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FEATURES OF THE HISTORIAN OF THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE RUSSIAN COSSACKS

Abstract: The scientific novelty of this article lies in its first comprehensive scientific analysis of the historical and legal foundations of the revival, development, and transformation of the Cossacks (from the 15th to the 21st centuries). The work examines the formation of legal foundations, the stages of the formation of the legal status of the Cossacks in historical and legal retrospect, the role of the Cossacks in the formation and development of civil society in the Russian Federation, and the prospects for the development of the Cossacks in modern Russia. Analysis of these provisions allows us to create a comprehensive picture of the process of Cossack revival in the present day.

Key words: etymology, churching, conformism, depressed, interethnic, ethnogenesis, proto-state, taxable class, decossackization, competencies, brodnichestvo theory of dualism, etatization of the Cossacks.

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Introduction

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Before we begin to study the issue of the revival of the Cossacks, we must define the moment that is associated with the so-called termination of the

existence, first of all in the legal sense, of the Cossacks as an ethnic group or their liquidation as a separate class. In science, this process, called "decossackization", is a tragic page in the history of the entire Russian Cossacks. At the same time, as we have already found out in our study, the debates about

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the socio-legal identification of the Cossacks still do not subside in the scientific community. Some scientists consider it a special subethnos or even an independent ethnic group (and we adhere to this position), others - exclusively as an estate group. Adherence to one or another point of view determines the assessment of "decossackization" by their adherents. In the first case, it is considered genocide, and in the second - as the elimination of class limitations, which is an integral part of the modernization process, i.e. the transformation of a traditional society into an industrial one.

The process of modernization in Russia began to "gain momentum" in the second half of the 19th century with the abolition of serfdom. It is no coincidence that it was at this time that the "Cossack question" became a subject of discussion in the highest spheres of the Russian state. Opinions were expressed in government circles about the low combat qualities of the Cossack troops, about the excessive isolation of the Cossacks, about the fact that they had outlived themselves in the new conditions. On this basis, proposals were put forward to deprive the Cossacks of their special social status and to transfer them to the position of a taxable class.

The authorities justified their desire to liquidate the Cossacks with the following arguments, namely:

firstly, by the end of the 19th century The main Cossack troops (with the exception of the Semirechye, Transbaikal, Amur and Ussuri) found themselves in the interior regions of the country as a result of the territorial growth of the Russian state, and lost their role in directly guarding and defending the borders. In the previous era, the main purpose of all the Cossack troops in European Russia, the Urals and Western Siberia was protection from their nomadic neighbors. The Cossacks did not need to be convinced of the need for security service, since they were defending their homes and families. Thus, the state received, in fact, a free and very reliable border guard, who knew the terrain, customs and tactics of their restless neighbors well. Now these neighbors became subjects of the Russian Empire, and border posts had to be relocated many hundreds of miles away. Cossack units were also involved in guarding the new borders, but only first-priority regiments, which were on state support, served there, as did units of the regular army. Thus, the financial benefit from using Cossacks to guard the borders gradually faded away;

Secondly, the increasing technical sophistication of the armies of potential adversaries, their saturation with rapid-fire artillery systems, and, at the beginning of the 20th century, machine guns, called into question the possibility of using large mounted cavalry units in combat. The experience of local wars in recent times, in particular the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, confirmed the low combat effectiveness of the Cossack cavalry. Its participation in combat operations was limited to reconnaissance, patrol, and

convoy duties, as well as a few raids behind enemy lines, which were of an isolated nature and did not have a serious impact on the operational situation. This gave rise to doubts about the need to have a large number of Cossack units in the armed forces, and, consequently, about maintaining the special status of the Cossacks as the main supplier of cavalrymen.

Thirdly, technological advances in military affairs led to rising costs for military personnel. The incorporation of Cossack regiments into regular cavalry divisions in 1873 led to increased demands on Cossacks when equipping for service. While in the mid-19th century the total cost of uniforms, equipment, and a draft horse ranged from 70 to 100 rubles, half a century later it had risen to 200 rubles, and by 1912, to 250–300 rubles. This meant that the main principle of forming Cossack units—equipping them for service from income earned from their own farms—was no longer effective. The state was forced to shoulder part of these expenses, paying each Cossack entering service for the first time a 100-ruble allowance. The former low cost of the light Cossack cavalry was becoming a thing of the past. The state's military expenditures on its maintenance grew, gradually becoming equal to those on the regular forces. This fact also spoke against the Cossacks;

Fourth, by the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, the already extremely sensitive land issue in Russia had become acutely acute. The demographic boom led to relative agrarian overpopulation—an increase in the rural population while the area of cultivated land remained virtually unchanged. As a result, the number of land-poor households, unable to provide for their own subsistence level, increased. In order to reduce social tensions in the countryside, the government, as early as 1868, permitted the resettlement of individuals not belonging to the military class to Cossack areas and the purchase of real estate as a form of sedentary estate. True, these individuals were not permitted to purchase arable or meadow lands as their own; they were granted only leasehold rights. Nevertheless, a step toward breaking the isolated existence of the Cossacks had been taken. The influx of settlers increased every year, especially since military and stanitsa administrations, in order to replenish their budgets, readily leased out unused lands of military reserves and stanitsa yurts. The prospect of solving the problem of peasant land shortages by confiscating part of the land from military property seemed very tempting to some high-ranking government officials.

Thus, the objective factors of "de-Cossackization" were quite real from the state's perspective. And the government, albeit slowly and inconsistently, cautiously, nevertheless began to implement it. The first step was the law of 1868. The next was the adoption a year later, in 1869, of a law permitting Cossacks (subject to certain conditions) to leave their class. These conditions were finally

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formalized in the 1883 Regulation "On the Service of Cossacks Outside Their Troops, on Leaving the Military Class, and on the Enrollment of Outsiders in the Cossack Class." According to the established rules, a Cossack wishing to leave his class was obligated to fully fulfill the duties imposed upon him, pay the required monetary dues, and, most importantly, renounce his land share and all benefits due to Cossacks. Naturally, he was simultaneously freed from all obligations inherent in his class status.

Of course, the overwhelming majority of the Cossack population was neither able nor willing to take advantage of this opportunity. The prospect of being left without a livelihood appealed neither to the Cossacks of the Don, Kuban, or Orenburg regions, who were primarily engaged in agriculture, nor to the people of Semirechye or Transbaikal, whose main income came from livestock breeding, nor to the Ural Cossacks, for whom leaving the host meant losing their right to the fishing industry, which had brought them considerable income. Only those who were constrained by the restrictions imposed by the unique nature of Cossack service left the host class: large entrepreneurs, whose commercial activities were hampered by the lack of freedom of movement, and some members of the Cossack intelligentsia, who permanently resided outside the host territory and therefore had lost their military skills. Their numbers were small, but a precedent had been set, the inviolability of class boundaries had been broken. This is further evidence that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, The Russian government's policy of gradual "de-Cossackization" was characterized by the ruling circles' persistent reluctance to address the progressive decline of Cossack land allotments. The aforementioned 1869 Statute established the general military land allotment for Cossacks at 30 dessiatines. However, population growth in the Cossack regions, coupled with unchanged borders, meant that by the early 20th century, Cossack land allotments had declined to 24.6 dessiatines in the Orenburg Host, 16.5 in the Don Host, and a mere 12.5 dessiatines in the Kuban Host. Even in the Amur Cossack Host, located in a region with significant tracts of unoccupied land, the size of the Cossack land allotment was somewhat below the norm—29.1 dessiatines. The deterioration of land supplies for Cossack households led to an increase in the number of Cossacks unable to afford military service, which, in turn, provided additional arguments for the abolition of the Cossack class. Another argument was the lower efficiency of Cossack agricultural farming compared to peasant farming. Unable to freely manage their plots, leave for long periods to earn money, or spend their earnings entirely on expanding their holdings, Cossacks lost the economic competition with the surrounding peasant population. Research by O. B. German shows that, in general, Cossack households were inferior to those of neighboring peasants in terms of economic indicators.

Since the income received from the exploitation of the land barely (and not always) covered the cost of military service, a paradoxical situation developed: the more adult sons a Cossack family had, the lower its standard of living. (In a peasant family, the situation was exactly the opposite.) An article published in 1911 in the magazine "Voice of the Cossacks" cited facts about the complete ruin of Cossack households when 2-3 sons (twins or close in age) entered service at the same time.

The burden of the duties imposed on the Cossacks caused discontent among them. Some representatives of the most radical part of the military intelligentsia expressed thoughts about abolishing the Cossack class and granting the Cossacks civil rights on an equal basis with the rest of the population, in particular complete freedom of movement, choice of occupation and service at their discretion. Such a proposal was submitted to the State Duma for consideration by the deputy from the Orenburg Cossack Host T. I. Sedelnikov. However, it did not receive support either in government circles or among the Cossacks. Despite the obvious anachronism of the military system, based on the class division of society, which slowed down the processes of social modernization, the ruling regime continued to preserve the old order. In 1913, a government decree was issued that narrowed the possibility of Cossacks leaving the military class in comparison with the laws of the late 19th century. The reason for this was the desire to preserve the Cossacks as a military force, but not so much for use in external conflicts, but for the purpose of suppressing the revolutionary movement within the country. The unreliability of the regular army, demonstrated by it in the events of 1905-1907, and, at the same time, the high level of military discipline, controllability and operational maneuverability of the light Cossack cavalry inclined the government to the idea of using it for police service.

Main part

The February Revolution, which proclaimed the liquidation of estates and the complete equality of all citizens of Russia, inevitably raised the question of the liquidation of all estate restrictions and privileges, including those of the Cossacks. The Cossack elite, represented by the generals, military officials and conservatively minded intelligentsia, understood this perfectly well. In order to preserve the land status quo, the thesis was put forward that the Cossacks were not an estate, but a separate people, since their recognition as such gave grounds for demanding the implementation of the proclaimed right to self-determination in the form of autonomy of military regions within the framework of a single Russian state. In this case, the hope for the inviolability of the Cossack lands during the approaching agrarian reform had a basis. The military congresses convened on the

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initiative of the Cossack "upper crust" in the spring and summer of 1917, taking advantage of the complete impotence of the central government, proclaimed the autonomy of their regions without prior arrangement and established local government bodies in the form of circles and military governments. At the same time, the newly-minted government bodies immediately declared all lands and their mineral wealth, forests, waters and other natural resources located in the territories of the Cossack regions to be the exclusive property of the military. They were prompted to this decision by the actions of non-residents (the population of the Cossack regions that was not part of the military class), which were expressed in the unauthorized seizure of uncultivated lands that were part of the so-called military reserve. (It was intended to provide allotments to Cossacks who had reached the age of 17.) A provocative role in the aggravation of inter-class contradictions was played by the speech of the Minister of Agriculture of the Provisional Government V. M. Chernov at the 1st All-Russian Peasant Congress in May 1917, who claimed that Cossack allotments significantly exceeded those of the peasants, and therefore the Cossacks would have to "move over."

In response, the 2nd All-Cossack Congress, held in Petrograd in June 1917, adopted a resolution stating that "all lands of the Cossack troops, forests, waters and lands with all their mineral resources as the historical heritage of the Cossacks constitute the inalienable property of each Cossack army." The resolution emphasized that the non-local peasant population living on Cossack lands received equal rights with the Cossacks in zemstvo self-government, but could not be allocated Cossack land. An exception was made only for those remote troops (Amur, Ussuri), where local land conditions allowed for sharing land with the peasantry without harming the Cossacks. This gave legitimacy to the decisions of military circles on the agrarian issue. At the same time, the decisions of the congress confirmed the right of peasants living in Cossack territories to use the lands at their disposal, provided that they pay the established fee to the military treasury. Such a sharp reaction is quite understandable, since the issue of ceding part of the Cossack lands to the non-resident population was raised by a member of the All-Russian government, and therefore was perceived as the official line of state agrarian policy.

With the Bolsheviks' rise to power, the policy of "decossackization" began to be implemented not in words but in deeds. True, in the first weeks of Soviet power, when it felt unsound, "decossackization" was carried out in a form that suited the Cossacks perfectly. On November 11 (24), 1917, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree abolishing estates and civil ranks, which, among others, abolished the Cossack estate. In early

December, the Council of People's Commissars granted the Cossacks complete freedom of movement and abolished military service, a move greeted with understandable enthusiasm by the rank-and-file Cossacks. However, this inevitably raised the question of special conditions for Cossack land tenure. The idea of land nationalization, which formed the fundamental basis of the Bolshevik Party's agrarian program, was incompatible with the Cossacks' claims to land and mineral rights within their military territories. Therefore, none of the Cossack military governments supported the Soviet power. Realizing the precariousness of their positions, the Council of People's Commissars issued an appeal to the Cossacks, in which they skillfully avoided the most pressing issue - the issue of allocating land to non-residents. The Bolsheviks resorted to their traditional method: to report a half-truth, draping it with pompous revolutionary slogans. The appeal stated that the lands belonging to officers and officials (in the terminology of the authors of this document - "Cossack landowners") would pass into the hands of the Cossack poor, and no one else would lay claim to them. But the Basic Law "On the Socialization of Land" that was being prepared provided for the equal allocation of land according to the consumer or labor norm to all rural population living in a given area, i.e., in relation to the Cossack regions, and to non-residents. In the documents sent by the central government to the regions, the requirement was clearly stated that when allocating land, the interests of not only the working Cossacks but also the working population in general, namely the peasants of the villages adjacent to the stanitsas, should be taken into account. The solution to this problem was impossible without alienating part of the Cossack allotment lands. And from the spring of 1918, a broad offensive against Cossack land ownership began. Attempts to resist expansion were assessed by the authorities as counter-revolutionary manifestations and were brutally suppressed.

The Soviet government maintained its policy of "de-Cossackization" throughout the Civil War. Only its severity varied depending on the military and political situation. For example, the decree of June 1, 1918, "On the Organization of Soviet Power in Cossack Regions," adopted at the height of the anti-Soviet uprisings, was a fairly liberal document. It provided for the creation of separate administrative units within the borders of the former Cossack hosts, granting them seats on the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the establishment of councils of Cossack deputies, and Cossack military units, taking into account the military and everyday characteristics of the local population. However, the decree also contained a fundamental provision regarding the allocation of land to non-residents at the expense of privately owned and military reserve lands. The victories won by the Red Army against the forces

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of P.N. Krasnov on the Don and A.I. Dutov in the Urals in the winter of 1918–1919, the refusal of a significant portion of the Don and Orenburg Cossacks to continue the fight, and their mass return to their villages gave the Bolshevik leadership confidence that Cossack resistance had been completely broken and that more stringent measures could be adopted. There is no other explanation for the appearance of such a document as the circular letter of the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) dated January 24, 1919:

1. Conduct mass terror against wealthy Cossacks, exterminating them completely; conduct merciless mass terror against all Cossacks who took any direct or indirect part in the struggle against Soviet power. All measures that guarantee against any further attempts by the middle class Cossacks to rebel against Soviet power must be applied to them.

2. Confiscate the grain and force all surplus to be dumped at designated points; this applies to both grain and all other agricultural products.

3. Take all measures to assist the displaced poor by organizing resettlement where possible.

4. To equalize non-resident newcomers with the Cossacks in terms of land and in all other respects.

5. Conduct complete disarmament, shooting anyone found with a weapon after the surrender deadline.

6. Issue weapons only to reliable elements from out of town.

7. Armed detachments are to be left in Cossack villages until complete order is established.

8. All commissars appointed to various Cossack settlements are requested to demonstrate maximum firmness and strictly implement these instructions."

It is quite understandable that the policy carried out on the basis of such a directive caused extreme indignation among the Cossacks, namely:

Firstly, the vague wording of the first two points of the above document gave scope for arbitrariness and abuse. The vagueness of the criteria for classifying farms into one property category or another, given the relatively high land wealth of the Cossacks, opened the door to the spread of repression to virtually the entire population of the villages;

secondly, the disarmament of the Cossacks and the arming of non-residents was essentially an insult to centuries-old traditions;

Thirdly, the equalization of land use between Cossacks and non-residents, and especially the resettlement of peasants into Cossack areas, fueled inter-class hostility. The Cossacks responded to this increased pressure with a new outbreak of anti-Soviet uprisings.

But even this did not dissuade the Bolshevik leadership from pursuing "decossackization." M. I. Kalinin stated this directly in his speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Working Cossacks in February 1920. True, he also assured the delegates,

and through them, all Cossacks, that the Soviet government had no intention of taking away Cossack lands, prohibiting them from wearing their traditional uniforms, or renaming stanitsas (Cossack villages). However, the words of the head of the highest legislative body of the Soviet state proved to be nothing more than a lie. The government continued to flirt with the Cossacks while the Civil War raged, and they needed to be wrested from the influence of anti-Bolshevik forces. But as soon as the active phase of hostilities ended, the sheep's clothing that had cloaked the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat was cast off. By late December 1920, a decision was made to liquidate the Cossack Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK)—the only government body that had somehow expressed or attempted to protect Cossack rights. Based on the decree of November 18, 1920, "On Land Use and Land Management in the Former Cossack Regions," the following year, 1921, saw the mass confiscation of land from Cossacks and its redistribution to non-residents, along with the mass resettlement of poor peasants from other regions of the country to the Cossack regions. The territories of the former Cossack regions were dismembered and transferred to the jurisdiction of various administrative-territorial entities. The Soviet government consistently fought against anything reminiscent of the old regime. Gradually, the words "Cossack" and "stanitsa" fell out of official use, and the population of the former Cossack regions was referred to as "peasants." Cossacks were subject to restrictions in their civil rights and were not conscripted into the Red Army. Yet, the consciousness of belonging to a distinct ethnocultural community has never been erased from the memory of the Cossacks' descendants. This is evidenced by the turbulent process of Cossack revival at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. There is no doubt about the validity and historical relevance of this phenomenon. The disappearance of the rich and distinctive Cossack culture would be an irreparable loss not only for our country. However, a natural question arises: what should be revived? A repressed ethnic group that never achieved the status of a separate people? A military-agricultural class? An ethnocultural community? Despite the fact that this process was launched more than two decades ago, there is no definitive answer to this question, and state policy towards the Cossacks remains highly inconsistent. The most radical are those who advocate recognizing the Cossacks as a distinct – fourth – East Slavic people. In doing so, they cite the Law of the RSFSR of April 26, 1991, No. 1107-1 "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples," which listed the Cossacks among those people. However, if we look at the text of the law, we see that this is not entirely true. Article 2 defines the Cossacks as a historically formed cultural and ethnic community of people, and not as a separate people. Whether intentional or not, this

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distorted interpretation of the law prompted some hotheads to demand self-determination for the Cossacks, the restoration of their administrative entities within the boundaries of their pre-revolutionary regions of residence, and the introduction of ataman rule. In the 1990s, there were even calls to appeal to the UN to consider the Cossack issue. However, before examining the specific legal acts related to the revival of the Cossacks in Russia today, it is necessary to identify the historical stages that conditioned their development and adoption, as well as influenced this process.

According to a number of researchers, the history of the Cossack revival can be divided into several stages. According to D. D. Penkovsky, five such stages can be identified:

The first stage was the initial restoration phase (1988–1990). During this period, the movement was taking shape, and people began to openly identify as Cossacks. The main goal of this period was to restore Cossack culture and awaken the social consciousness of those who identified with the original Russian part of Russian statehood, represented by the Cossacks and the Russian Orthodox Church. This stage culminated in the organizational formation of the movement—the creation of the Union of Cossacks of the Don Host Region. The CPSU played a special role in the Cossack movement, playing a tacit role in organizing the first Cossack unions. Significant measures were taken to restore the Cossacks as a military force, which resulted in the influx of various romantics, advocates of Cossack independence, and sometimes greedy, power-hungry individuals overcome by ambition. Many of these individuals received significant financial support from shadow financial structures, pushing aside the romantics of Cossack revival. In the Cossack movement in those years, sentiments for the revival of the Cossacks as a military class took over;

The second stage can be conventionally described as class-corporate (1991–1993). During this time, the development of an internal life new to modern Russia and its part—the Cossacks and their associations—continued. The politically scandalous portion of the Russian population joined the movement. Political actions became the main trend of the movement. New members of the Cossack movement sought to prove the continuity of Cossack traditions, sometimes reviving the irrevocable, and committed acts that were inadequately perceived by the public, sometimes not perceived at all even by that portion of the population close in spirit to the Cossacks. Nevertheless, the Cossack movement, amidst persistent internal struggle, disagreements, and disputes, gradually acquired a politically civilized character.

the third stage is political and social-status (1993–1994). The main activity of almost all Cossack organizations is strengthening the legal status and

establishing a movement for the revival of the Cossacks. Most Cossacks finally understand the inseparability of the Cossack society movement from the political system of Russia and are trying to find their place in it. Cossacks get rid of eccentric forms of activity, political "show-off", strengthen cooperation with state authorities and administration, seek support in various social strata of the population, try to be more open and understandable to the non-Cossack population of Russia not only in the south, in places of traditional residence of the Cossacks, but also in other regions - in the Moscow region, St. Petersburg, Siberia, the North Caucasus, etc. The Cossacks as a movement, not forgetting that it has always been outside of parties, begin to support elections and participate in them. A kind of implantation of Cossack structures into the political and economic structure of modern society takes place;

The fourth stage can be considered conditionally legal (1994–1997). At this stage, the state fully recognized the Cossack movement as such. From 1992 to 1995, the legal framework was developed, the procedure for organizational registration and the place of the Cossack movement in the modern political and state structure of Russia were determined. In 1994, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted the Resolution "On the Concept of State Policy towards the Cossacks," which defined the strategic directions of the relationship between the state and the Cossacks, outlined the main types and forms of state service for the Cossacks, developed forms of combining state management of the Cossack movement and Cossack self-government, designated their territorial bodies and forms of association, and the specifics of land use in areas of traditional Cossack residence. An important political outcome of this resolution can be considered the recognition of the high role of the Cossacks, while at the same time, one can speak of the ambiguity of the state's attitude towards the Cossacks as a class of state service people.

In 1995, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On the State Register of Cossack Societies in the Russian Federation" was signed, which defined the main direction of the revival of the Cossacks of Russia - the recreation, taking into account the realities of life, of the system of registered Cossack troops subordinated to the head of state and performing state and other service for the benefit of the state, our Russia. By the end of 1997, 18 Cossack organizations were registered with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, including: four international (the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and Abroad, the All-Great Don Army, the United International Union of Cossack Women, the Cossack School Charitable Foundation); two all-Russian (the Union of Cossacks, the Union of Cossack Formations); 12 interregional (Siberian Cossack Army, Orenburg Cossack Army, Cossack Cultural Fund, Great Brotherhood of Cossack Troops, All Ural

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Cossack Army, United Cossack Troops of Siberia, Ussuri Cossack Army, White Union of Cossack Troops, etc.).

The official goals of the movement were defined as the development of Cossack culture, traditions, spirituality, youth education, patriotism, and the revival of modern forms of traditional Cossack service. On October 27, 1996, the Great Unifying Circle of Cossacks decided to create a new Cossack structure reflecting the state-based nature of the modern Cossack movement. The "Great Don Army" Cossack Host Society was established as a body of territorial public self-government, uniting existing Cossack societies: farmsteads, stanitsa (stanitsa), and district ones. It became clear that the Cossack movement had outgrown the framework of a public organization and had become, within the framework of Russian statehood, a body of territorial public self-government.

The fifth stage of the modern Cossack movement has arrived—the unification and state stage (1997 to the present), which has become a stage in the movement of all Cossack formations toward reconciliation and unity. This stage can also be characterized as a stage of gradual nationalization of the Cossack movement, its integration into the modern political and state system of Russia. Thus, let us examine in more detail the stages that, in a legal sense, influenced the revival of the Cossacks in modern Russia. As we have already determined, the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 14, 1989, "On the recognition of repressive acts against peoples subjected to forced displacement as illegal and criminal, and the guarantee of their rights," contributed to the revitalization of the Cossack movement.

A key event in defining the strategy of the Cossack movement was the Founding First Grand Circle (Congress) of the Union of Cossacks of Russia (UCR), held in Moscow from June 28–30, 1990. The congress was attended by 263 delegates representing 72,807 elected members of Cossack organizations across various regions. A. Martynov, a member of the Moscow community and a native of the Nizhne-Gnilovskaya village and candidate of economic sciences, was elected Ataman. The newly formed Board of the Union also included the Ataman's comrades: V. Latynin for organizational matters, G. Nemchenko for culture and publishing, Koshevoy Ataman V. Ovcharov, and eight military elders. The writer B. Almazov became the Ataman's assistant. The Circle is held under patriotic slogans of reviving the glory and traditions of the Cossacks in service to a united and indivisible Russia. The Charter of the Union of Cossacks and an Appeal are adopted, and a program for historical and cultural revival, social protection, and the encouragement of entrepreneurship and initiative in economic activity is discussed. Although many of those attending the

Circle represent only a few dozen Cossacks (and some represent only themselves), the organizational development of the Cossack movement is given a significant boost: the organizations that comprise the Union of Cossacks are structured, divided into districts and departments, and so on. The Union of Cossacks gradually incorporates 28 different Cossack associations, unions, societies, regional communities, and troops.

Although the Grand Circle "awarded" the Cossacks not to join any political parties, the politicization of the Cossack movement nonetheless became inevitable. As early as April 1990, a group led by G. Kokunko broke away from the Moscow Cossack Community due to its "red" orientation and created its own organization, the "Cossack Community in Moscow." The division between "Reds" and "Whites" would soon engulf many Cossack organizations and become one of the causes of a schism within the Cossack movement.

The Cossack revival movement gradually spread to new regions. In April 1990, a founding meeting of descendants of the Orenburg Cossacks, living in the Orenburg, Chelyabinsk, and Sverdlovsk regions and the Republic of Bashkortostan, was held in Orenburg. The meeting resolved to establish the "Orenburg Cossack Host" community, which soon became part of the Union of Cossacks of Russia. The writer I. Pyankov became the community's first ataman.

In the Far East, the Amur and Ussuri Cossack Hosts were revived in the early 1990s. Units of the Ural, Semirechye, and Siberian Cossacks, whose descendants number approximately 70,000, are also being revived in Kazakhstan. However, attempts to revive the Cossacks have met with a negative reaction from local authorities and national organizations in Kazakhstan, such as the Kazakh Azat and Alash groups, the Soviet German Revival, and the Chechen-Ingush National Center. Furthermore, the participation of Cossacks in military-patriotic education of youth is categorically condemned, and Cossacks are accused of creating military ataman formations and of aspiring to political power.

At the same time, the internal split of the Cossacks along political lines became increasingly obvious. In Kuban, supporters of further radical democratic reforms in the country from among the Cossacks created independent Cossack structures, declaring their "white" orientation. Already at the beginning of the summer of 1991, the Black Sea Rada effectively separated from the Kuban Cossack Rada (KKR), and in September of the same year, the Cossack association "Russia" and the Anapa district did the same. In June 1991, several dozen Cossacks left the Orenburg Cossack Host and formed the Union of Orenburg Cossacks, at the First Big Circle (March 1992) of which the ideology of the "White movement" was proclaimed as fundamental. On June 12, 1991, during the elections of the President of the RSFSR, the

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Union of Cossacks

Russia and the Board of the Union of Cossacks of the Don Host Region call on the population to vote for N. I. Ryzhkov, the Kuban Cossack Rada supports the candidate for President of the RSFSR, former Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR V. V. Bakatin. Both of them represented the authorities of the USSR and advocated a more conservative policy. The "white" Cossack opposition, which by that time had not yet taken shape structurally, proposes voting for B. N. Yeltsin, representing the most radical political circles. Soon the split in the Cossacks took shape organizationally. At the Circle of Representatives of Cossack Associations of Russia, which met in Moscow on July 21-22, 1991 and represented from 9 to 30 Cossack organizations of the country, the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia (UCTR) is established and the first composition of its board is elected. The delegates of the Circle (65 people) declare their desire to cooperate with the Russian leadership and their support for the democratic forces in the country. The initiators of the Circle were the Cossack Community in Moscow, the Rostov village of Dolomanovskaya, the Cherkassky District of the Don Cossack Host, the Siberian, Kuban, and Yenisei Cossack Hosts, and others. From the moment of its creation, the SKVR acted as a "white" alternative to the "red" Union of Cossacks of Russia.

Unlike the SKR, the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia advocates the recognition, albeit with some limitations, of private ownership of land in historical Cossack regions, as well as support for the policies of the President of the Russian Federation, especially in the area of transition to a market economy and the implementation of radical economic reforms. At the same time, the SKVR places special emphasis on restoring the special role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the life of Cossack communities, accusing the leadership of the Union of Cossacks of Russia of the dominance of the party communist nomenklatura and former KGB employees in Cossack structures.

The state, seeing the Cossacks as a new, genuine political force, sought to impart a certain logic to the revival process, to control, "lead, and direct" its development. On April 26, 1991, the Law of the RSFSR "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples" was published, defining the status of the Cossacks as a "cultural-ethnic community of people." Article 3 of this law elucidated the essence of rehabilitation, which meant "recognition of the exercise of the right of repressed peoples to restore the territorial integrity that existed prior to the unconstitutional policy of forcibly redrawing borders, to restore the national-state entities that existed prior to their abolition, and to compensation for damages caused by the state." This law played a catalytic role in many political processes. According to its text, not only the Cossacks but also many other peoples received the legitimate right to oppose the existing political and ideological

system. At the state level, the foundations for further reform of the state structure were laid, where entire ethnic communities became allies of the reformers, which may have played a role in shaping attitudes towards the decision to dissolve the USSR.

The next important state document establishing the prospects for the development of the Cossack movement was Decree No. 632 of the President of the Russian Federation, dated July 15, 1992, "On Measures to Implement the Law of the Russian Federation 'On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples' in Relation to the Cossacks." [2] Clause 3 of the Decree established that Cossacks were citizens who considered themselves direct descendants of the Cossacks and who expressed a desire to jointly restore and develop economic, cultural, and everyday life practices and participate in public service, as well as citizens who had voluntarily joined the Cossacks in the established manner. Although the preamble to the Decree affirmed the cultural and ethnic status of the Cossacks, the provision that "voluntary entry" into the Cossacks was possible effectively negated the ethnic nature of the movement, as it was impossible to "join" the people. The only necessary and sufficient conditions for inclusion in the Cossacks were the desire to be a Cossack and to participate in joint economic management and public service. Apparently, with this Decree, the executive branch, represented by the President of the Russian Federation, declared its desire to promote the development of the Cossack movement, gradually introducing it into the mainstream of the state structure as an estate-based military-economic organization, although paragraph 2 proclaimed the rejection of "a return to any estate-based privileges."

The decree also defined two more areas of rehabilitation: the allocation of land allotments to Cossack communities for collective land use on a gratuitous basis and the possibility of using traditional forms of Cossack self-government in the territory of compact residence of the Cossacks on the basis of the free expression of the will of citizens (local referendum) and in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation "On Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation" of July 6, 1991.

Decree No. 341 of the President of the Russian Federation of March 15, 1993, "On the Reform of Military Structures, Border and Internal Troops in the North Caucasus Region and State Support for the Cossacks," defined the military aspects of the Cossack revival and the strategic policies of state institutions regarding the Cossack movement. According to the Decree, members of Cossack societies had the right to serve in Cossack units and formations of the Russian Armed Forces, border troops, Cossack motorized military units, and operational units of the Internal Troops, in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation "On Military Duty and Military Service."

Thus, the movement for the revival of the

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Cossacks was gradually transformed by the state: from an unpredictable "pressure group" with its own political goals and objectives, into a "state-voluntary-public" organization modeled on DOSAAF or local civil defense committees. A regulation on a "special land use regime" was planned to be developed as a "class privilege" for Cossacks serving in the military.

The Decree also ordered the Government of the Russian Federation, executive authorities of the republics, territories, regions, autonomous regions within the Russian Federation, the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg to assist in the revival of the Russian Cossacks. It was not explained how exactly this assistance should be manifested. According to some researchers, Decree No. 341 of March 15, 1993 remained almost completely unfulfilled, and the legal foundations for the Cossack revival laid down in it were not developed. Apparently, this is not entirely true. Although much of what was declared in the Decree was developed in more detail only in 1998-1999, the line of the authorities' attitude toward the movement for the revival of the Cossacks was declared and developed in subsequent legislative acts. On October 22, 1993, the Order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation No. 488 "On measures to implement the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On the reform of military structures, border and internal troops in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation and state support for the Cossacks" was issued in the army and navy, which set out a plan of measures to implement the Decree in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The Directive of the General Staff (DGS) of November 11, 1993 No. 315/3/0331 established a list of formations and military units, the subdivisions of which were to be staffed with Cossacks from the spring of 1994, and determined the procedure for interaction with representatives of the Cossacks. According to the DGS of February 14, 1994. No. 315/4/510, military commissariats were given instructions on the procedure for military registration of Cossacks.

From 1993 to 1996, the process of development of the movement for the revival of the Cossacks mainly took place in line with the legislative registration of previously declared directions, the definition of the status of the Cossacks in the state structure and the regulation of relations between state authorities and Cossack organizations.

The process of nationalization of the Cossacks continued with the adoption of Russian Government Resolution No. 355, "On the Concept of State Policy Toward the Cossacks," on April 22, 1994. This resolution provoked a highly controversial reaction both among the Cossacks themselves and among researchers of this issue. The resolution determined that the Cossacks had historically been directly linked to state service, which shaped the specific characteristics that allow them to be considered a

distinctive phenomenon in the history of the Russian people. Therefore, the revival of traditional forms of Cossack state service should become one of the elements in the development of a new Russian statehood and the strengthening of its security. The state will support the Cossack movement in its development as a state structure, providing financial, material, and other benefits, and promoting the development of Cossack self-government. The resolution instructed the Ministry of Defense to develop and approve regulations governing Cossack military service in the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces. At the same time, it was noted that the staffing of military units and subdivisions with Cossacks in no way signified the creation of a new branch or type of troops in the Armed Forces, much less any other armed formations not provided for by federal laws; atamans of Cossack societies will not have any authority or control functions in relation to military units and subdivisions staffed with Cossacks (Appendix No. 1 to Directive of the 1st ZMO No. 315/4/295 of January 24, 1996). According to O. V. Matveyev, this policy testified to the state's desire "to create a registered (list-registered and government-approved) Cossacks, endowing them, first and foremost, with police functions," which could turn the Cossacks "into a humiliatingly dependent class," finally splitting the Cossack movement and pitting it against the entire population of Russia.

At the same time, in many Cossack farmsteads and villages, Circles were held to discuss the state's policy towards the Cossacks. In the Cossack community itself, there was no clear opinion on the further development of the movement for the revival of the Cossacks. Some members of the Cossack societies advocated the need to shift the emphasis to the cultural and historical component of the process of socio-cultural transformation. From the "Report of the Ataman of the Pashkovsky Cossack Society, Yesaul G. T. Kvashura, on the activities of the Board" it is clear that the Cossacks of the society supported the idea of "carrying out state and other service". Moreover, state service, in their opinion, is "the main form of life, which should become the core around which a single way of life of the Cossack society, their psychology and way of life will be formed." At the same time, the Cossacks were not inclined to abandon independent political activity, which is "simply inevitable." For them, the transition to public service was most likely not a transformation into a faceless cog in the state mechanism, but an opportunity to feel their role in the life of the country. The turning point document implementing the concept of state policy towards the Cossacks and a logical continuation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 15, 1992 No. 632 was the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 9, 1995 No. 835 "On the state register of Cossack societies in the Russian Federation", which approved the "Temporary

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Regulation on the state register of Cossack societies in the Russian Federation". According to the Decree, a distinction was made between Cossack societies that assumed the duties of public service and were subject to registration with the Ministry of Nationalities and Regional Policy, and Cossack societies operating on the basis of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Public Associations" and registered by justice authorities. This provision effectively secured the status of a state structure for the "registered" Cossacks. Clause 4 of the "Temporary Regulations" confirmed the previously stated thesis about the non-ethnic nature of the Cossack movement by defining a Cossack society as "an association of citizens of the Russian Federation who consider themselves direct descendants of the Cossacks or who voluntarily joined Cossack societies and expressed a desire to perform state service...". In order to organize state service, Cossack societies were formalized into a rigid structure with an agreed number and fixed composition and were required to submit an annual report on the fulfillment of their obligations to perform state service to the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Nationalities and Regional Policy and the Council for Cossack Affairs under the President of the Russian Federation.

Thus, by the beginning of 1996, the activities of the Government of the Russian Federation and the country's executive authorities, represented by the President of the Russian Federation, in matters of state regulation of the development of Cossack organizational structures and the institutionalization of their political demands had acquired the characteristics of a targeted revival of the Cossacks as an "estate" destined to perform state or related service. On April 16, 1996, the President of the Russian Federation adopted a whole package of documents regulating the activities of Cossack societies in line with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 9, 1995, "On the State Register of Cossack Societies in the Russian Federation."

The appendix to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of April 16, 1996, No. 563, "On the procedure for attracting members of Cossack societies to state and other service," included the "Regulation on the involvement of members of Cossack societies in state and other service," which defined the types of state and other service, "based on the historical traditions of the Russian Cossacks and the modern needs of the state." Chapter II, "Types of service to which members of Cossack societies are involved and the procedure for attracting them to service," stated that members of Cossack societies "carry out military service in the manner established by federal legislation; are involved in the protection of the state border of the Russian Federation as part of public formations; are involved in the production and supply of agricultural products, raw materials and food for the needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian

Federation and other troops. Members of Cossack societies who are in the reserve may, in accordance with federal legislation, be enlisted in the reserve." In addition, members of Cossack societies may be involved in: "the protection of public order; protection of objects in state and municipal ownership, as well as escort of cargo; participation in events related to the elimination of the consequences of natural disasters and the provision of assistance to victims; participation in customs protection as part of the customs authorities of the Russian Federation; participation in the gamekeeper, nature conservation and ecological service, as well as control over the use and protection of lands; protection of forests from fires and their protection from pests and diseases; production, procurement and supply of agricultural products, raw materials and food for federal and regional needs." At the same time, paragraph 3 noted that the involvement of members of Cossack societies in service is based on the principles of "controllability and subordination of Cossack societies to federal government bodies, government bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local government bodies."

From 1991 to 1999, federal government agencies adopted about 80 regulatory legal acts on Cossack issues, and more than half of them occurred after the publication of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of January 20, 1996, No. 67 "On the Main Directorate of Cossack Troops under the President of the Russian Federation." If the documents on the Cossacks from 1991 to 1993 mainly concerned issues of rehabilitation of the Cossacks, the creation of structures for the Cossacks (commissions, councils), then from 1993 an active search for ways to include the Cossacks in the existing socio-political system of the country began. Among the most significant documents of 1993-1995 It is necessary to highlight the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of April 22, 1994 No. 355 "On the concept of state policy towards the Cossacks", the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 1, 1994 No. 1389 "On the Council for Cossack Affairs under the President of the Russian Federation" and the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 9, 1995 No. 835 "On the state register of Cossack societies in the Russian Federation". It was in these documents that the state policy towards the Cossacks was formulated, the vertical management of the Cossack military associations was outlined, and the demands of a certain part of the Cossacks were constituted.

However, the adoption of the above-mentioned normative acts, in addition to the creative beginning in the matter of the revival of the Cossacks, also brought a kind of split in the Cossack circles. This is due to the fact that all Russian Cossacks were divided into the so-called "registered" and Cossacks in the form of public organizations. We deliberately do not

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pay due attention to this problem in this paragraph of our study in order to cover it in more detail in this article.

Subsequently, the legal and organizational foundations of the Cossacks (primarily the "registered" ones) were defined in more detail by Federal Law No. 154-FZ of December 5, 2005 "On the State Service of the Russian Cossacks", which we will also analyze below. It can be argued that the development of the legislation of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation on the Cossacks in the 1990-2000s was quite chaotic and provided for the regulation of conceptually different aspects of the process of the revival and development of the Russian Cossacks. This period is characterized by the adoption of numerous disparate legal acts aimed not so much at the revival of the Cossacks, but at attracting Cossack associations to military service. As E. A. Kokarev rightly notes, the periodization of the stages of the formation and development of the legislation of the Russian Federation on the Cossacks should look like this, namely:

Stage I – 1989–1992 – at this stage, the need for the revival of the Cossacks in Russia is being understood, the first acts are adopted that form the political and legal basis for the rehabilitation of the Cossacks, granting the Cossacks certain rights; at the same time, the question of the status of the Cossacks, their recognition as a people or ethnic group, remains unresolved;

II stage – 1993–1995 – at this stage, the adoption of conceptual by-laws at the federal and regional levels on the involvement of the Cossacks in public service is observed, the first long-term programs for the development of the Cossacks are adopted; the issue of the status of the Cossacks still remains unresolved, although from the content of the legal acts it becomes clear that the state is in no hurry to recognize the Cossacks as a people or ethnic group and prefers to build relations with the Cossacks through Cossack associations;

III stage – 1996–1999 – at this stage, an active process of forming the legal basis for state governance of the Cossacks took place, with the creation of state authorities at the federal and regional levels, whose competence included issues of managing Cossack associations and interaction with the Cossacks; it became obvious that the Cossacks would not be recognized as a people or ethnic group;

IV stage – 2000–2004 – at this stage, there is an active process of adopting legislative acts of the subjects of the Russian Federation, which determined the legal status of the Cossacks, measures of state support for the Cossacks on the territory of the subjects of the Russian Federation, etc.;

V Stage – 2005 – present – after the adoption of the Federal Law "On the State Service of the Russian Cossacks", the status of the Cossacks was finally

determined, the legislation of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation on the Cossacks was streamlined, updated concepts and programs for the development of the Cossacks were adopted.

The objective factors that determined the formation and manifestation of the main sources of the revival of the Cossacks can be considered, namely:

- the dissolution of the USSR and the strengthening of centrifugal tendencies in Russia;
- the rapid growth of ethnic self-awareness among the Cossacks as a reaction to the national policy pursued in the USSR in the 1950s–1980s to erase national differences and educate a "new Soviet man";
- aggravation of interethnic and interstate relations both within the state and along its borders;
- general politicization of public life in the country, caused by difficult modernization processes;
- the need to fill the spiritual and existential (V. Frankl) vacuum that formed after the loss of state ideology;
- the difficult social and economic situation of the Cossacks, as well as all citizens of Russia;
- the desire of the Cossacks to play a more prominent role in Russian society (according to some Cossack ideologists, the cossackization of Russia is the third path that takes into account the political, socio-economic and cultural features of the formation of the Russian state and differs from all forms of democracy presented in the world today);
- the vitality of the customs and traditions of the former Cossacks, which initiated the revival of the Cossack movement in the late 1980s.

Among the subjective factors one could consider:

- the desire of government structures at different levels in different periods of the country's history to solve their problems using the peculiarities of Cossack culture;
- the need for the state leadership to control the political life of the country;
- the desire of people in an era of political and social turmoil to enter into some kind of stable organized structure capable of resisting the growing atomization of society and protecting their interests;
- the desire of the descendants of the Cossacks to clear the concept of "Cossackism" from undeserved accusations and to revive its traditions.

All of the above, without a doubt, must be viewed through the prism of the peculiarities of value orientations, thinking, assessment of reality and behavior of the Cossacks, which impose a unique "regional" and "subcultural" imprint on the political life of the Cossacks.

Before beginning to examine the role of the Cossacks in building civil society in the Russian Federation, it seems reasonable to consider the theoretical and legal foundations of this phenomenon.

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Without going into a historical digression in defining the concept and content of civil society, we will dwell only on some theoretical aspects that allow us to determine the place of the Cossacks as an institution of civil society in its development and formation.

Civil society is a category that has evolved throughout virtually the entire existence of society, the state, and the individual. The theoretical and legal model of civil society allows us to answer the eternal social question that concerns the definition of the relationship between society, the state, and the individual. In the present era, defining the relationship between the theoretical construct of civil society and the contemporary process of its formation, development, and evolution has become particularly relevant.

In our opinion, when examining the theoretical foundations of civil society, the most justified is the political and legal concept of the union system of L. Stein. The formation of a theoretical and legal model of civil society by identifying the union system, the basis of which is non-governmental organizations and unions of people created to represent the interests of individual groups, associations of people in the state, as well as to exercise control over the activities of state power, determines the essence of the idea of civil society in the works of L. Stein. The union system in the political and legal concept of L. Stein has a dual content. On the one hand, the union system "embraces all forms in which individuals voluntarily unite for some specific purpose." On the other hand, the concept under study in L. Stein's concept is "that part that concerns only those associations whose purpose is the implementation of some task of management and control over state activities through the free combination of means and forces."

At the same time, civil society institutions (public organizations, unions, associations, public chambers under state authorities, etc.) in the interpretation of the theoretical and legal model under consideration are elements of the "union system", the purpose of which is to ensure the possibility of dialogue, the implementation of control functions by society over the activities of state bodies and officials. Comparing the theoretical and legal model of the category under study and its practical implementation in the life of modern society, the state, and the individual, we can state the continuity, significance, and value of the idea of civil society.

Having mentioned the institutional nature of civil society, a completely natural question arises: does the Cossacks belong to the institution of civil society and is it capable of influencing its development? To answer this question, it is necessary to determine what the institution (institutions) of civil society are and what features or characteristic traits they possess.

The existence of institutionality and the presence

of dependence on the state will as signs of civil society are questioned by few modern political scientists and social scientists. In this regard, as I. S. Usvatov rightly notes, civil society institutions are socially significant structures recognized and/or initiated by the state.

However, at the same time, civil society and its institutions cannot be perceived as elements of the structure of state governance. Civil society appears to us as a phenomenon, the presence of self-governance of which is one of its main characteristics. It exists not in spite of, but thanks to the state, and in the conditions created for it, primarily normative, it interacts with state bodies, implementing functions that are difficult or impossible for the state to implement. Thus, civil society, consolidating citizens through informal communities outside the state, prevents separation from the whole, prevents mutual alienation of citizens.

One of the first authors who attempted to systematize the institutions of civil society in Russia, S. V. Kalashnikov, classified the family as such, as well as all types of religious confessions, associations, unions, foundations, public associations, commercial enterprises, banks, joint-stock companies, labor collectives, farming (peasant) households, local government bodies, human rights movements, interest clubs, non-governmental mass media, and commercial educational institutions. I. Zh. Iskakov singles out among the institutions of civil society unitary enterprises and educational institutions (state and non-state), trade unions as institutions of the socio-economic and cultural spheres, as well as the mass media, regardless of the form of ownership. Community, family, urban communes, neighborhood communities, religious communities, public movements and organizations, the mass media system, clubs and societies of interest, and trade unions are classified as institutions of civil society by L. M. Romanenko, who was one of the first researchers on this topic to define institutions of civil society as historically established, stable forms of self-activity of social subjects and the organization of their relations and interactions that exist outside the framework of the state and develop without its direct intervention. Considering that the main task of an institution of civil society is, among other things, the implementation of civil initiatives, an institution of civil society must meet the following criteria:

- be a community of people created to achieve common goals;
- must be based on the principle of voluntary participation;
- must have the ability (usually indirectly) to influence the adoption of management (and political) decisions;
- must have political independence and economic autonomy.

Based on this, the institution of civil society is a politically independent and economically autonomous community of people based on the principle of

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voluntary participation, created to achieve common goals, including the ability to influence the adoption of management decisions.

We believe that the Cossacks of modern Russia, meeting the above criteria, are a full-fledged institution of civil society, occupying one of the central places in it. The content of the Cossacks' activities, their normative design, the role recognized by the state for them in the management of social processes, as a whole, determine the characteristics of the Cossacks as an institution of civil society. An important distinguishing feature of institutions from other elements of civil society, among other things, is the implementation or the ability to implement all the functions characteristic of civil society. We will indicate, from our point of view, the most important of them, which are implemented, including and not least, by the Cossacks:

- control over the implementation of powers vested in government bodies and officials;
- informing the public and influencing public opinion;
- influencing the distribution of financial resources in the charitable, non-production sphere;
- implementation of activities aimed at raising the level of legal culture of the population and the legal awareness of individual citizens;
- influencing the content and progress of ongoing reforms, primarily in the social, spiritual and cultural spheres.

So, having defined the Cossacks as one of the most important institutions of civil society, we will move on to examining the problems of their participation in the further development and modernization of civil society.

Looking ahead somewhat, we note that the significance of the Cossack movement in the development of civil society lies not in its quantitative characteristics compared to all other actors in the region's socio-political space. A certain uniqueness of public organizations of this type lies in the length of their "political longevity." Unlike a number of other social movements and associations, which either disintegrated after a few years of existence or degenerated into narrowly elite "interest groups," the Cossack movement as a whole expanded its ranks and maintained a certain integrity of strategic guidelines and development prospects. From 1991 to 1999, the number of Cossack organizations in Russia's regions underwent significant periodic fluctuations, driven by three factors:

- 1) changes in the mass consciousness of the population of the region and the country;
- 2) the dynamics of the political situation;
- 3) the process of forming the corresponding regulatory framework at both the national and regional levels is sluggishly keeping pace with the first two.

For example, in the period from 1991 to 1999, the Main Justice Department of Krasnodar Krai

registered 85 Cossack public associations operating in Krasnodar. The formation of Cossack public associations had two waves. The first was 1991-1992, when more than 10 organizations were registered per year - a completely natural phenomenon at the initial stage of such a process, when any movement "emerging from scratch" is potentially capable of drawing a large number of supporters into its orbit. Then the "human resource" is exhausted, and the surge of 1995-1996 (13 and 21 organizations were registered, respectively) is explained by macro events in Russian political life - primarily preparations for the presidential elections. Moreover, as a number of all-Russian sources testify, not only the "party in power" of this period is involved in this phenomenon. Its political opponents also, whenever possible, directly or covertly, through "support groups", initiated the creation of various, including Cossack, socio-political movements, which in the future were supposed to act as parallel, duplicating structures. The subsequent decrease in the number of Cossack public associations is influenced not only by the "opportunistic-temporal" factor, but also by organizational and legal issues. In 1999, 34 Cossack public associations were liquidated by a court decision in accordance with the Federal Law "On Public Associations", 26 associations - under Article 52 (as having failed to re-register in accordance with the Federal Law) and 8 associations - under Article 29 (for failure to provide information on their activities). From the point of view of the issue we are considering - the prospects for the development of civil society in Russia - Cossack public associations and organizations, among all others, seem to be the most promising in Russia as a whole and in individual regions in particular. A number of circumstances testify in favor of their prospects for the development of civil society in Russia, namely:

firstly, the numerical significance of the organizations included in the movement, as well as the group of potential support;

secondly, the nature of the relationship between Cossack organizations and associations with state institutions.

Despite the dissatisfaction with the established system of relations emphasized by the leaders of the Cossack movement, the Cossacks have very close contacts and experience of cooperation with the legislative and executive authorities at all levels, and are involved in the activities of individual state structures. The radical statements made earlier about the need for complete etatization of the Cossacks, turning them into one of the state institutions, have practically disappeared today; their unreality is recognized not only by ordinary members of the organizations, but also by the leaders who voiced them. Nevertheless, deviating from strictly legal, statutory formulations, in our opinion, Cossack organizations can rightfully be designated as voluntary associations of citizens, implicitly or

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explicitly setting the improvement of the functioning of a number of state institutions as the main goal of their activities. This is their main difference from the entire spectrum of other public organizations, social and political movements;

Thirdly, the characteristics of the movement's ranks. Scholars have repeatedly noted the dual nature of the recruitment of representatives of diverse gender, age, and socio-professional groups into the ranks of a party, movement, etc. The Cossack movement is significantly influenced by this factor, but it carries the potential for both negative and positive prospects. In particular, Cossack organizations, unlike most public associations, which are narrowly focused in their goals and the characteristics of their members, possess not only a broader but also a more socially diverse social base, which significantly facilitates their activities.

Fourth, being traditionally and historically tied to rural areas, the Cossack movement and its organizations more easily attract the upper management of agricultural enterprises to their ranks or activities. This is especially important for southern Russia, given that agricultural production is the foundation of the economy and plays a far greater role than in other regions. The movement is thus capable of forming significant groups of "agents of influence" and channels of influence on subregional and regional policy among local elites.

From everything we have said above about the prospects of the Cossack movement in Russia for the process of formation and modernization of civil society, it follows that it is called upon to be the main factor in this process.

The growing tendency of Cossacks to participate in the country's political life through party building plays a significant role in the process of building civil society in Russia, with the participation of the Cossacks. However, these tendencies are also dictated by historical preconditions.

Let's give a brief example: after February 1917, the Cossacks took part in party building, even attempting to create their own party. In the spring of 1917, the ruling Constitutional Democrats enjoyed the greatest popularity among the Cossack villagers in the Cossack regions, especially on the Don. Suffice it to say that the Don Regional Committee of the Cadet Party, headquartered in Novocherkassk (it had existed since 1905), was headed by the Cossack A. I. Petrovsky (a deputy of the Second State Duma and a lawyer by profession). The regional committee was led primarily by Cossacks. Members of the Don Regional Committee of Cadets since 1905 were: I. A. Zakharyev, M. M. Karpov, V. A. Boldyrev, A. S. Manuilov, A. V. Trapeznikov, V. I. Popov, S. I. Kashkin, I. G. Kogan, G. V. Filatiev, S. V. Kharitonov, I. M. Zaporozhtsev, teacher, in 1917, government commissar M. S. Voronkov and chairman of the Don-Kuban Committee of the All-Russian

Zemstvo Union V. A. Kharlamov, who was elected to the Central Committee of the Cadet Party in May 1917 at the VIII Congress of this party. Cossacks led some Cadet Party organizations, which existed not only in cities but also in some district stanitsas (councils) along the Don: G. V. Filatyev was the chairman of the Uryupinsk Committee of the Cadet Party, and M. Sinev chaired that of Ust-Medveditsky. The Cadets managed to establish their own organizations in some stanitsas. For example, on the Don, they existed in the stanitsas of Aksayskaya, Velikoknyazheskaya, Kamenskaya, Kagalnitskaya, and Ust-Medveditskaya, as well as in the Vladikavkaz Railway Administration. Cossacks determined the social composition of these Cadet Party organizations.

The Cossacks' current tendency to participate in Russia's political and party life has not faded. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev repeatedly emphasized that the state is interested in realizing the potential of the Cossacks in our country and in addressing the joint tasks traditionally addressed by the state and the Cossacks: strengthening our country as a whole, educating youth, and strengthening military-patriotic traditions. As the Cossack revival progresses, the Cossack Party can become a unique center for implementing these tasks of reviving, uniting, and rallying the Cossacks and those who support this movement. Without such a center, it will be difficult, given Russia's bureaucratic landscape, to protect Cossack rights and advance the process of Cossack revival.

Russia is building a civil, democratic society that includes the functioning of various civil institutions. On November 23, 2010, the President of the Russian Federation specifically noted the danger of the opposition and the ruling party deteriorating in the country's political life. In this regard, Dmitry Medvedev believes it is necessary to raise the level of political competition. To this end, the quality of popular representation must be improved and minority rights must be ensured. In addition to equal access to the media, the opposition is guaranteed access to leadership positions in regional parliaments. The number of signatures required to participate in elections has been reduced. In effect, the barrier for party representatives to enter parliaments at all levels has been lowered to 5%. A party is a means, a political instrument of representation. A party represents its voters. The President believes that everyone should know they have like-minded people in representative bodies. This means that the Cossack Party can confidently be represented in parliaments at various levels and reflect the wishes of its voters. By putting forward the slogan "For the strengthening of Russia, Orthodoxy, and the revival of the Cossacks," the Cossack Party will only contribute to the further development of the Russian state, the strengthening of the country's political system, and better popular representation. Apparently, the time has come for the

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Cossacks to unite in their own party and, while addressing issues of their revival, will truly support the state with their actions. And the Cossacks have always done this, as evidenced by their rich history. On January 28, 2013, the Cossack Party of the Russian Federation was registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. In accordance with the Program of the Cossack Party of the Russian Federation, the political party "Cossack Party of the Russian Federation" is created with the goal of promoting the development and consolidation of Russian Cossacks by strengthening their role in addressing state, municipal, and public issues, improving interaction with federal government bodies, state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, other state bodies and local government bodies, organizations and public associations, and developing effective mechanisms for public-society partnership. The party intends to achieve this goal by addressing the following objectives:

- popularization of Cossack ideology, expansion of public support for Russian Cossacks by various sectors of civil society;
- improving the mechanism and creating economic conditions for the Cossacks to fulfill their obligations;
- development of spiritual and moral foundations, traditional way of life, forms of management and the original culture of the Russian Cossacks;
- enhancing the role of Cossack societies and public associations of Cossacks in educating the younger generation in the spirit of patriotism and its readiness to serve the Fatherland, including using the potential of the Cossack cadet corps;
- support for international cooperation of Russian Cossacks;
- establishing international contacts with Cossack organizations from the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States and far abroad.

The priority areas of the program of the political party "Cossack Party of the Russian Federation" are: participation in elections at all levels to implement the Cossack ideology in the political life of our country; improvement of the system of interaction with federal government bodies of the Russian Federation, government bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, other government bodies, local government bodies, Cossack societies and public associations of Cossacks, as well as with religious organizations to support initiatives aimed at achieving the goals of the state policy of the Russian Federation with respect to the Russian Cossacks; promotion of the economic activity of the Cossacks within the framework of existing instruments of state support, development and adoption of measures to stimulate and develop various forms of entrepreneurial activity carried out by Cossack societies, providing them with

information, scientific and methodological assistance; assistance in strengthening the material and technical base of creative Cossack groups, holding events in the field of preservation and development of original Cossack culture, expansion of the Cossack festival movement, preparation and publication of materials on the history of the Russian Cossacks; assistance in organizing work on military-patriotic, spiritual-moral and physical education of Cossack youth, development of a network of educational institutions of all types and kinds implementing educational programs taking into account the cultural and historical traditions of the Russian Cossacks, including Cossack cadet corps, creation of Cossack youth centers and Cossack children's summer camps in places of compact residence of Cossacks; assistance in the international activities of the Russian Cossacks, expansion of contacts and cooperation with Cossack organizations in the states - participants of the Commonwealth of Independent States and far abroad, support for the participation of Cossack societies and public associations of Cossacks in programs regarding compatriots abroad, as well as youth and cultural exchanges, assistance in returning to the Russian Federation unique values that have highly artistic, scientific and historical-cultural significance associated with the history of the Russian Cossacks. In order to strengthen the spiritual and moral foundations, as well as to develop the cultural and historical traditions of the Russian Cossacks, harmonize interethnic relations, interreligious and interfaith dialogue, the activities of the political party "Cossack Party of the Russian Federation" must be built using the potential of civil society institutions, the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations of traditional faiths.

Conclusion

I would like to believe that the Cossack Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) will be a real political institution of civil society, and not a formal organization created on paper to satisfy someone's political ambitions under a beautiful name. Some atamans of military Cossack societies have already expressed their attitude to the created party quite clearly. In particular, the ataman of the Great Don Army Viktor Vodolatsky, on a live broadcast of the Azov TV company "Pulse", after the host's question about the new Cossack party, crossed himself with the words "thank God, we have nothing to do with it."

Ataman of the Kuban Cossack Host Nikolai Doluda, speaking to the Cossacks at the IV World Cossack Forum in Novocherkassk before the CPRF congress, said: "We are being forced to choose between two options, both of which are harmful to the Cossacks: the first is to create a "Cossack party," the second is to become members of existing parties and accept their ideology. And then the Cossacks will supposedly be protected. Although everyone

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understands perfectly well: by ceasing to rely on their own idea – the idea of reviving the Cossacks as a people, the idea of Cossack brotherhood and Cossack unity – the Cossacks will instantly be “smeared” and will very soon cease to exist at all. The opinion of the Kuban Cossacks here is this: we do not need any parties! We already have what is above all parties: the Cossack idea, the Cossack people, the Cossack army,” the ataman emphasized.

Deputy Prime Minister of the Sverdlovsk government Vladimir Romanov, who is also the ataman of the Orenburg Cossack army, also criticized the idea of the Cossack Party: “A registered Cossack who has agreed to take on the responsibilities of public service must remain outside of politics, and therefore outside of parties. Like a serviceman, he must be ready to carry out the order of the state, and not of any specific political force. Members of public Cossack organizations who have not registered can be members of parties,” the ataman said in an interview with the Oblastnaya Gazeta. The Council of Atamans of the largest All-Russian public organization, the Union of Cossacks, made the following decision in its Resolution of 09.09.12:

1. Consider the creation of a Cossack political party in modern conditions to be inappropriate and harmful for the Cossack movement in Russia.

2. Atamans and Cossacks of the All-Russian public organization “Union of Cossacks” to support the decision of the Ataman Board of the Union of Cossacks of Russia, not to participate in events to create a Cossack political party, not to join this party, not to delegate Cossacks to the congress of the Cossack party.”

As for the ordinary Cossacks, their opinions were divided into three main groups;

The first, most noticeable, included those who completely deny the need for Cossacks to participate in any political parties.

The second group includes those who consider it possible to participate in political parties, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

And finally, thirdly, those who believe that it is necessary to try to correct the initial mistakes that were made, as they believe, during the creation of the party and try to transform it into a genuine political body for defending the interests of the Cossacks.

Several initial miscalculations are cited. First and foremost, the party's unfortunate name—the Communist Party of the Russian Federation—evokes associations with the Communist Party of the Soviet era, whose leaders committed genocide against the Cossacks, leading to the extermination of over 2 million Cossacks in Russia.

Another miscalculation, in their view, was the election of a non-Cossack as the leader of the Cossack Party, who was accepted into the Cossack society after the congress. Another miscalculation was the uncritical approach to selecting delegates to the party's

founding congress. As a result, people who were either far removed from the Cossack faith or had compromised their identities with the Cossacks were selected. Complaints were also raised about the lack of transparency in the preparation of the congress and the fact that the party charter was drafted without broad discussion or consideration of the Cossacks' opinions.

Confusion among both supporters and opponents of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was caused by a statement made by A.D. Beglov, Chairman of the Presidential Council for Cossack Affairs, on December 4, 2012, during a meeting with atamans of registered Cossack societies in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. In it, Aleksandr Dmitrievich stated that the creation of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was the Cossacks' response to the Don Cossacks' initiative, expressed in response to the election of a communist as mayor of the Don capital. “And this Cossack party is the first to fight, and will fight, the communists. For real. Because they are ideological enemies, simply put.”

At the international conference “Cossacks as a Factor in Interethnic Stability” held on December 8, 2012, in the Grand Conference Hall of the Moscow Government Complex, Oleg Gubenko, a member of the Stavropol Krai Duma and a Terek Cossack, commented on this matter: “You all understand well how this new party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, was created. It was not created for the development of the Cossacks. Not to establish the principles I speak of, the ones I dream of, and my heart aches for that. It was created as an anti-communist party. It was clearly stated by some of our leaders, members of the Presidential Council, that the Cossacks must now truly fight the Communist Party. Listen, we ourselves must now decide who to fight and who to befriend. This is our internal affair. And it is not for anyone from above to dictate to us who our enemies are and who our friends are. We'll figure it out ourselves somehow...”

We believe that the current situation around the Cossack Party of the Russian Federation is an indicator of the development of the Cossacks and the entire civil society. We are convinced that a Cossack political party in the current conditions is a necessary element of the development of the Cossacks. We do not undertake to declare that this should be a created political party, perhaps it is necessary to adopt a decision of the entire Cossack community to create such a political institution, however, in the current conditions this will be extremely difficult.

With all this, the Cossack party (created in the future or existing today) can and should perform a very important function, along with the development of civil society - this is the increase of legal culture and electoral activity of modern Russian youth.

A fundamental change in the attitude of young people to politics, to the institution of elections is

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possible only when young people themselves feel like real participants and subjects of transformation processes in our country. The leadership of modern Russian parties clearly understand that expanding the participation of young people in the political, economic and cultural development of the country is the first and necessary step towards the formation of a stable civil society in the country. This is a way of forming relationships between young people, society and the government. In addition, this creates opportunities for young people to assume responsibility for the development of their country and society as a whole.

Each political party at a certain stage comes to the discovery of the importance of youth policy in a different way, however, there are three reasons that make youth policy a universal political technology. Among these reasons, it is worth noting: the significant electoral potential of youth; the attractive image of youth as a subject of the future; the specific nature of political mobilization of youth.

The importance of the parties' work with young people is, first of all, that it represents one of the most numerous, but also the most problematic segments of the electoral field. Over the last 3-4 years, all leading Russian parties have begun to form an effective, not nominal, youth policy, with the goal of not only attracting young people as passive participants in the political process, but also creating conditions for their political self-realization and real entry into power. Parties for young people are increasingly becoming not only institutions of political socialization, but also channels for career growth and a kind of social elevator.

The role of modern parties is most significant in shaping the political preferences of young people and their electoral orientations.

Today, Russian parties focus their youth policy on working in several areas:

- participate in the organization and implementation of special political projects related to raising the level of political culture of young people with the help of "teenager socialization" programs, organizing political courses and seminars for young people, and holding business games ("children's elections," "youth mayor's office," "youth parliament"). Within the framework of these same projects, "non-political" student organizations are emerging in universities;

- create conditions for the inclusion of young people in the electoral process, including inclusion in the electoral lists of candidates;

- create their own youth organizations or interact with existing ones.

Russian parties have taken several paths in this direction. Some parties have established their own youth organizations (for example, the CPRF – Union of Communist Youth of the Russian Federation, A

Just Russia – Young Socialists of Russia, the LDPR – Time of the Young, and United Russia – Young Guard of United Russia), while others have begun to collaborate with independent youth organizations.

A study of youth political attitudes shows that young people in the country are gradually acquiring civic responsibility. This underscores the growing importance of global, state-oriented models of influencing youth.

Modern Russian youth is heterogeneous both in the nature of political participation and in its content. On the one hand, we have a group of young people who already have established political views and convictions. This group, although not numerous, is distinguished by its independence of judgment (and not only in the political sphere). It is less inclined to be led; on the contrary, it rather represents a personnel reserve for the "adult party elite". On the other hand, a more numerous group consists of those who vote in cases where one or another political force manages to really strongly affect their interests, somehow encourage them to participate in elections. This can be facilitated by the emergence of a bright party leader who captivates young people with his unconventional image and behavior. The extended transitional state of young people to "adulthood" is characterized by differences in their social experience, behavioral stereotypes and, accordingly, civic responsibility, differences in the degree of conformism and nonconformism, and the stability of the formation of reference groups. Hence, the factor of differentiation of political technologies into those that are effective for all youth and those that are intended for specific segments is significant.

We must strive to ensure that young people possess the great potential of a legal culture, which presupposes, first and foremost, legal education—that is, knowledge of the fundamentals of the law and the ability to apply it in specific life situations. For every young person, coming of age is a time of developing life principles, a time of boundless energy and a thirst for achievement. It is a new stage in their journey, when they must study, work, and bear responsibility for their actions.

Russian political parties of all ideological persuasions have recently been increasingly focusing on young activists and potential allies among the generation entering adulthood. Transforming this phenomenon into a sustainable and meaningful process requires defining political parties' youth policy as a top strategic priority and developing and implementing a comprehensive set of youth political strategies. Channeling youth political activity into constructive rather than destructive channels and organizing a smooth and organic entry of young people into politics—this is the task that the Cossack party in Russia must face.

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