will of the people. However, the results of the referendum on the status of Crimea were not taken into account by the leaders of Ukraine and its allies in the United States and the European Union. The change in the status of the peninsula caused the largest confrontation between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. From the point of view of Washington and Brussels, Moscow's actions were a violation of the foundations of international law and world order. The Russian leadership believes that the results of the popular vote provide grounds for talking about the reunification of Crimea with Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin notes: "Crimea is a unique fusion of cultures and traditions of different peoples. And this is what makes it so similar to greater Russia, where not a single ethnic group has disappeared or dissolved over the centuries. Russians and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and representatives of other peoples lived and worked side by side on the Crimean land, preserving their identity, traditions, language and faith." Along with the annexation of Crimea, Russia inherited a wide range of problems of interethnic relations on the peninsula, which had not been resolved by the previous government for twenty years. And in this series, a special problem is building relationships with the Crimean Tatars, who make up about 12% of the entire population of Crimea. Given the tragic history of this people, who survived Stalin's deportation and for many years had no opportunity to return to their homeland, this is natural. The events of the 20th century largely determine the current identity of the Crimean Tatars. Over the years of Ukraine's jurisdiction in Crimea, the negative impact of the Soviet trauma was transferred to Russia as the successor of the USSR in the mass consciousness of the Crimean Tatars, although post-Soviet Russia has done a lot to condemn Stalin's policies and perpetuate the memory of the victims of political repression and deportation. Vladimir Putin rightly noted in his "Crimean speech": "Yes, there was a period when the Crimean Tatars, like some other peoples of the USSR, were subjected to cruel injustice." It should not be forgotten that the history of Crimea, especially the centuries-long confrontation between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, whose vassal the Crimean Khanate was until Crimea's annexation to the Russian Empire at the end of the 18th century, added a certain urgency to the perception of Russia. During

their time as part of post-Soviet Ukraine, many of the Crimean Tatars' pressing problems were not resolved. At the same time, official Kiev artificially inflated fears and stereotypes among the Crimean Tatars associated with their tragic history during the period of Soviet totalitarianism. This was done to create a counterweight to "Russian separatism in Crimea" and provided an opportunity to distract Crimeans from demands to resolve pressing socio-economic and political problems. Today, the Crimean Tatars have new opportunities as part of the Russian Federation. At a meeting with activists of the Crimean Tatar movement on May 16, 2014, on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the President of the Russian Federation said: "In no case can we allow the Crimean Tatar people to become a bargaining chip in any disputes, including interstate ones. Especially in any disputes, say, between Russia and Ukraine." Thus, to a large extent, the success of Russian policy in Crimea will depend on how effective the Russian government is in integrating various groups of the peninsula's population through a competent national policy and policy in the sphere of religious relations.

This report examines the initial problems that the Crimean Tatars faced when Crimea joined the Russian Federation, the existing difficulties in building their integration, opportunities for Russia and challenges to its desire to ensure stability and progressive development of the peninsula. It also analyzes the actions taken by the Russian authorities in Crimea after March 2014. Taking into account the relevance of historical and political topics of the past on today's agenda, the report also pays attention to the main facts of the history of the Crimean Tatar people. The final part of the report offers practical recommendations for achieving socio-political stability and strengthening civil peace in Crimea. Crimean Tatars are a Turkic ethnic group that formed on the territory of Crimea in the 13th-17th centuries. Its historical core was the Kipchak tribes. Today, there are many publications in the Russian media about the historical kinship of the Crimean Tatars and Kazan Tatars, but these are different ethnic communities. According to the Secretary of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea, Ayder Adzhimambetov, the Crimean Tatars and the Tatars from Russia are "brotherly peoples with a common history." "But they are different peoples. They were formed in different territories in a completely individual way," he continues. Indeed, if the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates came under the rule of Moscow in 1552 and 1556, the Crimean Khanate existed until 1783, having been a vassal of the Ottoman Empire for most of its history. This Ottoman influence had a serious impact on the religious traditions, culture, and language of the Crimeans, not to mention their awareness of their "specialness" and involvement in the policies of the Ottoman Empire, a great power of the Middle Ages

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and the New Age. Crimea became part of the Russian Empire after the Manifesto of Empress Catherine II on April 8, 1783. During the process of Crimea's annexation to Russia, the Crimean Khanate was liquidated, which contributed to the mass emigration of Crimean Tatars to Turkey. At the same time, the peninsula saw the growth of Russian and then Little Russian (Ukrainian) communities, as well as an increase in the number of Armenians, Germans, Bulgarians, Jews and other groups.

A significant part of the Crimean Tatars moved to the Ottoman Empire between 1790 and 1850, and from there they spread throughout the world (today, small diasporas exist in Canada, Romania, Germany, and Bulgaria). Expert Rinat Pateyev rightly noted: "Estimates of the migration flow vary considerably: from tens of thousands to several hundred thousand, and sometimes even millions of immigrants." At the same time, he notes: "If we can talk about several million Crimean Tatars in Turkey, then it is correct to call them Turks, who may have Crimean Tatar roots, but do not identify themselves with this people. A striking example is ... Ahmet Davutoglu, who often likes to remember his Crimean roots, but does not identify himself as a Crimean Tatar." It should also be noted that in Turkey, the Crimean Tatars living in Crimea are called "Crimean Turks." After the end of the civil war (during which the "white", "red" and "national" governments changed in Crimea) in 1921, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was created from part of the former Taurida Governorate of the Russian Empire as part of the RSFSR. By this time, representatives of 59 nationalities lived in Crimea. The ethnic composition of the Crimean population at that time was as follows: Russians - 42%, Crimean Tatars - 25%, Ukrainians - 11%, Germans - 6%, Jews - 5%. The question of a national republic with the right to national autonomy was already raised then. As documentary sources testify, the Crimean Tatars and Germans laid claim to "full autonomy". Full autonomy implied achieving a certain level of state sovereignty - granting rights to the Crimean Republic in the sphere of foreign relations, international trade, and independent decision-making on the return of emigrants to Crimea. The two languages of the autonomy were Russian and Crimean Tatar. "In the 1920s, the so-called Leninist national policy was actively pursued. It was then that many autonomous republics and districts with national names were formed. In Crimea, the autonomous republic was simply called Crimean. There were many Crimean Tatars in its leadership, and certain quotas (public and private) of local national personnel were always observed. And this was done not only for appearances, for show. Indeed, some impetus was given to the cultural development of the people - theaters and publishing houses were opened, and teaching was carried out in the native language." However, it should be taken into account that the

Crimean ASSR was not an ethnic (in Soviet terminology - "national") autonomy, i.e. it was not formed on a national-state or ethnoterritorial principle. However, local residents, especially the Crimean Tatars, perceived Crimea as "their" republic. In 1937, during the "Great Terror," representatives of the national intelligentsia came under attack (in particular, the national poet Bekir Choban-zade was repressed). In the 1930s, more than 100 mosques and prayer houses were taken away from the Crimean Tatars, half of which were demolished. Similar actions by the authorities were directed at the Orthodox clergy and Orthodox churches, as well as other religious denominations of the peninsula. According to the All-Union Population Census of 1939 (the last before the start of the Great Patriotic War), on the territory of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, Russians made up 559 thousand people (49.6%), Tatars (including Crimean Tatars) - 219 thousand (19.4%), Ukrainians - 154 thousand (13.7%), Jews - 66 thousand (5.8%), Germans - 51 thousand (4.6%), Greeks - 21 thousand (1.8%), Bulgarians - 15 thousand (1.4%), Armenians - 13 thousand (1.1%) people. In August 1941, in connection with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the NKVD of the USSR carried out an operation to deport Germans from Crimea, in 1942 - Italians, on May 18, 1944, after the liberation of Crimea from the fascist occupation, the deportation of the Crimean Tatars began. In the 60 hours required to carry out the operation, 187,859 people were taken out of Crimea. About 70% of the resettlers ended up in Uzbekistan, as well as in Kazakhstan and other regions of the Soviet Union. The bulk of the deportees were old people, women and children. Special orders were issued at the fronts to dismiss Crimean Tatars from the army, who were also sent to special settlement areas. Taking into account former military personnel, the total number of deported Crimean Tatars was 200 thousand people. The fate of the Crimean Tatars was shared by Crimean Armenians, Bulgarians and Greeks. Their expulsion from Crimea began on June 24, 1944. 9,620 Armenians, 12,420 Bulgarians and 15,040 Greeks were deported to Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia. Kurds, Gypsies and Turks living in Crimea were also expelled from the area. In total, over 300,000 residents were deported from Crimea during the war. The deportation became the pretext for the liquidation of the Crimean Autonomous Republic and its transformation into an administrative region. To compensate for the loss of population, tens of thousands of people from various regions of Russia and Ukraine were resettled to the peninsula in an organized manner. Crimean Tatars were deported from the peninsula on charges of collaborating with the Nazi occupiers. Cases of collaboration did indeed occur (the Tatar Mountain Jaeger Regiment of the SS, Wehrmacht units, the police) and were not isolated. A number of Crimean Tatar movement activists hoped to establish their national statehood with the help of

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the German occupiers. And if some of them sought full support for the occupation authorities, then the moderate part advocated a "third way" between Hitler and Stalin. "Most of the people who collaborated with the Nazis managed to leave Crimea together with the retreating German troops, and the rest (about 5 thousand people of different nationalities) were arrested by the NKVD even before the deportation of the Tatars. Both the apolitical part of the population and the Red Army servicemen and their families fell under the eviction... In 1944-1945, according to estimates by Soviet agencies, "15-25% of the exiled Crimean Tatars died in exile (representatives of the Crimean Tatar population themselves cite even more terrifying figures – up to 46%)." The latter figure is questioned by Russian experts on the history of Stalin's repressions and deportations. About 9 thousand front-line soldiers who fought in the Red Army were sent to places of deportation. At the same time, among the Crimean Tatars, nine people have the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, one of them (Amet-Khan Sultan) was twice awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, about 12 thousand people fought against fascism in partisan detachments and underground groups. During the Khrushchev thaw, the Crimean Tatars, unlike other deported peoples, were not given the opportunity to return to their homeland. By this time, the Crimean region was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. On February 5, 1954, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, a decision was made, "considering the common economy, territorial proximity and close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean region and the Ukrainian SSR," to transfer Crimea to Soviet Ukraine. This decision, submitted for approval to the Union authorities, received their support. This administrative measure did not change the situation of the Crimean Tatars. As a result, a movement for the right of return arose, which at the first stage maintained a moderate line. In 1958, its representatives were received by the then Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.I. Mikoyan, who promised to solve the acute problem in a short time. But it was only in 1967 that a document appeared allowing "Tatars who previously lived in Crimea" to settle throughout the territory of the USSR, subject to the provisions of the passport regime. This spurred a wave of return. The passport registration system that was in effect during the Soviet era effectively blocked the possibility of resettlement, and activists of the Crimean Tatar movement were persecuted by the authorities. The return of Crimean Tatars to Crimea on a mass scale did not happen during that period. At the same time, it should be noted that representatives of the dissident movement who were not of Crimean Tatar origin (Pyotr Grigorenko, 1907-1987) also provided significant moral support for the demands for repatriation to their homeland. Other facts are also

known. After the tragic event in the village of Besh-Terek (summer 1978), when Musa Mamut (previously convicted of violating the passport regime) committed an act of self-immolation, at his funeral Russians carried banners reading "To Musa from his Russian brothers." Against the backdrop of dissatisfaction with the then policy of the Union center, Mustafa Dzhemilev came to the forefront of the Crimean Tatar movement. With the change in the political course of the USSR leadership towards liberalization, the Crimean Tatars had the opportunity to return to their homeland. In 1987 and especially 1988, the flow of Crimean Tatars returning to Crimea became massive. In fact, the process of political rehabilitation of the deportees began on November 14, 1989, when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Declaration "On the recognition of repressive acts against peoples as illegal and criminal, who were subjected to forced displacement, and ensuring their rights." In October 1992, in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, the heads of the CIS member states signed an Agreement on issues related to the restoration of the rights of deported individuals, national minorities and peoples. This agreement was ratified by Ukraine, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Armenia. But it was impossible to talk about the unity of the Crimean Tatar movement at that time. If its more radical part was grouped around the OKND (Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement), then the moderate part, which gravitated towards cooperation with the authorities, collaborated with the NDKT (National Movement of the Crimean Tatars). It should be noted that the OKND was created in May 1989 as a result of a split in the Crimean Tatar national movement. The OKND represented the more radical part of the Crimean Tatars. In June 1991, the OKND leaders held a national congress of Crimean Tatars in Simferopol – Kurultai, which laid the ideological foundation for the modern Crimean Tatar national movement. The NDKT mainly united representatives of the intelligentsia and civil servants. The movement advocated the restoration of the national statehood of the Crimean Tatars within the framework of state institutions being formed in Crimea. The NDKT did not display any noticeable political activity and was more of an intellectuals' club than a political party, limiting itself mainly to literary polemics with its opponents. The OKND was headed by Mustafa Dzhemilev, and the most prominent leader of the NDKT was Yuri Osmanov. Both leaders had experience of imprisonment for political reasons. In 1989, Yuri Osmanov was included in the State Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the Problem of the Crimean Tatar People. In 1989 (according to the latest All-Union Population Census), the number of Crimean Tatars in Crimea was 38,365 people. By May 1990, according to experts, it had already grown to 83 thousand people, and by October of the same year - to 120 thousand people. By November 1991, shortly

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before the signing of the Belovezh Accords and the collapse of the single union state, the number of Crimean Tatars in Crimea was already 147 thousand people. However, their settlement and integration on the peninsula took place already in the context of the collapse of the USSR, the formation of an independent Ukraine and the development of the Ukrainian national-state project. During the collapse of the USSR, the Crimean Tatar national movement outlined the following basic demands: legal rehabilitation, land provision, language status and state position. Different opinions and assessments were expressed on all these issues. Thus, the issue of rehabilitation was not only connected with its legal implementation, but was also sometimes supplemented by calls to grant the Crimean Tatar population a special status of "indigenous people", as well as appeals to the international community with a request to speed up the rehabilitation process. The land issue was often presented as a demand for the unconditional legalization of all unauthorized seizures of land on the peninsula. The language issue was discussed not simply as a problem of state status and support for the Crimean Tatar language, but often flowed into a demand for a complete translation of all geographical names on the peninsula into Turkic toponymy. The most radical calls that arose among the national movement were repeatedly reduced to the demand for an independent Crimean Tatar statehood. At the same time, the relationship between Kiev and the Crimean Tatar movement for more than two decades was distinguished by inconsistency and contradiction. At the end of the USSR and in the first years of Ukrainian independence, two major political movements began to develop in Crimea in parallel, among others - the Crimean Tatar and the pro-Russian. At the same time, the Crimean Tatar movement was split into representatives of the OKND and NDKT. In 1991, through the efforts of OKND representatives, self-government bodies of the Crimean Tatars (in fact, parallel government structures) were created. These are the Kurultai (the national parliament, elections to which were held every five years with the participation of the adult Crimean Tatar population) and the Mejlis (a semblance of a government). The Mejlis was formed by the Kurultai. At the second Kurultai (June 26-30, 1991), the Declaration on the National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatars was adopted, which clearly stated: "Crimea is the national territory of the Crimean Tatar people, on which only they have the right to self-determination as set out in international legal acts recognized by the world community. The political, economic, spiritual and cultural revival of the Crimean Tatar people is possible only in their sovereign national state. The Crimean Tatar people will strive for this goal, using all means provided for by international law. The land and natural resources of Crimea, including its health and recreational potential, are the basis of the national

wealth of the Crimean Tatar people and the source of well-being of all residents of Crimea." In the early 1990s, the Mejlis was in some competition with the NDKT, whose leader was the writer Yuri Osmanov. He was the founder and editor-in-chief of the Areket newspaper, and he developed the draft concept of the Constitution of the Crimean Autonomy, the draft Law of Ukraine on the restoration of national integrity, rights and status of the Crimean Tatar people (nation), the Concept of national policy, rights and relations in Crimea. At the same time, unlike Mustafa Dzhemilev and his supporters, who took a harshly critical position in relation to Russia, Osmanov was a supporter of building pragmatic relations with the Russian Federation and opposed the maximization of the ethnic factor. He also criticized the Mejlis and its leadership for their commitment to extremist forms of struggle. Unfortunately, the tragic death of Osmanov in November 1993 (according to the official version, it was the result of a robbery) contributed to the marginalization of the NDKT. This moderate political movement did not find a new leader and effectively disappeared from the scene, while Mustafa Dzhemilev, on the contrary, began to gain points, and the Mejlis after that turned into a monopolist of Crimean Tatar politics for many years. Mustafa Dzhemilev was the permanent leader of the Mejlis until November 2013, after which he was replaced by Refat Chubarov. Only in 2006, with the formation of the public organization "Milli Firka" ("People's Party"), this monopoly was slightly shaken. During its stay in Ukraine, unlike the Mejlis, the public organization "Milli Firka" received official registration with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. But this organization did not achieve great success. In the 2010 elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, it participated on the list of the Ukrainian Rural Democratic Party, which received only 7,268 votes (1%) and did not enter the parliament of the peninsula. Representatives of the Milli Firka organization claimed then and later that the election results were falsified. Nevertheless, thanks to close cooperation with the Party of Regions and the apparatus of the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich, Milli Firka strengthened its position. For two decades, the central Ukrainian authorities saw the Mejlis as their natural ally in containing the "Russian party" (which achieved some success in 1994, when both the president of the autonomy and the majority in the highest representative body of Crimea were supporters of unity with Russia). At the same time, Kyiv was wary of the ethnocentric aspirations of the Crimean Tatar activists, their claims to transform the peninsula into an entity that would not take into account the Ukrainian legal framework. Hence the interest in the latent conflict between the Russian and Crimean Tatar communities of Crimea. This contradictory approach determined the Crimean Tatar policy of official Kyiv and the regional authorities of Crimea, which, with the

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exception of a short period in the first half of the 1990s, showed loyalty to the Ukrainian state. Before the change of state jurisdiction of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars was not registered with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine and was not recognized by either the Crimean or Ukrainian authorities. Vice Speaker of the Crimean State Council Remzi Ilyasov rightly noted: "The relationship between the authorities and the Crimean Tatars was more like open flirting and going in circles. For two decades since the proclamation of Ukraine's independence, the Crimean Tatar people, deprived of their homeland, have been waiting for the authorities to adopt a law on the status of the Crimean Tatar people, a law on rehabilitation, which would be the most important prerequisites for the preservation and development of national identity, development of national culture and language. Unfortunately, Ukraine has not adopted a single legislative act aimed at restoring the rights of the Crimean Tatar people, to create fundamental conditions for its revival and preservation in their native land, which turned the return of the people into a painful process."

By decree of the President of Ukraine (May 1999), the Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People headed by M. Dzhemilev was created as an advisory body to the head of state. Thus, the Mejlis was given direct access to the president, bypassing parliament. In 2010, Viktor Yanukovich, who came to power in Ukraine, fundamentally changed the composition of the Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People. Representatives of the Mejlis began to make up a minority of its members, and the majority was made up of participants in other public organizations (including Milli Firka), loyal to the ruling Party of Regions. As a result, representatives of the Mejlis refused to participate in the meetings of the Council. Among other things, this explains the subsequent support of the Maidan in 2013-2014 by the Mejlis. Only on March 20, 2014, that is, two days after the peninsula became part of Russia, the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada recognized the Mejlis as the highest executive body of the Kurultai of the Crimean Tatars (Resolution No. 1140-VII). This was done along with a number of guarantees for the development of the Crimean Tatar people within the framework of a united Ukraine. The Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (1995, then 1998) as part of the Ukrainian state did not include the concept of "indigenous people", which the Mejlis insisted on. Now that Crimea has already become Russian, this definition was introduced into circulation by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the aforementioned resolution. Throughout the post-Soviet period, the Mejlis actively interacted with Ukrainian nationalists. In the all-Ukrainian parliamentary elections of 1998, M. Dzhemilev was elected on the list of the People's Movement of Ukraine party, in 2002 as part of the Our Ukraine bloc, in 2007 as part of the Our Ukraine –

People's Self-Defense bloc, and in 2012 on the lists of the more moderate Batkivshchyna party. Refat Chubarov became a deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea of the sixth convocation on the list of the People's Movement of Ukraine party in 2010. From 1991 to 2014, the Mejlis supported the new Ukrainian state, the inviolability of its borders, and also opposed the pro-Russian Crimean movement. This, however, did not mean that ordinary Crimean Tatars unanimously supported the leadership of the Mejlis. Until 2014, during the Ukrainian elections, ordinary Crimean Tatars did not always express their preferences in accordance with the "general line" of the Mejlis, casting their votes not only for nationalist parties or the Batkivshchyna party, but also for the Party of Regions and the Ukrainian Communist Party. Nevertheless, the Mejlis, speaking on behalf of the entire Crimean Tatar people, claimed a special status on the Crimean peninsula, without much regard for the legal framework of Ukraine.

Since 1991, during the mass repatriation of Crimean Tatars, land grabbing has been actively practiced in Crimea. Land is perceived in Crimea as one of the most valuable resources, around which the struggle of social and political groups periodically intensifies and conflict situations arise on ethnic grounds. The most resonant conflicts are typical for the southern coast of Crimea (Simeiz, Gurzuf), Koktebel (Tikhaya Bukhta), Simferopol district (Chistenkoye village, etc.). Tent camps were set up in these territories, the situation periodically worsened, repeatedly threatening to get out of control. The leaders of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis tried to justify any land grab by the fact of Stalin's deportation in May 1944. At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities did not try to resolve the land issue, which was acute for the Crimean Tatars. Speaking about the Ukrainian period, the vice-speaker of the State Council of Crimea, Remzi Ilyasov, notes: "The Crimean Tatars received the most remote and low-quality agricultural lands, 1.5 times less per person. All this was done cynically, despite the existence of the problem itself and powerful protests. Wasn't it clear that the Crimean Tatars were deported, everything was taken away from them, including land. They began to return en masse only 55 years later. Therefore, the Crimean Tatars, in fact, could not be members of collective farms, which were distributed land shares in accordance with the current legislation of Ukraine." The situation of this complex and unstable balance was disrupted by Maidan-2 in Kyiv and the response in the form of the "Crimean Spring", which led to Crimea joining the Russian Federation. The civil unrest in Crimea was a direct consequence of the illegitimate change of power in Kyiv. After President Viktor Yanukovich left his post and the Verkhovna Rada was reformatted in accordance with the wishes and ideas of yesterday's opponents of the head of state and the leaders of the Maidan, opponents of the new

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Ukrainian order came under attack. Despite the democratic rhetoric used by the Kyiv authorities, in reality, "farewell to the past" was accompanied by discrimination against dissent and settling scores with those who disagreed with the new government. For the Crimean Tatar movement, the Ukrainian crisis highlighted several fundamentally important points, namely:

Firstly, it demonstrated the crisis of the Mejlis as a monopolist in expressing the opinion of the entire Crimean Tatar people;

secondly, it highlighted the contradictions between the politically engaged elite and ordinary people concerned about issues of security, interethnic peace, opportunities for business development and the realization of freedom of religion;

Thirdly, the positions of the opponents of the Mejlis have strengthened. The previously relegated organization "Milli Firka" has come forward, speaking out for the Russian choice and against the movement towards Euro-Atlantic structures.

As soon as anti-government protests began in Kyiv in November 2013, the Crimean Tatar Mejlis outlined its position aimed at supporting European integration and against the "establishment of an authoritarian regime" in Ukraine. In fact, this was a position directly opposed to the opinion of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. After the violent dispersal of the Euromaidan in Kyiv on November 30, 2013, the leadership of the Mejlis stated: "Today, the situation in Ukraine has begun to acquire a character that threatens the territorial integrity of Ukraine and its sovereignty. Such a development of events is facilitated by local councils of some regions of Ukraine, including the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, which, at the behest of the ruling party, are making decisions containing demands to introduce a state of emergency and suppress peaceful protests by Ukrainian citizens by force." According to Ukrainian media reports, representatives of the Mejlis were present at the Maidan itself, positioning themselves as defenders of the interests of the entire Crimean Tatar people, acting as guarantors against separatism in Crimea. When it became clear that Viktor Yanukovych had left office, a rally organized by the Mejlis took place on 23 February 2014 on Lenin Square in Simferopol, during which Refat Chubarov demanded that Crimean members of the Party of Regions leave the party and demanded that the city authorities demolish the Lenin monument within ten days. Three days later, the Mejlis organized a rally with the aim of blocking the building of the Supreme Council of Crimea and preventing the decision to join Russia. During the rally, the Chairman of the Mejlis Refat Chubarov stated that "the Crimean Tatars will not allow Crimea to be torn away from Ukraine." At the same time, a rally of the Russian community of Crimea was held there. A conflict broke out between the participants of

the two rallies, as a result of which 30 people were injured and wounded and 2 people died.

But almost simultaneously with this, an alternative Crimean Tatar point of view was voiced. "Crimea is desperately fighting the Bandera scum. It's Russia's turn. If the Russian Federation does not want to finally and irrevocably lose fraternal Ukraine as a friendly country, if it wants to get a NATO border near Smolensk, let it sit and watch as the Crimeans try to sweep away this Bandera scum themselves, which is fully financed and armed by cold pragmatists from Washington and Brussels. But our resources are not enough," Vasvi Abduraimov, a well-known Crimean public figure, politician, and deputy chairman of the Council (Kenesh) of the Milli Firka party, told the IslamNews news agency on February 27. According to him, among the Crimean Tatars, only the Mejlis and its leadership advocated the Maidan. He also emphasized that during the 2012 elections, only 18% of the Crimean Tatar population supported the Mejlis, while more than 60% of this nation is apolitical, and about 10-15% does not support the "Kyiv revolution" at all. The fears of "Milli Firka" were more than justified - from the point of view of the Mejlis leadership, they were "collaborators" of Yanukovych. And if Refat Chubarov's plans regarding bans for the Party of Regions were realized, supporters of Vasvi Abduraimov would also fall under the steamroller of repression. And although in March a split was also emerging in the ranks of "Milli Firka", Vasvi Abduraimov's opponents, led by Enver Kantemir-Umerov, also supported the idea of holding a referendum on the future status of Crimea, expressing confidence that "a prosperous future awaits the Crimean Tatars in Russia." In early March 2014, a peacekeeping mission was undertaken by representatives of the authorities and public structures of Tatarstan, as well as the World Congress of Tatars. They appealed to activists of the Crimean Tatar movement with a call for interethnic peace and the settlement of contentious issues with the Russian majority of the peninsula. Then, deputies of the State Council (the highest representative body) of Tatarstan, the mufti (head of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims) Kamil Samigullin and the president of the republic Rustam Minnikhanov visited Crimea. An agreement on cooperation between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the field of medicine, tourism, investment and innovation was signed. On March 6 and 10, 2014, representatives of the new government of Crimea, which had taken a course on preparing a referendum and actually joining the Russian Federation, made proposals to Crimean Tatar activists to join the authorities of the autonomy. Equal rights were declared for the entire population of Crimea and Sevastopol – Russians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Armenians and others. On March 11, 2014, the Supreme Council of Crimea unanimously adopted

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a resolution "On guarantees for the restoration of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people and their integration into the Crimean community." The resolution guaranteed that when the new Constitution of the Republic of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation is approved, the Crimean Tatar language will be given the status of an official language on par with Russian and Ukrainian. In addition, The Supreme Council of Crimea and the executive bodies of the republic will be formed with a guaranteed representation of 20% of the Crimean Tatars. On the same day, the Chairman of the lower house of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (State Duma) Sergei Naryshkin stated that in the event of support for the idea of joining Russia, the deputies will support guarantees for the Crimean Tatars. In parallel with this, attempts were made to establish a dialogue between the highest Russian authorities and the leadership of the Mejlis - on March 12, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a conversation with Mustafa Dzhemilev. After this conversation, M. Dzhemilev said that Vladimir Putin did not deny the presence of Russian troops in Crimea and stated that the proclamation of an independent Ukraine in December 1991 did not comply with the norms stipulating the procedure for leaving the USSR. According to Dzhemilev, V. Putin also said that he gave the order to avoid excesses with the Crimean Tatars. However, these attempts failed to fundamentally change the position of the Mejlis and especially Dzhemilev himself. Moreover, M. Dzhemilev tried to make efforts in the international arena to internationalize the Crimean crisis. Two days after the conversation with V. Putin, the Crimean Tatar leader visited NATO headquarters and held meetings with representatives of the missions of member countries, the EU Foreign Policy Service. He called on American and European politicians to introduce a peacekeeping mission to Crimea (in the format of UN troops), and to ignore the results of the popular vote on March 17. Dzhemilev met with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan in Izmir and also considered the possibility for official Ankara to intervene in the Crimean crisis. However, the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic, having expressed his concern, refrained from making firm promises and guarantees. Despite the difficulties, the Russian authorities continued their course of establishing a dialogue with the Crimean Tatars and attracting them to their side. On March 18, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin said in his address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: "The Crimean Tatars have returned to their land. I believe that all necessary political and legislative decisions must be made that will complete the process of rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar people, decisions that will restore their rights and good name in full." During the Crimean referendum, it was possible to avoid interethnic incidents, and there was no consolidation

of the Crimean Tatars around the Mejlis. The question of the real participation of the Crimean Tatars in the 2014 Crimean referendum is debatable. According to M. Dzhemilev, no more than 1% of the Crimean Tatars took part in the voting, and in the Bakhchisaray region, no polling stations were opened at all. According to the Deputy Prime Minister of the Crimean government (from February to June 2014) Rustam Temirgaliev, 40% of the Crimean Tatar population participated in the voting, 25% supported the entry of Crimea into the Russian Federation. M. Dzhemilev's statistics are extremely dubious, especially for cities with a mixed population. Experts from the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights observed the voting process in the Bakhchisaray district. Polling stations were open. Some of them did have a low turnout. There were provocative anonymous leaflets calling for a boycott of the elections. It is also worth taking into account the various positions of ordinary Crimean Tatars, which they previously held during the Ukrainian elections. Consequently, it is wrong to unambiguously assess the political views of the entire ethnic group of Crimean Tatars. The preparation for the expression of will itself showed the presence of different views and approaches even within the Mejlis. A number of prominent figures of this structure (Remzi Ilyasov, Zaur Smirnov) indicated resistance to confrontation and a willingness to cooperate. Even Mejlis activists are tired of its commitment to one-sided support for Kyiv and its unwillingness to accept new realities. After the announcement of the results of the nationwide referendum on the status of Crimea, their recognition by Russia and the inclusion of the peninsula (in the form of two subjects of the Russian Federation) into Russia, a "transition period" was declared until January 1, 2015. During this time, it is planned to settle the basic issues of the integration of the new region into the economic, financial, credit and legal system of the Russian Federation, into its system of state authorities, as well as to solve the problems of fulfilling military duty and military service. The integration of the Crimean Tatars into the all-Russian society turned out to be one of the priorities of the Russian authorities almost from the very beginning of Crimea's incorporation into Russia. Lentun Bezaziyev, a deputy of several councils of the supreme representative body of the autonomy, and the chairman of the Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatars under the President of Ukraine in 2010-2014, was included in the constitutional commission for the development of the provisions of the Basic Law of the Republic of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. The Constitution of Crimea (adopted on April 11, 2014) in its preamble enshrined the concept of the "multinational people of the Republic of Crimea", and in Article 10 proclaimed the Crimean Tatar language, along with Russian and Ukrainian, as the "state language" of this entity. This

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constitutional norm provides grounds for the further adoption of relevant regulatory legal acts for its development and ensuring full linguistic equality. Subsequently, in the fall of 2014, in accordance with the plan of priority measures, the State Council (parliament) of the Republic of Crimea developed the laws of the Republic of Crimea "On the Functioning of Languages in the Republic of Crimea" and "On Education in the Republic of Crimea". On April 21, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree "On measures to rehabilitate the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state support for their revival and development". According to the text of the document, it is proposed to develop a separate program for the economic development of Crimea until 2020, taking into account measures aimed at the national-cultural and spiritual revival of these peoples. It is planned to allocate 10 billion 805 million rubles for its implementation. By October 2014, 450 million rubles out of the 800 million planned for this year had been allocated from the federal budget for the resettlement of deported ethnic groups. Thus, the Russian government drew another line under the legacy of Stalin's national policy. This granted the Crimean Tatar people the right to receive benefits and other preferences stipulated by the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression". In April-May 2014, representatives of the Crimean Tatar movement entered the republican government of Crimea. Remzi Ilyasov received the post of deputy chairman of the republican State Council, and Zaur Smirnov headed the committee on nationalities. For some time, the post of acting vice-premier of the Crimean government was occupied by Lenur Islyamov, then he was replaced by the head of the public organization "Generation Crimea" Ruslan Balbek. On the eve of the 70th anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting in Sochi with representatives of the Crimean Tatar community on May 16, 2014. The issues of practical implementation of the decree of the head of state on the rehabilitation and integration of the Crimean Tatars were discussed. During the conversation, foreign policy factors were also discussed, as well as their influence on the Crimean Tatar movement. Thus, according to Ruslan Balbek (later - Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic), representatives of the Mejlis should stop playing the role of someone's tool, and "deal with their own people."

Due to the fact that Crimea as a subject of the Russian Federation received the right to adopt its own laws, today the authorities of the republic are trying to regulate the land problem legislatively. This issue has been one of the most difficult and dangerous challenges for the entire population of the peninsula for more than two decades. The draft law of the

Republic of Crimea "On the regulation of issues related to the unauthorized occupation of lands on the territory of the Republic of Crimea" is in the process of being prepared (as of early October 2014). Another already adopted and current Law of the Republic of Crimea "On the specifics of property and land relations on the territory of the Republic of Crimea" provides for some benefits for representatives of repressed peoples. Thus, it is proposed to allocate a one-time free plot of land to those in need for the construction of an individual residential building. During the "transition period", the days of the Islamic religious holidays of Kurban Bayram and Uraza Bayram became days off not only for the Muslim believers of Crimea, but also for the entire population of the peninsula, which was perceived by ordinary people as a manifestation of respect for their faith, history and traditions. However, the situation in Crimea after its incorporation into Russia should not be described as a continuous series of integration successes. On March 29, 2014, the Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar people at its extraordinary session decided to begin the creation of a "national-territorial autonomy" in Crimea and instructed the Mejlis to enter into relations with international organizations (the UN, the Council of Europe, the EU, the OSCE, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), parliaments and governments of states on all issues of ensuring the right of the Crimean Tatar people to self-determination. At the same time, Refat Chubarov stated that with this document the Kurultai did not recognize the "annexation of Crimea" and the loss of the peninsula's territory by Ukraine, and also suggested that the Crimean Tatars could hold a national referendum to confirm their desire to have autonomy. But in which specific state this autonomy would be - it was not explained, just as no recipes for the peaceful return of Crimea to the "united Ukraine" were offered (at least theoretically). Soon after, Mustafa Dzhemilev announced that the Crimean Tatars were not yet going to announce a referendum on the status of the peninsula, explaining this by the "complicated political situation and international isolation." After this, a turn was made toward cooperation with the Russian authorities. The Mejlis advocated delegating its representatives to the government structures of the Republic of Crimea. However, this line was also accompanied by numerous public reservations about not recognizing the results of the March referendum and changing the status of Crimea after the announcement of the results of the expression of will. And already on the last day of April 2014, the chairman of the republican State Council Vladimir Konstantinov stated that the Crimean authorities were unable to establish a constructive partnership with the Mejlis on issues of representation in governing bodies. The factor, The event that intensified the confrontation between the authorities and the Mejlis was the delivery of the

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Notification Act on non-permission to enter the Russian Federation until April 19, 2019 to Mustafa Dzhemilev. However, in early May 2014, he made several unsuccessful attempts to enter the peninsula. All these events became a pretext for increased criticism of Russia from official Kyiv, Ukrainian and Western media. On May 3, the Prosecutor of Crimea Natalia Poklonskaya prepared a public address in which she qualified the actions of the Mejlis as extremist. Soon, the first court rulings were issued on cases of mass protests in support of M. Dzhemilev. On May 16, 2014, Sergei Aksyonov (at that time the acting head of the republican government) banned mass protests in Crimea until June 6 under the pretext of preventing incidents in connection with the civil conflict in the southeast of Ukraine. This decision was made almost on the same day as the significant meeting of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin with representatives of the Crimean Tatar community and two days before the events dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatar people. Aksyonov's May decision contributed to the deterioration of relations between the Crimean authorities and the Mejlis. It is worth noting that the leaders of this Crimean Tatar structure, after the decision of the head of the republic's government, began to appeal to Russian laws. On July 4, 2014, the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, deputy of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea Refat Chubarov was banned from entering the territory of Crimea, on August 9 - advisor to the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Ismet Yuksel. On June 26, 2014, it was forbidden to hold a festive event dedicated to the Day of the Crimean Tatar Flag, which traditionally took place on the central square of Simferopol for several years in a row. The Mejlis was denied permission to hold the traditional requiem event on August 23, timed to coincide with the All-European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism (in Russia, attempts to equate these political phenomena are viewed extremely negatively). On June 24, 2014, FSB officers conducted a search in a madrasah in the village of Kolchugino in the Simferopol district of Crimea. Subsequently, searches under the pretext of searching for prohibited Islamic literature were conducted in mosques, madrasahs, national schools, schools with predominantly Crimean Tatar students, and a university. On May 16, 2014, Sergei Aksyonov (then acting head of the republican government) banned mass events in Crimea until June 6 under the pretext of preventing incidents related to the civil conflict in southeastern Ukraine. This decision was made almost on the same day as the landmark meeting of Russian President Vladimir Putin with representatives of the Crimean Tatar community and two days before the events dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatar people. Aksyonov's May decision

contributed to the deterioration of relations between the Crimean authorities and the Mejlis. It is worth noting that the leaders of this Crimean Tatar structure began to appeal to Russian laws after the decision of the head of the republican government. On July 4, 2014, the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Deputy of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea Refat Chubarov was banned from entering the territory of Crimea, on August 9 – the advisor to the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People Ismet Yuksel. On June 26, 2014, the festive event dedicated to the Day of the Crimean Tatar Flag, which traditionally took place for several years in a row in the central square of Simferopol, was banned.

The latter's calls for a boycott of the elections on September 14, 2014 also played a role in the growing contradictions between the authorities and the Mejlis. This campaign to elect deputies to the State Council and local self-government bodies had a symbolic meaning not only for the peninsula, but also for the Russian Federation as a whole, since it was the first election campaign in Crimea as part of Russia. Meanwhile, the leadership of the Mejlis assessed it as an "imitation". Such actions by the Mejlis, according to the vice-speaker of the State Council of Crimea Remzi Ilyasov, should be assessed as "an imaginary problem created for the purpose of manipulating public opinion, discrediting the democratic institution of elections, leading to hostility and other manifestations of national intolerance in society." On September 5, 2014, a search was conducted in the home of the Chairman of the Nizhnegorsk Regional Majlis Mustafa Salman, and on September 16, searches were conducted with the seizure of computer equipment in the apartment of a member of the Majlis Eskender Bariyev, Chairman of the Belogorsk Regional Majlis Mustafa Asaba. On the same day, representatives of the security forces conducted a search in the office of the Majlis in Simferopol. In September, the property of the Majlis in Simferopol was seized, and members of the so-called "People's Parliament" were forced to leave the building they had occupied for fifteen years. However, according to Sergei Aksyonov, the searches were caused by the fact that, according to available information, the offices of the Majlis and the madrasah contained publications of extremist content prohibited by Russian law. At the same time, during a meeting with the Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia Ravil Gainutdin (September 9, 2014), Sergei Aksenov stated: "We will not allow either the security forces or any other government officials to violate the level of correctness and morality, even during any investigative actions. I promise for my part that the authorities will do everything possible to ensure that such cases do not happen again." He also added that the authorities of the republic have found mutual understanding with the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea, and all further actions will be coordinated. "We have

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agreed on constant interaction," he said. "There is no danger for Muslims in Crimea." Deputy Speaker of the State Council of Crimea R. Ilyasov speaks about the need for more fine-tuning in working with various Crimean Tatar organizations: "The behavior of employees during searches must be respectful, justified, with the presentation of grounds. This should be done especially politely and correctly in the presence of minors and underage children. And even better, if necessary and possible, it is desirable to conduct such events with the participation of the public. In this difficult period, which we are all experiencing together in Crimea, it is necessary to very subtly and flexibly carry out certain actions, I think, and events carried out by law enforcement agencies, so as not to, God forbid, hurt or offend anyone, whoever they may be. Today we are obliged to say good things to each other, to give hope." He believes: "Politics presupposes mutual concessions and compromise options, if, of course, we follow a civilized path. The policy of confrontation, as a rule, leads to disastrous results." The well-known Russian orientalist Alexei Malashenko warns (against the background of the mistakes that have already taken place in the North Caucasus) against going too far in terms of harsh persecution of the opposition: "Experience shows that as soon as relations between Muslims become tense, religious radicalism begins to manifest itself." And there is a danger, in his opinion, of getting a small, "but very active group of Muslims who are extremely hostile to Russia." Mustafa Dzhemilev, speaking at PACE on October 2, 2014, stated that, according to his information, 18 Crimean Tatars disappeared without a trace after Crimea joined Russia. It was reported that four Crimean activists went missing in May - Leonid Korzh, Timur Shaimardanov, Vasily Chernysh and Seyran Zinedinov. He expressed the opinion about the involvement of Russian special services in these incidents. The head of the Central Electoral Commission of the Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar People, Zaira Smedlyaeva, also spoke about the disappearance of 23-year-old Eskender Apselyamov in early October. On October 7, 2014, 25-year-old Edem Asanov, who had disappeared on September 29, was found dead in an abandoned sanatorium in Yevpatoria. The press linked what happened to him to the case of director Oleg Sentsov, who is accused of planning terrorist attacks in Crimea. At the same time, his relatives spoke out against the politicization of this tragedy. "This is a family grief, but it is not connected with politics or crime. We have no complaints against the investigator, the investigation, or the law enforcement officers," said Edem Asanov's uncle. According to the chairman of the regional Mejlis of the Saki District, Eskender Belyalov, there is no reason to believe that Edem was killed. "I participated in the search from the first day, after Edem was found, I spoke with the investigators. Yesterday's forensic

examination showed that it was a non-violent death. In addition, there is a suicide letter. I cannot say what was in it, but it is clear from the letter that this was his choice. He did it himself," said E. Belyalov.

The abductions and other incidents were the subject of discussion at a meeting of the Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights under the President of the Russian Federation on October 14, 2014. This discussion with the participation of the head of the Russian state, in which acute issues were publicly raised, shows that today there are no "forbidden problems" regarding the Crimean Tatars, although critics in Kyiv and the West say so. In his speech, Council member, journalist and historian Nikolai Svanidze focused on the negative stories in the area of interethnic relations in Crimea. According to N. Svanidze, the decision on the rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar people "is not actually needed by them", but is needed "by the Russian state". Continuing his thought, he also emphasized that instead of a real dialogue, it is "imitated", the authorities rely on discriminatory policies (examples of restrictions on public events for the 70th anniversary of the deportation were given), and abductions of people are practiced. Russian President V. Putin responded to N. Svanidze's remark. At the same time, the head of state gave a detailed argumentation on all the points of criticism. "As for the events for the 70th anniversary, I cannot fully agree with you. After all, these events were agreed upon with public organizations of the Crimean Tatars. Some wanted to hold such rather tough events, some did not agree, but in general an agreement was reached with them that these events would be held, would be held in places of compact residence. And so they did. And people took part in these events," the head of state stated. V. Putin also drew attention to the fact that the position of the entire people cannot be identified with one group or structure (even an influential one): "In addition to those who consider themselves representatives of the Crimean Tatars, but in fact set some other goals for themselves, there are people who have long been involved in human rights affairs, protecting the interests of the Crimean Tatars. They retain Ukrainian citizenship, they are members of the Verkhovna Rada, they take part in international events on behalf of Ukraine somewhere in third countries, and at the same time they claim to protect the interests of people who live in Crimea and have accepted Russian citizenship." According to V. Putin, there are no grounds for someone to monopolize the right to represent the interests of an entire nation and "speculate on their past." The Russian President emphasized the validity of the rehabilitation act and its importance for ordinary Crimean Tatars: "This is also important for people, they do not want to feel like criminals, they want society to apologize to them, and the rehabilitation act has this meaning, including this apology to them. Although we did not take part in the

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decisions that were made then, nevertheless, we are here today, and we have the right to do this, and we must do this, and we did it." At the same time, the head of state expressed concern about the problem of kidnappings: "It is not clear who is doing this. Who is doing this? Why are they doing this? I do not understand this at all. The only thing that is clear to me is that we will do something that has never been done before for the Crimean Tatars. One of the most important problems for them is the legalization of their property and land rights. This is a key issue, and we are doing it." The ultimate goal of Russian policy in Crimea, according to V. Putin, is to restore order and establish law and order, which was not the case earlier during the period when Crimea was part of Ukraine. An important thesis of the President of the Russian Federation was the idea of the presence of "by no means idle problems" on the peninsula. Indeed, one should not exclude the possibility of an escalation of the ethnic conflict in Crimea as a result of external influence using the Islamic factor with the support of international network structures that already have their representatives in the Black Sea basin. This is confirmed by the fact that in recent years, Crimea has seen an increase in radical Islamist movements such as Wahhabism, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Hizb ut Tahrir party. The latter party, after Crimea became part of the Russian Federation, found itself outside the legal field due to the entry into force of Russian legislation prohibiting the functioning of this religious party in the country. However, despite this, this religious movement has not lost its influence on its supporters (mainly in the rural and youth segments). On November 17, 2014, the well-known human rights organization Human Rights Watch published a 37-page report with the "telling title" "Derogation from Rights: Abuses in Crimea." The report cited facts of intimidation and harassment of those who opposed Russia's actions in Crimea, primarily the Crimean Tatars. The human rights defenders' report was based on 42 interviews with representatives of the Crimean Tatar community, activists, journalists, lawyers and other residents of Crimea, Kyiv, Lviv and Moscow. However, according to Lyudmila Lubina, the Crimean parliament's human rights commissioner, the Human Rights Watch material appears to be extremely biased. According to her assessment, that in recent years, radical Islamist movements such as Wahhabism, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Hizb ut Tahrir party have become more active in Crimea.

There are over 800 missing persons listed by law enforcement agencies in Crimea, only 18 of whom are representatives of the Crimean Tatar people. "This is about 2%, six to seven times less than the share of Crimean Tatars in the population of Crimea. Although, of course, each such case is a tragedy, and we monitor each situation," Lubina said. The director of the Department of State Policy in the Sphere of Interethnic Relations of the Ministry of Regional

Development of Russia, Alexander Zhuravsky, commented on the situation in a similar way (November 19, 2014): «When I was recently in Simferopol, this issue was discussed. They cited absolutely provocative examples of disinformation. A person died, and they distort the essence of this phenomenon, prescribing some kind of ethnic cleansing." On November 21, the Crimean Field Mission for Human Rights (CFM, created in March 2014) reported that during the day, unknown individuals in camouflage detained more than 100 people at the Simferopol market. According to the CFM, the detentions were carried out by people in civilian clothes, accompanied by machine gunners in masks and dark brown uniforms without identification marks. They introduced themselves as employees of the Department for Combating Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. On November 25, 2014, the press service of the Investigative Committee of Russia for Crimea stated that on October 10, the Investigative Department for Sudak received a statement from the Chairman of the Sudak City Mejlis. F. Aliyev that several persons of Crimean Tatar nationality were kidnapped by unknown persons in masks near the Prival cafe on the road between Sudak and Grushevka. The investigative bodies conducted an investigation into the fact. During the investigation it was established that no violations of the law were recorded in this territory during the specified period of time. All persons without exception were questioned, both those who reported the crime committed and those who were its witnesses, whose testimonies contradicted each other and indicated that they did not see any illegal actions. Taking into account the words of the Head of Crimea S. Aksenov that the kidnappings of Crimean Tatars in the region are not of a mass nature, The Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, however, sent an appeal to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Yuri Chaika with a demand to take the investigation of the abductions of Crimean citizens under his personal control. On December 2, 2014, the mufti of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine Said Ismagilov in an interview with the Ukrainian commercial channel BTB stated that the situation of Muslims in Crimea is much worse than in the territories of the self-proclaimed people's republics of Donbass. Representatives of the Russian Muslim clergy have a different opinion. Thus, according to the leader of the RMC (Council of Muftis of Russia), the Crimean Tatars have realized that the Russian Federation "does a lot so that we, Muslims, develop spiritually and morally." He also emphasized that the Crimean Tatars are concerned that over the past two decades they have not been rehabilitated. At the same time, conditions have not been created for them to live normally, and not like aliens: "Now there has come an understanding that the Crimean Tatar people will be rehabilitated," the chairman of the RMC said.

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Unfortunately, many representatives of the Russian liberal public do not take into account a number of positive facts that have taken place since Crimea became part of the Russian Federation. One of these is the process of repatriation to the homeland, which has not frozen, but, on the contrary, has intensified. Thus, according to the head of the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of Crimea, Zaur Smirnov (a Crimean Tatar), about 50 more Crimean Tatar families have returned from Central Asia after the change in Crimea's jurisdiction. Crimean Tatars are actively participating in the population census (the All-Ukrainian Census was held in 2001, the statistics require updating). "Entire residential areas are contacting our committee with the question of why there are no census takers, and we are drawing the attention of Krymstat to the problems that have arisen," Zaur Smirnov told journalists in October 2014. All this, despite the existing contradictions, leaves significant room for dialogue. In September 2014, the All-Crimean Conference "On the Situation of the Crimean Tatar People at the Current Stage in Crimea" was held, where ways of successful integration of new citizens of the Russian Federation were proposed. Representatives of the Mejlis, and figures of science, art, and education took part in it. Remzi Ilyasov stated: "The address of the All-Crimean Conference notes that demonstrative self-isolation and confrontation will lead to negative consequences, primarily for the Crimean Tatar people. And therefore, in this fateful period, entry into power and active joint work on issues of the people's arrangement will be the key to their security, well-being, and development in their historical homeland - in Crimea." On November 25, 2014, on the air of the program "Brave Hearts," M. Dzhemilev stated the need for Crimean Tatar young men of draft age to ignore summonses to join the Russian army, while understanding the possible consequences of such a refusal: "It is clear that Crimean Tatars will not serve in the Russian army. And since they will refuse conscription, then they face imprisonment." As a result, he showed his fellow tribesmen an "alternative" - leaving for the territory of Ukraine: "Probably, we will have to create some settlements somewhere on the border with Crimea, in the Kherson region. And the men, of course, will be in the Ukrainian army." He did not forget to note such a fact as the participation of 450 representatives of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian National Guard. Obviously, such calls strengthen phobias and suspicions inside Crimea, contribute to the formation of an atmosphere of mistrust towards citizens of the Russian Federation of Crimean Tatar nationality. Shortly before the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin (it took place on December 1, 2014) to Turkey, Dzhemilev met with the head of the Turkish Republic Recep Erdogan and proposed to support sanctions against Moscow. Thus, the topic of Crimea and Ukraine is artificially heated

up, introduced into the focus of Turkish public and political discussion. On December 10, 2014, representatives of the Central Office of the Crimean Tatar Culture and Mutual Assistance Society in Turkey held a protest at the Russian Embassy in Ankara. During the protest, they held portraits of V. Putin, in which his image was stylized as Adolf Hitler. The protesters chanted: "Murderer Putin, get out of Crimea", "Deportation and genocide continue", "Crimean Tatars will not surrender". The situation was made more acute by the fact that on December 2, 2014, the Crimean republican authorities decided to deny the Mejlis the right to hold events dedicated to the protection of Crimean Tatars on Human Rights Day (traditionally held on December 10). "For a number of years, events have traditionally been held, mainly a rally dedicated to the problems facing the Crimean Tatar people. And traditionally we adopted the resolution as an appeal to the authorities to solve the problems of the Crimean Tatars... This year the situation has changed somewhat. It started on May 18 (Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Deportation). On June 26 (Day of the Crimean Tatar National Flag) and after that, they stopped allowing us to hold any mass events at all, refusing under various pretexts. In the end, they made it clear to us that this year on December 10 in the central square, as well as on any other date, the Mejlis will not be allowed to gather and organize a mass event. I think there is no point in explaining why," said Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis Nariman Dzhelal. Today, Ankara is showing restraint in its attitude towards the Crimean problem (which contrasts with its activity in the regions of the post-Soviet space with a Turkic population in the early 1990s). However, attempts to draw a powerful Eurasian power into a conflict with Moscow are extremely dangerous. On December 9, 2014, a conference entitled "Ukraine as a Test of European Solidarity" was held in the European Parliament in Brussels under the patronage of EP President Martin Schulz. Refat Chubarov gave a speech during this forum. He called on parliamentarians to "protect the Crimean Tatars from persecution" and to show solidarity with them. However, it is possible that a strong counterweight to the Mejlis will soon appear in Crimea, focused on cooperation with the Russian and Crimean regional authorities and integration into the Russian Federation. Remzi Ilyasov announced the creation of the "Kyrym" movement on October 20, 2014. Its representative offices may appear not only on the territory of the Crimean peninsula, but also in several "continental" regions of Russia. At the first stage, we are talking about ten subjects of the Russian Federation. The new movement, according to Ilyasov, will make it possible to more effectively solve the problems that the Crimean Tatars have been facing for the past decades. "The creation of the movement is due to ... the fact that the representative body of the Crimean Tatar people, the Mejlis, is bogged down in

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fruitless discussions," he emphasized. According to him, the new public movement is not being created in the format of a strict opposition to the current forms of consolidation and self-government of the Crimean Tatars - the Kurultai and the Mejlis. The founding congress for its creation is scheduled for mid-December. Before that, potential supporters and activists of the newly created organization will hold local meetings, at which delegates will be determined. At the congress itself, it is planned to consider proposals for the creation of a Concept for the Development of the Crimean Tatar People and Its Culture, including education and the functioning of the language, until 2035. Along with this, there is significant potential for public influence in the alternative to the Mejlis organization "Milli Firka" and a number of public organizations, among which the most active can be called the organization "Sebat". Cooperation with some of the Crimean Tatars who have had experience of constructive cooperation with government bodies and who held major posts in the Crimean parliament and government in different years seems interesting. The last of them created a new public organization "Kyrym Birliġi" (Unity of Crimea) in June 2014. In October 2014, this association put forward an initiative to hold elections of new delegates to the Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar people within a year. According to its leader Seitumer Nemetullaev, the re-election of the Kurultai delegates will be held within the framework of Russian law.

Conclusion

In 2014, Crimea became the most important argument for Russia's positioning in the international arena. Russia, having decided to support the expression of the people's will on the peninsula, was able not only to protect its national interests in the Black Sea region, but also to prove that it is an independent subject of world politics, ready to defend its approaches to the world order. However, the consolidation of these successes in the short and long term depends on a high-quality and effective solution to the problems of the development of Crimea and Sevastopol. And among the primary priorities in this area is the development of the idea of Russian civil identity among the Crimean population, the harmonization of interethnic relations and the integration of the Crimean Tatars, who have historically had difficult relations with the Russian state. To successfully solve the tasks set, the following measures are proposed, namely:

1. Encouragement of socio-political Crimean Tatar organizations focused on integration with Russia, support for Eurasian integration and involvement in all-Russian social processes. In addition to party structures, attention should be focused on supporting non-governmental organizations. At the same time, it is important to pay attention to publishing, media and educational

projects. In the conditions of information confrontation with the West, our own Crimean Tatar "voices" are extremely necessary, capable of qualitatively opposing and promoting a pro-Russian point of view, while having some distance from the authorities and autonomy from their tutelage.

2. Minimizing the "exclusivity" of the Crimean Tatar issue. Vladimir Putin has already succeeded in this at the rhetorical level, integrating issues of the tragic history or problematic present of the Crimean Tatars into the general context of the return and restoration of Crimea. But today a system of practical measures is needed in this direction - not in the sense of hushing up the problems of the Crimean Tatar population, but in terms of solving its pressing issues as an integral part of all-Crimean and all-Russian tasks. It is necessary to create commissions for the rehabilitation of both the Crimean Tatars and all those who were subjected to Stalin's repressions in Crimea. A similar approach is associated with the resolution of land relations. It seems extremely important to develop a Concept of the National Policy of the Republic of Crimea, which should pay attention to all ethnic communities of the peninsula.

3. Development of dialogue between Crimean Tatars and representatives of Tatarstan, which has proven itself positively during the referendum preparation period. It is necessary to continue work in this direction, to encourage interaction between representatives of other subjects of the Russian Federation and Crimea. Representatives of the Volga Region Islam (Spiritual Administration of Muslims) would be extremely useful as consultants for building religious policy in the Islamic direction.

4. Avoiding the practice of applying the "principle of collective responsibility" in the actions of security forces and law enforcement officers. Also, in covering incidents and court decisions, attention should be focused not on membership in the Mejlis or on religious affiliation, but on the personal offense or extremist actions of a specific citizen. Situations should be avoided in which certain harsh actions by the authorities will be perceived by the population as actions against the Crimean Tatars (the Mejlis leadership uses such rhetoric for its own purposes).

5. It is necessary to move from previous denunciations of Crimean Tatar collaborationism to a discussion of positive examples (popularization of such characters as Akhmet-Khan Sultan), the actions of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War and the partisan movement, it is necessary to remind the modern generation of the experience of coexistence of different peoples of Crimea in Tsarist Russia and the USSR (1783-1991). It is proposed to establish prizes for talented students, postgraduates and even schoolchildren associated with the names of Crimean Tatar origin (Akhmet-Khan Sultan, twice awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, etc.), and to award

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them not only to Crimean Tatars, but also to other residents of the Republic of Crimea.

6. Establishing international contacts with the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. Additional legitimization of Russian actions in Crimea and promotion of the image of Russia as a homeland for all its peoples and citizens is extremely necessary at the international level.

7. Organizing the recruitment of Crimean Tatar youth into the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces during the "transition period" is an extremely important task.

8. Optimization of competition between Caucasian muftiates and those spiritual centers that are controlled by people from Tatarstan. In Russian Crimea, an extremely important process of determining who and from which Russian muftiates will take a kind of patronage over Crimean Muslims is already underway. For this purpose, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive, practically oriented study of the religious situation in Crimea, find a partner for dialogue within the Crimean Tatar community itself, and very subtly regulate the attempts of Russian muftiates to influence the Crimean situation.

9. Extension of the "transition period" to prevent protest sentiments among the population of Crimea on such issues as re-registration of passports, property rights, etc., which, in the event of citizen discontent, could be used for mobilization on an ethnic basis.

10. Implementation in Crimea of a consistent and rapid language and educational policy, according to which all declarations on the support and development of the Crimean Tatar language and other languages of Crimea could be put into practice.

On March 18, Crimea celebrated the tenth anniversary of the reunification of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol with Russia. This decision was made following the results of the all-Crimean referendum held on March 16, 2014, in which almost 97% of the population supported reunification with the Russian Federation. Not only Russian residents of Crimea voted for joining Russia, but also representatives of all nationalities living on the peninsula. Meanwhile, the Crimean Tatar issue remains the main reason for political speculation on the part of Ukraine and attempts to interfere in Russia's internal affairs. FAN examined what support measures in the area of socio-economic development were implemented over seven years for representatives of national autonomies in Russian Crimea. The entry of Crimea into the Russian Federation was marked by a fundamental change in the state's attitude toward representatives of the peoples deported from the territory of the Crimean ASSR in Soviet times. By decree of President Vladimir Putin, 21.04.2015 was declared the Day of Revival of the Rehabilitated Peoples of Crimea. To

implement the provisions of the Decree, 14 legislative and regulatory acts were adopted in Crimea. The representatives of the Crimean Tatar people themselves confirmed to the FAN correspondent the groundlessness of the political claims made by Ukraine all these years. Thus, the Chairman of the Regional National and Cultural Autonomy of the Crimean Tatars of the Republic of Crimea Eyvaz Umerov believes that a new era of the revival of the Crimean Tatars in their historical homeland is associated with the return to their native harbor. As a Crimean Tatar, a resident of the Simferopol district Emir (he asked not to give his last name) told FAN, he often hears from Ukraine, especially from representatives of the "Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People" 1 (banned in the territory of the Russian Federation) in Kyiv, that the Crimean Tatars are in Crimea as if in a ghetto, allegedly they are kept here by force, their rights are violated, that they are oppressed and not allowed to live. However, according to him, this is far from true, this is deception and provocation on the part of Kyiv. Many Crimean Tatars were able to obtain much more rights, opportunities to learn their language, legalize housing after 2014.

He says he regrets that he himself, even in 2014, first left for Ukraine, believing the promises of a good life and fearing the alleged "repressions" from the new government. Having lived there for several years, the man says, he realized that the ghetto for his people is in Ukraine - no one is waiting for them there and is not going to help. Recently, thanks to government support, he and his family received documents proving his rights to the land. Now they are planning to build a house. He admits that he tried to occupy this land back in Ukraine, but he received it legally only recently. In general, today about 5,000 Crimeans have been able to obtain extracts from the register and have become full owners of the land once occupied in the "protest fields". The main driver in the field of socio-economic development was the State Program of the Republic of Crimea for Strengthening the Unity of the Russian Nation and the Ethnocultural Development of the Peoples of Russia "The Republic of Crimea - a Territory of Interethnic Harmony", adopted in 2015. The details of its implementation were told to the FAN correspondent by the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea. Thus, last year alone, more than 620 families received their housing, and 600 people were provided with one-time financial assistance to complete the construction of individual housing for a total of more than 104 million rubles. Within the framework of the direction "Ensuring interethnic unity" of the Federal Targeted Program, 520 places were created in preschool educational institutions in areas of compact residence of citizens from among the rehabilitated peoples of Crimea. This year, it is planned to commission 36 apartments, create another 520 places in kindergartens in

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Simferopol and the Simferopol region. Meanwhile, echoes of the Ukrainian policy towards the Crimean Tatars are still evident, believes Ruslan Eminov, a member of the Council of Elders of the Crimean Tatar people "Namus". According to him, the old policy of Ukraine is still visible in Crimea, in which the Crimean Tatars are assigned the role of a diaspora. And this leaves a certain imprint on the entire policy carried out in relation to the Crimean Tatar people. For many years, he actively promoted the idea of the reunification of Crimea with Russia, met the Crimean Spring and was awarded a medal for the return of Crimea. Ruslan Eminov associates hopes for the true restoration of the rights of the Crimean Tatar population with the recognition of the Crimean Tatar people as a separate nation formed on the territory of the Crimean peninsula, and the implementation of the Russian Federation law on the rehabilitation of repressed peoples in relation to it. Earlier, FAN reported on the statement of the leader of the "Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People" (banned in the territory of the Russian Federation) Refat Chubarov that the lack of water in the Republic of Crimea is perceived by the Crimean Tatars as a factor that allegedly holds back Russians from settling on the peninsula. Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was a brutal blow to the Crimean Tatars, a Muslim minority who returned to their historic homeland after being deported in 1989. Three years have passed, and the European Union is opposed to the latest round of anti-Russian sanctions passed by the US Congress in July. And German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel has even suggested that the EU might turn a blind eye to the disputed status of Crimea. Ukraine's leaders, who are usually very sensitive to signals about anti-Russian sanctions and the status of Crimea, which was Ukrainian, have remained silent, which is quite surprising. But the Crimean Tatars have loudly condemned the EU's actions. Lenur Islyamov, a prominent Crimean Tatar activist and owner of the Crimean Tatar TV channel ATR, sharply criticized Gabriel for his "message in defense of Putin" and said that, if necessary, the Crimean Tatars would fight to return Crimea to Ukraine. This is a long story. We discussed this issue in our article in the American Journal of Political Science. Crimean Tatars remain quite hostile to Russia's annexation of Crimea. We noted that part of the reason for this hostility is the persistent memory of events that took place more than 70 years ago. In May 1944, the Soviet authorities summarily deported 200,000 Crimean Tatars to Central Asia for aiding the Nazis during the war. As in other cases, everyone was subject to deportation, even Crimean Tatar officers of the Red Army. Families were not allowed to take personal belongings with them, and the long journey to Central Asia in cattle cars turned out to be the last for many. By some estimates, between 20 and 46 percent of the Crimean Tatar population died during the journey and in the

first year of exile. Disease and hunger were the main causes of death. In 1989, as the Soviet Union was heading toward collapse, the Crimean Tatars were allowed to return to Crimea and their ancestral homes. Approximately 280,000 people returned. Although every Crimean Tatar family experienced the horrors of the deportation, some families lost more relatives in the first year of exile due to the harsh living conditions. We analyzed the effects of the loss of family members on the children and grandchildren of survivors. In late 2014, shortly after Russia's annexation of Crimea, we surveyed three generations of respondents in 300 Crimean Tatar families who had returned to Crimea. We included survivors of the 1944 deportation, their children who were born in exile, and their grandchildren who were born in the early 21st century and did not live under the Soviet Union. Because some survivors of the deportation lost more relatives than others, we were able to assess the impact of the loss of additional family members on the political leanings, attitudes, and behavior of grandchildren. Two points are particularly important: remain surprisingly silent.

We found that the effects of violence within families are surprisingly strong. The more relatives who died during the brutal deportation, the more the grandchildren's generation views Crimean Tatars as victims. And they are more likely to see Russia as a constant threat. Our research also found that young Crimean Tatars whose families suffered more are more likely to participate in politics. They voted more actively in the referendum on Crimea's accession to Russia in early 2014 and in local elections later that year. But in these elections, they demonstrated their opposition to Russia by voting against the annexation and then against Russia's ruling party. We found that what is passed down from generation to generation is the memory of victims, a heightened perception of threat, and strong in-group attachment. This self-awareness was formed in families through interactions (sometimes through conversations about the family's experiences), and now influences how the descendants of the deportees react to political events, how they decide who to vote for, and whether to vote at all. Our research has shown that the memory of past suffering is very strong in families and is passed down from generation to generation. The strong anti-Russian sentiment among today's Crimean Tatar youth is at least partly a direct result of the persecution of their family members that took place more than 70 years ago. Overall, these findings help explain why reconciliation between the descendants of the victims and the descendants of their persecutors is often simply impossible. The victims themselves have passed away, but their relatives remember the violence perpetrated against them, and those generations that did not directly experience the suffering of the deportation continue to feel victimized. Below is a story about a man who went

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through such trials as an “enemy of the people”, while maintaining moral purity and faith that everything can be overcome if you believe in God and in yourself. Some people live with the conviction that a person is the master of his own destiny. Some people believe that destiny chooses a person. The truth, obviously, lies in the middle. I think of Timofey Vasilyevich Prokhorov, a 114-year-old resident of Munich. “Fatherchen (father) Timofey”, as he was called here. Who is he - the master of his destiny, or subject to it? His life seems like a legend that he himself created. You talk to him, and before you is a real figure and a real human life. And you see the work of his hands - a small church, a chapel next to it, a solid residential building, but you also see something else - a colorful character from Russian fairy tales, in which there is almost always a gray-bearded grandfather, wise and kind, and with a mind of his own. His legend is firmly woven into historical events, and history - into his life. And there is no reason now to separate one from the other. The path to the West of this Don Cossack began not of his own free will during the war, when the German troops defeated at Stalingrad rolled back from the banks of the Volga. On their way back lay the city of Shakhty. In one of the suburbs, soldiers requisitioned a cart harnessed a pair of horses - they really needed some kind of transport. The driver of this cart was a local resident, Timofey Prokhorov. In the occupied city, he delivered coal to the townspeople's homes and thus earned his family money for food. Having loaded the wounded and the soldiers' belongings into the cart, the Germans ordered Timofey to follow them, not even allowing him to stop by home and warn his relatives. They only let him go in the Rostov region. It must be said that Timofey Prokhorov's relations with the Soviet authorities were not particularly warm. A hard-working owner from a dispossessed family, he could not help but be on the authorities' special list. And here it turned out that Timofey was helping the enemy with something. And so, on the very first night on the way home, a vision appeared to him in the steppe. (I am quoting Timofey's own words: “The Mother of God, the Queen of Heaven, appeared in a fiery pillar from earth to heaven, blocked my way home and said: “There is no way back for you, Timofey. Go to the West and build a church there for the reconciliation of East and West.” I fell in the snow and began to cry: “Where would I go, I said, when my wife at home is about to give birth and two more children.” And she said: “I will take care of them. And your wife has already given birth to a son, and they named him Vladimir. And for you, there is only one road - to the West.” The believer did not dare to disobey the voice of Heaven, turned his horses around and went to fulfill his destiny. Along country roads, and even off-road, through cities and villages scorched by war, he finally reached Austria. This journey lasted more than a year. Once, while driving Austrian soldiers to Vienna, he

left Timofey didn't stay long, and when he returned, he found neither soldiers nor his horses. So he was left without a “means of transportation”, without knowing the language, without money, alone in foreign lands. No one counted how many of them - homeless, restless pilgrims of war - were wandering around Europe at that time. And among them was an inconspicuous man with a knapsack on his shoulders from the little-known city of Shakhty. Once at the train station in Vienna he met a Russian woman who had been driven to Germany, one of the same wanderers as he. They got acquainted. The woman called herself Natasha. They decided that together it would be easier for them to endure the hardships of nomadic life. And Timofey remembered the words of the Virgin Mary: “You will not build alone - I will give you an assistant.” Then they wandered together. They worked wherever they could. They made tea in the kitchens of the guest houses, sometimes they trusted them to cook soups, bake bread. Timofey “on a part-time basis” dug graves, helped bury soldiers killed in the war or died in hospitals. They lived without documents, on bird rights, as they say. There, in Austria, they began to build a church on a piece of land that did not belong to them. The “authorities” showed up and destroyed what they had managed to build. They were expelled from Austria twice. But Timofey turned out to be a tough nut to crack. He found another place, and they began building a church again. It suffered the same fate as the first. When they had completely despaired, the Virgin Mary appeared to Timofey in a dream and said, “Go to Munich, build there, and you will receive your documents there.” Timofey and Natasha appeared in the vicinity of Munich in 1952. At first, they spent the night under bridges, cooked food on fires, and then found shelter in the area of the giant Munich landfills. This is now the picturesque Olympic Park. But then there were mountains of garbage, rubble, and ruins from a city almost completely destroyed by the war. Here, on the site of the old airfield, there was an American military base. And when Timofey hinted at his desire to build a church nearby, an American officer told him, “We are Americans - a free nation. Take as much land as you want!” And Timofey “took it.” On no-man's land, they built a hut or a shed out of boards and brick fragments that they got from a dump, and began to live there and develop the land around them. They plowed the garden and planted fruit trees. And, of course, they began to build a church. Local police officers began to visit them, threatening to demolish the illegal construction. One day one came and asked: “What are you building, Timofey?” - “I'm building a church.” - “Do you have permission?” - “But the Queen of Heaven ordered it.” This argument seemed convincing to the policeman. He wrote a paper, with which Timofey went to the district authorities, and they (what a miracle!) issued documents for the building, and both were given passports. And their years flowed

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	GIF (Australia)	= 0.564	ESJI (KZ)	= 8.100	IBI (India)	= 4.260
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in labor and trouble. They continued to build a church and a chapel. They bought old beehives from a peasant. Bees still live in them. The strawberry harvest and honey collected began to be sold to stores. Some money appeared. They bought building materials with it. And when the church was built, they began to buy everything for its interior decoration. All stages of this construction are reflected in numerous photographs that hang on the stands of the museum created on the territory of the site. It is located in their former house. In the mid-60s, an unfamiliar word burst into their more or less established life - "Olympiad". The word seemed so beautiful, but how much anxiety and worry it brought to the owners. The fact is that the territory where the church stood, was included in the Olympic Complex construction project. And according to this project, a track for equestrian competitions was to pass through their estate. As one local newspaper wrote at the time, "Horses will jump over the church." And all the buildings were destined for demolition. But Timofey and Natasha stood up for their church. Humble and submissive people, they were unwavering here. Their firm position became public knowledge. Almost all German newspapers launched a discussion on the topic: should the church be built? Journalists conducted a survey among the population. The majority of people said that the church should be built. The chief engineer of the project, architect Benesh, himself came with other specialists to look at the "subject of dispute." He inspected all the buildings with undisguised interest, marveled at the good architectural taste of the amateur builders and the technically competent execution of their construction work. And already in Timofey's house, having unfolded the plans on the dining table, he decided to move the equestrian track to another place. The journalists who were quick with their words called Timofey Prokhorov the first winner of the Munich Olympics. And people who had learned from the newspapers about the existence of the church and about the passions that had recently raged around it went to Timofey and Natasha. Soon the Church of Reconciliation of East and West was included in all the city maps. A person close to Timofey, Natasha, with whom he registered his marriage in 1972 at the age of 76, died five years later. Before her death, she asked to be buried next to the church and even indicated the place. But the authorities did not give consent to this burial, and she was buried in one of the city cemeteries. And in the place that she indicated, Timofey Vasilyevich made a symbolic grave, put up a cross, planted flowers and came there every day to pray. He lived alone for more than two decades. In fact, he did not feel lonely. He was constantly surrounded by people - visitors came daily to meet the old-timer, to visit his church and museum. Several times, children from Russia came to visit him: daughter Tatyana, son Vladimir with his wife Tatyana and son Igor - grandson of Father Timofey. After

Natasha's death, Pavlina Konstantinovna Gerner, nee Mironova, helped him with everyday life and around the house. She had lived in Munich since the war, when, like Natasha, she was interned from the Stavropol Territory. All her relatives were there, she and Timofey Vasilyevich flew to their homeland in 1993, and Timofey Vasilyevich visited his hometown of Shakhty for the first time in 55 years. He met with his children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren. He even recognized some of his former acquaintances. "Only for some reason they have all aged greatly," he told his parishioners upon his return. The children tried to persuade him to stay. But how could he abandon his church to its fate?!? Every year on January 22, on my father Timofey Vasilyevich's birthday, the mayor of Munich, Christian Ude, would come to congratulate him. Dozens of journalists and Timofey's friends would crowd into his small hut. Timofey Vasilyevich would happily clink glasses of homemade wine with everyone, which he made himself from the grapes he grew, and would lovingly treat his guests to it and tea with honey from his apiary. On this day, hundreds of candles would always burn in his church and Russian songs would be performed by him. In 1995, a museum was opened on the estate grounds. It was created and actively looked after by Camilla Kraus, a photographer from Munich, who continues to look after it now that Father Timofey is no longer with us. She is keeping a photo chronicle of Timofey Vasilyevich's life. In the guest books in the museum, you can see entries in many languages: German, Russian, English, Japanese, Hebrew... Everyone is interested not only in the church and the museum and the simple Russian way of life, but, of course, in Father Timofey himself, who did not betray his Motherland, the Cossacks, and preserved the honor and dignity of a Russian citizen. He always tirelessly greeted guests and talked to everyone. His German left much to be desired, but somehow the Germans always understood him. He loved to joke, and laugh, and take photos as a keepsake, and was always sincere, which provoked guests to treat this man with respect, whose fate broke, killed and betrayed him, but he stood firm...

The news about the Munich old-timer has long since crossed the borders of Germany. They know about him in Russia, too. There was a documentary about Timofey Prokhorov on television. Russian newspapers also write about him. After one publication in the newspaper "Trud", the priest received a postal envelope with the following address: Munich, Olympic Village. "To Grandfather Timofey". Almost like Chekhov. A fifty-year-old Siberian woman proposed to him. After reading the letter, the grandfather only grinned into his gray beard. And around Timofey's estate, life is in full swing, bustling and loud. And on its territory - peace and quiet. In the summer, flowers smell sweet, bees buzz, onions and potatoes, planted by him, ripen in the ground. The wall

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clock in his house inexorably counts the time. For some reason, it is always in a hurry. And now it is the third millennium and the third Timofey century. His small church, nestled at the foot of historical hills, and his estate are a unique corner of Russia on German soil. The grandiose Olympic complex and the fate of Timofey himself are intertwined by time into one knot. All of them together and each one separately represent a landmark of the wonderful city of Munich. Timofey Vasilyevich Prokhorov died at the age of 114 on July 14, 2004 and was buried in the Westfriedhof cemetery in Munich, where Natasha, with whom the Queen of Heaven united them and forgave his wife

Fekla Vasilyevna Prokhorova, who died in Shakhty in 1992 on Tatyana's Day - January 25, and on June 11, 2023, under strange circumstances, the church burned down - the pride of the museum-estate, which, as is known, Timofey built with his own hands, and now in memory of him, parishioners believe that they will be able to restore it and allow the townspeople to preserve the good memory of a man who was able to stand firm and live in the name of faith in God, which I would like to wish the peoples of Russia to maintain good relations among themselves in the name of this very Russia.

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